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The Supreme Court of Canada is the court of final appellate jmisdiction in this
country. Its decisions govem the day-to-day legal discourse in Canadian society. Thejudicial
h c t i o n has undergone a drarnatic change since the advent of the Canadian Chmter of Righrs
and Freedoms, and the inauguration of constitutional supremacy in a country where, prior to
1982, judicial deference to the concept of parliamentary supremacy was the nom. Yet, these
two coflstitutional principles-coasfitutionai supremacy and parliamentary suprernacy-should

not be treated as antagonistic. Rather, they are both integral to the type of criminaljustice
system evolving in Canada The task for the Supreme Court of Canada since its elevation as
constitutionalarbiter has been to h d the balance between these two constitutional doctrines.
It must do so within the limits prescribed by the judicial function.

What are those limits in the context of criminal law? The definitional elements of the
offence; the political and legal theory of classical liberalism; the Charter's constitutionai, as
opposed to statutory, character; the primacy of either crime control or due process values in
judicid decision-making; the fluctuating balance in the criminal process between the
influence of constitutional supremacy and parliamentary supremacy; the flexibility of the
foundational principles of judicial independence and judicial impartiality; and, finally,
prevailing societal n o m . In this thesis it has been argued that there is a reciprocd normative
relationship between the criminal process and society. Decision-makingat the SupremeCourt
of Canada filters prevailing societai n o m to conform to constitutional values-herein lies the

process of readjustment between the criminal law and society at large.

To explore the lllnits of the judicial function at work, an analysis of case law
emanating fiom the Supreme Court of Canada, pdcularly, but not exclusively, in the law of
homicide had been undertaken. It is a premise of this work that the professional and academic
dimensions of the criminal law cannot be imderstood in isolation of each other. Rather than
approach the judicid function in an abstract manner, its iirnits have been reveaied and
expiored through case law analysis. This gives the analysis imrnediacy to both academics and
practitioners in their attempts to understand the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to
constitutional adjudication in the field of criminal law.
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Chapter One: Introduction

The Supreme Court of Canada and the Adversarial System
Thuty years ago Professor Paul Weiler, writing about the process of judicial decision-

making, observed: "The philosophy of the judicial process will soon be of great practicai
significance for the Canadian legal scene. The traditional, inarticulate, legal positivism of

Canadian lawyers and judges is rapidly becoming outmoded ..."' How prophetic his words
seem in post-Charte9 criminal law where the judiciary and the judicial hction, especiaiiy
at the Supreme Court of Canada level, are the subject of unpardeled scrutiny and cnticism.

The adversarial system of criminal justice forms the background to the Supreme Court of
Canada's new role as Guardian of the Constitution and, like the Court itself, has been the
subject of extensive academic comment. The focus of this thesis will be the changing nature
of the judicial function in the context of criminal law, particuiarly at the Supreme Court of

Canada level; however, such an analysis neceuitates a basic understanding of the adversaial
context in which that fuaction has evolved.

In R. v. Swaid, Lamer C.J.C.found that the Supreme Court of Canada had, in past

'Paul Weiler "Two Models of Judiciai Decision-Making" (1968) 46 Can. Bar Rev.
406.

'Canadian Charter of Rights a& Freedm,, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedde B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Chmter].
3[1991] 1 S.C.R.933,63 C.C.C. (3d) 481,5 C.R.(4th) 253 [hereinafterSwain cited
to C.R.].See also R v. S-(RD.),
[1997] 3 S.C.R 484. 118 C.C.C. (3d) 353,lO C.R. (5th) 1
[hereioafter S.(RD.) cited to C.C.C.] at 364 where Justice Major in dissent-Çhief Justice
Lamer and Justice Sopinka concurring-writes: "The bedrock of our jurisprudence is the
adversary system. Cruninal prosecutions are less adversarial because of the Crown's duty to

decisions, "recognized the constn~ctsof the adversarial system as a bdamentd part of our
legal system.'" He cited with approval Professor Weiler's characterizationof the adversarial
process:
An adversary process is one which satisfies, more or less, this factual

description: as a prelude to the dispute king solved, the interested parties
have the opportunity of adducing evidence (or proof) and making arguments
to a disinterested and impartial arbiter who decides the case on the basis of
this evidence and these arguments. This is by conwith the public
processes of decision by 'legitimated power' and 'mediation-agreement',
where the guaranteed pnvate modes of participation are voting and negotiation
respectively. Adjudication is distinctive because it guarantees to each of the
parties who are af5ected the right to prepare for themselves the representations
on the basis of which their dispute is to be resolved.'
Botnotes omitted]
Effective preparation for an adversarial criminal contest aiso requires that the d e s by which
the Court will adjudicate the dispute are ascertainable beforehand by the parties concemed.
Chief Justice Larner concluded that '%e principles of fiindamental justice contemplate an
accusatorial and adversarial system of crimiaal justice which is founded on respect for the
autonomy and dignity of human beings ...'* Its foundational principle is the presurnption of
innocence.
At common Law, the presumption of innocence is referred to as the golden thead

present al1 the evidence fairly. The system depends on each side's producing facts by way
of evidence from which the court decides the issues. Our system ...does not permit a judge
to become an independent investigator to seek out the facts." For a detailed discussion of
R.(SB.) relative to the issue of judicial impartiality see i n f i at 60-71.
'SwainYsupra note 3 at 280.
~ e i l e rsupra
,
note 1 at 4 12 cited in Swain, supra note 3 at 28 1.
%wuin, supra note 3 at 28 1.

ninning throughout the English criminal law: Woohington v. Director of Public
Prosecutionr? In Canada, the common law presumption of innocence has been entrenched
under S. 1l(d) of the Charter. A A trial ought not, therefore, to be perceived as an

exercise in establishg the accused's innocence as he or she is presumed innocent nom the
outset. Rather, it is an adversarial contest in which the Crown seeks to prove the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt To speak of detemiining the g d t or innocence of the

accused, therefore, is flawed when, in fact, the accused's innocence is the operating premise
upon which the trial proceeds.
The conceptualizationof the criminal trial as an adversariai contest between the State
and the Individual emphasizes the liberal underpinnings of the Canadian criminal justice

system.'

However, since the inception of the Charter, there has been growing discontent

with a bipartite triai proces? Third party interests vying for legitimacy in trial proceedings

'[l935] A.C. 462 (H.L.) at 48 1.

'See Peter H. Russell, The Judiciary In Canada: n e Third Branch Of Government
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 25 where the author h e s :
Insofar as the adversary system practised in most Canadian courts puts
a premium on the rights and responsibilities of the litigants in the process of
judicial decision-making, it reflects a strong cornmitment to individualism.
Such a system tends to assume that the individuals (or their professional
representatives) whose rights are at stake should be in the best position to
ascertain the strongest arguments with which to support their respective
daims. At the philosophicul core of such a system is the perception that a
person is the berner andpnrdentpreserverof individuuirights. An emphasis
on the rights of the individual is evident in numerous other procedural
features of ourjudicial system, nota&&thepresumption of innocence and the
requirement ofproof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials.
[Ernphasis added]
See Aian Young "Adversarial Justice and the Charter of Rights: Stunting the
Growth of the 'Living Tree"' (1997) 39 C.L.Q.362. And see Jamie Cameron "Tradition and

do so against a predomiuantly libeml philosophical background.'*
It is not the purpose of this paper to resolve the tension between the concept of a
criminal trial as a contest between the accused and the Crown, in pursuit of the truth," and

growing demands to make room for third parties, such as victims, in the adversarial context.
This aside, a note of caution is warranted. The inclusion of third parties in advermial
proceedings where the accused's innocence is under attack ought to be approached with
restraint.12 It is not the third party whose liberty is at stake and who faces criminai sanction

Change Under the Charter:The Adversary System, Third Party Interests and The Legitimacy
of CriminaiJustice in Canada" in Jarnie Carneron, ed., The Charter 'sImpact on the Criminal
Jurtice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 2 17.
'"Third party or victim interests are not ignored in the current criminai process. Don
Shiarf Charter Justice In CPnadan Criminal Law, 2d ed. (Ontario: Carswell, 1996)
[hereinafter Charrer Justice] writes (at 35):
Legislative changes to better protect interests of victims have included rape
shield laws, greater restitution provisions, fine surchargeproto support
victim services, provisions for bans on publicity of the identity of victims,
written victim impact statements on sentencing and victirn input into parole
decisions.
"See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Procedwe [Report 321
(Ottawa: Supply and SeMces Canada, 1988) at 9-13. Speaking of the pursuit of tmth in the
trial process, and the impact of criminal procedure on that pursuit, the commissioners stated
(at 10): "The truth is one thing; the law has regard for other values as well. A whole network
of procedural and evidentiary d e s exists to regulate and modulate the workings of the
criminaljustice system and thus secure the end of fundamentaljustice. The manner Ni which
Canadian criminal process pursues its purposes is therefore best described as a qualified
semch for mth." The commissioners maintain (at 9) that juxtaposed to the quest for tmth
are concerns for "human dignity (a notion which is broad enough to encompass the
protection of society and the prese~ationof peace), and protection against the risk of
convicting innocent persans."
I2SeeDon Stuart "Charter Protection Against Law and Order, Victims' Rights
and Equality Rhetoric" in Jamie Carneron, ed., The Chmter 's Impact on the Criminal
Jwtice Sysrem (Toronto: Carswell. 1996) at 327.

for wrongdoing. It is the accused.
Often what is overlooked in the debate over the extent of third party participation in
the actuai determination of guilt is the role of the Crown Attorney. He or she is responsible
for the public interest in its many facets, and, in this capacity, for third party interests:

Crown Attorneys in Nova Scotia are responsible ... for the conduct of
prosecutions. The conduct of a prosecution involves not only the conduct of
the trial itseif but a myriad of other activities essential to a fair prosecution.
Crown Attorneys therefore conduct arraignments, show cause (bail) hearings,
prelimhary inquiries, sentencings, appeals ...disposition and review hearings
before the Criminal Code Review Board, and fataiity inquiries. In addition,
they provide pre-charge advice to the police and provincial govemment
enforcement officials, participate in the formulation of policy advice on the
criminal law, participate in management activities aimed at improving the
delivery of prosecutorial s e ~ c e to
s our cor~ll~lunity,
prepare professional
papers, and conduct and participate in public speaking engagements. In short,
they discharge a number of responsibilities of fundamental importanceto our
cornrnunity.
In discharging these responsibilities, a Crown Attorney must be guided
by the law, codes of professional ethics, and the public interest. The public
interest involves many consideratiom. It encompasses the need toprotect the
ovenvheiming percentage of lawdbiding citizens through the conviction of
criminals and the detemence of crime. ...
The notion that dl accused should receive fair and equal prosecutorial
treatment by the Crown is an aspect of the d e of law. Canada'sjudicial
system operates on an adversarial triai model. It is left up to the parties to
fiame the issues before the court and Iead the evidence relied on in support
of their case. The role of defence counsel in this mode[ is to do everything that
c m be ethically done to secure an acquittaifor an accused who has chosen
to plead not guilty. The role of the Crown Attorney excludes uny notion of
w inning or Zosing.I3
[Emphasis added]

The Crown Attorney's role "excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter
of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal

%blic Prosecution Senrice,Annud Report (Septeder 1,1993 to March 3 1,1997)
(Halifax: Nova Scotia Govemment Printer, 1997) at 1S.

The judiciary of the Supreme Court of Canada approaches its adjudicative task in the
context of an adversarial tradition where Iiberalism's emphasis on the individual is a primary
influence.
As a third party deciding a dispute about legal rights, the judge should not
render his decision without first allowing each of the p d e s to put forward its
side of the case. If there is no opportunity for one or the other side to make its

subrnissions and counter those of its adversary, or if the judge's decision is
based on considerations exîraneous to the arguments of the parties, the
adjudicative process will appear to be less a process for irnpartially and
objectivety settüng disputes about legal rights than a device for imposing the
wiU of the judge and the politicai forces with which he seems to be aligned."
~ o o m o t e omitted]
s
Meeting the criteria of impartiality and objectivity in post-Charter Canada is particularly
dauuting given the stratifie& heterogeneous and multi-cultural society in which we live. Yet
the task is not impossible. b f a r as discretion-as

distinct nom unfettered

subjectivity-Worms subjective influences, the human dimension of the j udicial function
becornes an invaluable tool of individualized justice?

'4Boucher v. Her Majesîy The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16 at 24. However, this
understanding of the C r o w role does not aiways correspond to that of actud practice. See
for example the dissenting reasons of McLachIin and Major JJ. in R v. C m a g h Inc., [1997l
1 S.C.R. 537, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 481,5 C.R. (5th) 291 at 299-329 bereinafter Westray cited
to C.R]. At 326-327 the Justices wrote: "The present case is not simply about Crown nondisclosure. This case is about the appeanuice of justice. ... The entire proceedings were
tainted by prosecuton who were playing to an enraged public, and playing to win. ...To win
is not the role of the prosecutor, to w h at al1 costs is an f i o n t to the Canadian justice
system."
15Russe11,supra note 8 at 25.
I6See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionmy Justice (Louisiana: Louisiana State
University Press, 1969).

The tripartite relationship between the Charrer. the criminal law, and the judicial
fiinction, as revealed through an anaiysis of case law issuing fiom the Supreme Court of
Canada, shall be explored in later chapters. The prirnary focus shall be on the evolving nature

of the judicial hction, and the consequences of that evolution for the law of homicide. In
short, the question to be addressed is as follows: What are the operational Iimits of thejudicial
h c t i o n in pst-Charter criminal law as revealed through an analysis of case law emanating
fiom the Supreme Court of Canada, padcularly, but not exclusively, in the area of homicide?

This question presupposes an examination of the adjudicative fiuiction against a
broader theoretical background. Law is neither created, hterpreted nor applied in a vacuum.

"Legal change reflects an intemal dynamic, which, nevertheless, is affected by extenial stimuli
and, in tum, influences the external environment."'' Likewise, the judicial function does not

evolve in isolation fiom its broader theoretical context. In Chapter 2 that broader theoretical
context will be explored including the implications for the judicial hction of Canada's
political designation as a democracy; the predominantly liberal ideology infonning our
democratic institutions and constitutional documents; the predominance of either crime
control or due process values in the criminal process; and the human dimension of judicial
decision-making.
Both the law and the judicial adjudicative fiinction are perceived as king influenced
by the external environment, but in a self-adjusting rather than a simply reactive manner."

"Gunther Teubner "Substantive And Reflexive Elements In Modem Law" (1983)
17 Law & Society Rev. 239 at 239.

laThe ensuing discussion concemhg the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in
facilitating, through decision-making, a reciprocal adjustment between itself, the criminal
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In tum, the social environment, itself, undergoes readjustment. Thus, one possible goal of the
criminaijustice system in a stratifie4 heterogenous and muiti-cdtuml post-Charter Canada
is to facilitate, perhaps even coordinate, the process of muhial readjustment between the
criminal law and society. The common ground underpinuhg Herbert Packer's two models
of the criminal process could be seen as providing the foci of adjustment for both society and
the legal system.I9 Limiting the criminal investigatory powers of the State, for instance, is an
exercise in balancing the pnvacy interest of not only accused persons, but of socieîy at large,
as against the superior resources of the govemment. Cornpliance with the Charter and

Charter values at the executive, legislative and judicial levels of government also facilitates
the concept of the c r i m a justice system as an adjusting influence rather than a coercive

law and prevailing societal or community values derives fiom Teubner's, supra note 17,
articulation of "reflexive law" as the outcorne of evolutionary change in law and society
The author States (at 242):
From this juxtaposition of dflerent but overlapping approaches [to law and
society posited by German and Amencan neo-evolutionary theones], 1
develop a new perspective on the process of legd and social change that
pemits me to point to a new "evolutionary" stage of Law, which 1 cal1
"reflexive law." This stage, in which law becomes a system for the
coordination of action within and between semi-autonomous social
subsystems, can be seen as an emerging but as yet unrealized possibility, and
the process of transition to a tnily "reflexive" law can be analyzed.
Teubner ( at 270-273) sees the evolution of reflexive law in the context of "fwictionally
differentiated societies" characterized by "specialized social subsystems".
Similarly, the need to perceive the Supreme Court of Canada fiom a different
perspective is a consequence of the litigious rnulti-dimensional and multi-culturai society
which Canada has become, particularly since the Charter's inception. Homogeneity no
longer being the reality, the Supreme Court of Canada is compelled to re-assess its
adjudicatory role insofar as it is involved in the constitutionalization of values.

The Suprerne Court of Canada should not be seen as an isolated entity thnistllig its
vision of Canadian society on an unsuspecting public. Rather, it is the filterer of norms, but

within the context of constitutional and criminal law principles. And herein lies the mb. The
Supreme Court of Canada is not-and should not-be a resultsriented body where the facts of
the case determine the outcorne. Rather, the focus should be on the principles of criminal
liability? Has the presumption of innocence been respected? Has the Crown proven guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt? Has the accused's right to a fair trial been respected? Has the
substantive criminal law been interpreted and applied in a fair manner which respects the
principle of the nile of law?= While some may decry decisions of the Supreme Court of

'O~ee"Theory of the Charter", n
i*

note 64 and accompanying text. And see Peter
Hogg and Aiiison Bushell "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures" ((1997)
35 Osgoode Hall L.J.75.
" ~ h eissue of criminal liability is not novel. However, exploring the theoretical
foundations of criminal liability is a resurgent trend in criminal law theory. See George
Fletcher "The Rise and Fall of Criminal Law Theory" (1998) 1 Buffalo Crim. L. R. 275.
%ee Our CriminalProcedure, supra note 1 1 at 7-8 where the commissioners discuss
the distinction between procedural and substantive law.
Substantive law reflects the legislature's posture with regard to a
particular social policy issue. It is substantive law which mirrors the decision
to label certain activity as criminal. ... By contrast, procedural law provides
the surrounding d e s regulating the inquiry (whether at the police
investigatory stage or a trial) into whether a violation of the substantive law
has occurred,
While procedural law simpliciter is unable to control the content of
substantive legislation, constitutional law is potentialiy able to do so. Where
the Constitution contains express provisions, as ours does, protecting
fundamental fkeedoms or legal nghts, it may be wielded in such a manner as
to prevent an invasion of the liberty of the individual by govemment or its
agencies. This hold true regardless of whether the violation of the right or
fieedom has been accommodated by either the substantiveor procedural law.
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Canada, the grim reality is this: by conceclhg rights to the most despicable offenders accused

of the most heinous crimes, only then will rights be secured for di. Undoubtedly, there is a
tension between the confidence of the majority in the criminal justice system and the

individual rights of the accused. But the balance must not be decided in the capricious court
of public opinion. It must be decided k u g h the ongoing assessrnent of basic criminal law
principles and values necessitated by the Charter's mandate that the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. Respect for the rule of law, in turn, minimizes the risk of convicting
the innocent and acquithg the puilty.
It is a working premise of this work that the theoretical h e w o r k introduced in
Chapter 2 cannot be appreciated divorced fkom the actuai practice of criminal law, hence the
subject matter of Chapter 3-the law of homicide? The language and practice of the trial and

[Footnotes ornittedl [Emphasis added]

%ee Nicola Lacey "Philosophy, History and Criminal LawTheory" (1998) 1 Buffalo
L. Rev. 275. The author (at 303-304) suggests an interpretive approach to crimllial law
theory:
An excellent illustration of the complex relationship between the
normative and other aspects of legal theory may be drawn fiom Jules
Coleman's work of tort theory. Coleman introduces Risks and Wrongs by
announcing that "[tlhis book is a book about liberai political, moral and legal
theory." This immediately suggests that his enterprise is normative-part of
liberal political philosophy. But over the next few pages it becomes clear that
this is far fiom king the case:
We cm distinguish among at least two ways of approaching
this sort of explanatory inquiry. The fïrst kind of explanatory
approach adopts what 1 will cal1 a 'Yop-down" strategy. In
top-dom explamtions, the theorist begins with what she
takes to be the set of n o m that would gain out reflective
acceptance, at least among those practitioners who adopt the
intemal point of view. Then she looks at the body of law she
seeks to understand and tries to reconstruct it piausibly as
exempiifying those n o m . In contrast to the topdown

appellate courtrooms is determineci, in large measure, by the S u p m e Court of Canada. The
governing politicai, moral and legal values and assumptions implicit in those judgmentsy in
tum, influence day-to-day legai discourse. As well, those values and assumptions fuel

academic reaction to the Supreme Court of Canada's stewardship of the criminai justice

approach, one can work fiom the middle up. In midme-level
theory, the theorist immerses hersef i i n the practice ifseIfand
aFkr if it c m be usefil& organized in ways that reject a
cornmitment to one or more plausible principles. mis
opproach seekr to identia the principles that m e condakztes
and those aspects of the practice that reflect them.
For Coleman, then, the differentiation between normative and anaiytic
projects is muddied because both middle-leveI theory and top-down theory
are conceived as part of an essentially explanatory project. What Coleman is
expressing here is what Ishall term an interpretive conception; the idea that
explanatory projects around law are always going to be informed by the
values which are immanent within a particuIar set of legal institutions and
practices.
[Emphasis added] Footnotes ornittedl
Building on this interpretive conception, Professor Lacey States (at 309):
Moreover, I would argue that theorists of criminai law-whether
lawyers or philosophers-who seek to develop theories which answer to the
contours of achial practices of criminal law are, inevitably even if implicitly,
engaged in the sort of interpretive enterprise which I have already suggested
is the best way of understanding Coleman's concept of middle-level theory.
The idea of linking theory to practice-albeit not in a purely interpretive style-and developing
a position on p ~ c i p l e derived
s
fiom the analysis is central to this paper.
2 4 ~ eFletcher,
e
supra note 2 1 at 293-294 where the author underscores the importance
of moral and political philosophy for an understanding of the principles of criminal liability:
Skepticism both about the distinction between acts and omissions and about
the distinctionbetween attempts and completed crimes derives fiom the same
root misconception. Both are premised on a dubious moral theo~ythat makes
bad intentions to be the core of immoral conduct This view of morality
would be iafluential ody if theorists c o d t t e d the additional rnistake of
failing to integrate political theory into their views of just punishment.
It should be clear, 1 think, that the fuhw of criminal theory rests on
an adequate appreciation of both moral and political philosophy. It is &er
al1 the state that seeks to inflict punishment. Without a view about the proper
relationship of the state to its citkens, mord theones about crime and
punishment can lead us astray.
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systern. For example, the IndividuaUState divide, ceneal to traditional liberal ideology, is
explored in Hunter v. Southm Inc.? a non-homicide case which later influenced the 1997
decisions in Feeney 26 and ~tiIIrnan7two murder conviction appeais to the Supreme Court
of Canada These cases generated a wealth of academic response, sent a message to policing
authoritiesthat, as agents of the State, they wili be bound by strict guidelinesbefore infihging
the accused's privacy interest, and prompted legislative reaction h m Parliament, itself. Thus,
by examining legai theory in the context of adversarial criminal practice, the various State and
private players can appreciate better their respective positions vis-a-vis the criminal law.
Disparate views at least would have in common an identifiable starting point-the bipartite
adversarial criminal trial and the prevailing law as articulated by the Supreme Court of

Canada.
Chapter 3 examines the judicial fiinction in action in the law of homicide. The tension
between constitutional supremacy and parliamentarysupremacy,as operative principles in our
liberal democracy, is the focal point of the analysis. The shift fkom judicial deference to
legislative bodies in favour of judicial activism under the Charter, and the implications for
the criminal justice system, will be explored in both Chapters 3 and 4.
This is not a treatise on the criminal law nor on the law of homicide. It is a focussed

attempt to bring order to the chaos of academic and public criticism of the Supreme Court of

13

Canadat8by highlighting what may be perceived as the major forces governing their decisionmaking process. The Chmter has thnist the Supreme Court of Canada into "un-Chmtered"

waters. In efféct, not ody must the Chwter be intmduced to the criminal law, but dso the
crimllial law must be introduced to the Charter.

28Thisis not to Say that the Supreme Court of Canada was immune h m criticism
prior to 1982. See, for example, Paul Weiler, In The Las Resort (Toronto: Carswell, 1974)
[hereinafter Last Resort]. At 235 he writes:
Underlying this litany of cornplaints is one basic theme: our Supreme
Court is unduly onented to the task of adjudicating the concrete dispute
before it and, as a resuit, it exhibits much too nanow a conception of legal
reasoning to do justice to the important legal policies it is setting for the
Canadianpolity. These are the hdamental attitudes which must be changed
if we are to secure a better quality of judging fiom the Supreme Court of
Canada.

Chapter 2

The Supreme Court of Canada:
Exploring the Operationai Limits of Judicial Activity
The Supreme Court of Canada operates within a Liberal democracy. Of principal
importance to the judicial fûnction is the relationship between elected legislative bodies and
the courts. The lMiits of the judicial b c t i o n ui criminal law must be understood in that

context with its attendant ideological underpinnings.
The principle of parliamentary supremacy derives from the preamble to the

Comtitution Act, 1867 and connotes a constitutional legai system in which Parliament,

through its criminal law power, is subject to the Courts ody insofar as it exceeds its
jurisdiction under the federal division of power~.*~Judicial deference to legislative
pronouncements had been the nom in Canada prior to the advent of the Charter despite the
~ of federal legislation enacted in 1960.
operation of the Canadian Bill of R i g h ~ sa, ~piece
Perhaps the most notable exception was the case of R. v. Drybone~.~'
In deciding that federal
legislation making it an offence for an hdian to be intoxicated off a reserve violated the

29SeeDouglas A. Schmeiser 'The Case Against Entrenchment of a Canadian Bi11 of
Rights" ( 1 973) 1 Dal. L.J. 15 at 15-1 8.

"S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III [hereinafter the Bill of Rights].

"(1969), [1970] S.C.R 282, 10 C.R.N.S. 334, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 355 Dereinder
Drybones cited to C.R.N.S.]. The accused, a First Nations man living in the Northwest
Temtories, was convicted of being intoxicated off a reserve, a crime specific to native
peoples under then existing federal legislation.

equality provision of the Bill of R i g h J 2Ritchie J. for a majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the Bill of Rights was more than a canon for the construction of federal
statutes. It was, (and continues to be), "a statutory declaration of the fiindamental human
nghts and fieedoms which it recognizes ..."." Substantive review of legislation became a

rec 15ogoized possibility, particularly with Chief Justice Laskin's later characterizationof the
Bill of Righls as a quasi-constitutional document?" Referring to the Drybones case, one
author noted:
Suddenly everything seemed changed when the Supreme Court
decided Drybones in late 1969. Here the Court was directly confionted with
the issue of the precise legal impact of a Bill of Rights ... The judges seized
the opportunity to came out a visible and full fledged judicial role as the
protector of our civil liberties aga% Parliamentary intrusi~n.'~

"Section 1 (b) states:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed
and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fiindamental
fieedoms, namely,
a..

(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the
protection of the law;

33Drybones,supra note 3 1 at 343.
34SeeR. v. Hogan (1 974), [1975] 2 S.C.R.574,18 C.C.C. (2d) 65,26 C.R.N.S.207
[hereinafter cited to S.C.R.]where Laskin, C.J.C., speahg in dissent, wrote (at 597): "The
Canadian Bill of Rights is a haK=wayhouse between a purely common law regirne and a
constihitionai one; it may aptly be described as a quasi-constitutional instrument. It does not
embody any sanctions for the enforcement of its terms, but it must be the fiuiction of the
Courts to provide them in the light of the judicial review of the impact of that enactment.
The Drybones case has established what the impact is, and 1have no reason to depart f b m
the position there taken." The Supreme Court of Canada's continuing conservatism in its
adjudicative h c t i o n under the Bill of Righrs often lefi Laskin C.J. in dissent.
"Lmt Resort, supra note 28 at 195.

Yet, this initial promise did not mature, and the Supreme Court of Canada retreated fiom its
activist stance.36
Constitutional developments in 1982 changed this perspective. Whereas the Bill of
Rights had been a federal statute applicable only to federal legi~lation,'~
the Charter had

constitutional status. Professor Hogg, writing of the shift h m a statutory to a coIiSfitutiona1
guarantee of fùndarnental rights and freedoms observes: "The restraint that led the Courts to
defer to the legislative choices that were presented forjudicial review under the Bill of Rights
has not continued under the Charter. The Courts have assumed that the constitutional status
of the Charter resolves their former uncertainty as to the legitimacy ofjudicial review.'"' The

source ofthat uncertainty derived, in part, fiom Canada's political institutions and culture, and
is equally as topical in current academic commentary on the Supreme Court of Canada's
application of the Charter in a stratifie4 multi-cultural Liberal democracy. The old analysis
still has some relevance, especially the ongoing tension between the principle of parliamentq
supremacy and the role of an appointed court in Canadian democracy:

%ee Charter Jurtice, supra note 10 at 426 where Stuart, referring to Drybones as a
"landmark decision" writes: "However, Drybones was subsequently distinguished by the
Court in two controversial decisioas. ... Canada (A.G.) v. Lave11 (1974) ... [and] BIiss v.
Canada (A. G.) (1979) ..."[F ootnotes omitted]. See also Peter Hogg, ComtitutionaI Law of
Canada, 4th ed. (Ontario: Carswell, 1997) (Loose-le@ at 32- 1 1 where the author observes:
"In the 22 years that elapsed between the Bill's enactment in 1960 and the Charter's adoption
in 1982, the Drybones case was the only one in which the Suprerne Court of Canada held a
statute to be inoperative for breach of the Bill." pootnotes omitted].
S. 2 of the Bill of Rights implies that it is applicable to "every law in
37~lthough
Canada", that phrase is qualified under S. S(2) to refer to federal legislation,d e s , orders, and
regdations only.

" ~ o g g ,supra note 36 at 32-1 1.

Before considering Drybones we mtïst eramine the Cmadian setting
in which it appems. We know that provincial and f e d d legislative
jurisdiction is delineated in ss. 91 and 92 of the British North America Act;
that there is no Bill of Rights entrenched in o u .constitution, a s in the United
States, and if it were entrenched in our constitution, considering our many
problems conceming amendment of out constitution, it is easy to foresee grave
problems arising should we ever wish to amend it, as, for example, to conform
to the needs of a changed and changing society; that our Govemment operates
on the basis that the elected majority will d e , and the Govemment is
representative and responsible; Parliament is supreme, hence any federal
enactment, including the Canadian Bill of Rights, can be abrogated or
amended (and we do not have a division of the legidative, executive, and
judiciai branches, nor do we have a system of checks-and balances [sic], as in
the United States); and the Supreme Court of Canada is itself a creature of
statute; and we live in a pluralistic federal community, in which Quebec does
have its own unique problems."
[Emphasis added]
Despite the aclcnowledged difficulties of achieving, let alone amending, a constitutional bill
of rights, that feat was accomplished in 1982. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Canada found

its judicial review role expanded by a legal rights document that enlarged upon its review
fmction of both the positive and the cornmon law.
The principle of constitutional supremacy, inaugurated under s.52 of the Constitution
Acr, 1982, has left the Supreme Court of Canada in an awkward position: it must now balance

the competing principles of parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy in the
decision-making process. It will be argued that the CO-existenceof these two p ~ c i p l e is
s
a constitutional reality albeit not aiways an easy one?'

The Court is trying to reconcile the

two constitutional doctrines by articulating appropriate principles of constitutionai

'Qugh W. Silvennan ''Aunotation: Dry bones: Are they aiive?" (1 970) 10 C.R.N.S.
356 at 357-358.

"('Explorationof the impact of parliamentary and constitutional supremacy in the law
of homicide will be undertaken in Chapter 3.
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adjudicationthat demarcatethe Court's review h c t i o n as distinct fiom Parliament's criminal
law policy-making responsibility.The post-Chter ideological mix impacting on thejudicial
function to be explored in this chapter wili f o m a background to the subsequent analysis of
the law of homicide. That analysis will, in tum, pivot around judicial efforts to reconcile the
Supreme Coiirt of Canada's status in a legal system where a deep-rooted tradition of

parliamentary democracy offers no quarter to the new-born principle of constitutional
supremacy.

1. The Supreme Court of Canada

The Supreme Court of Canada exercises "exclusive ultimate appellate civil and
criminal jurisdiction within and for Canada, and the judgment of the Court is, in al1 cases,
h a l and conclusive."'

Such was not always the case. Until 1949, the Supreme Court

exercised an intemediate appellate jurisdiction only. It was overshadowed by the Judicial

Cornmittee of the Privy Council in England which continued to wield nnal appellate
jurisdiction over the Dominion. Although the British North America Act, 1867 " provided,
under S. 101, that a general court of appeal coufd be created in Canada, the ongoing British

41SupremeCourt Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, S. 52. Notice that the section number
according the Supreme Court of Canada finaland exclusive appellatejurisdiction in Canada
ais0 is the same numbering given to the constitutional supremacy clause under the Charrer.

"30 & 3 1 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.)renarned the ConstitutionAct, 1867 by the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canclda Act 1982 (U.K.),1982, c. 11. For purposes of
clarity, references to the B.N.A. Act, 1867 prior to the year 1982 will not reflect the name
change.

influencemargblized the Court's relevance and stature? The Supreme Court's s u b s e ~ e n t
position to British legal institutions parallelled the status of the Dominion vis-a-vis its
colonial master?
The push for independence fiom British legal institutions initidy was not unanhous.

The relationship between this continuing appeal procedure [to the
Judicial Cornmittee of the Rivy Council] and the "general court of appeal for
Canada" contemplated by S. 101 of the 1867 constitution was a matter of
controversy. Some wanted the new Caniirfimappeal court to be a tribunal of
last resort; others sought that Privy Coiincil appeals should be preserved, both
as an alternative to any new court and as a tribunal for reviewing its decisions.
An early intimation of this division of opinion came in 1870 when, in the
House of Commons debate on a subsequently withdrawn Supreme Court bill,
a member of parliament asked whether the new court would supplant the Privy
Council, provoking a vigorously negative response from Sir John A.
MacDonald?
Footnotes omitted]

4 3 ~ eDale
e
Gibson "Development of Federal Legal and Judiciai Institutions in
Canada" (1996) 23 Man. L. J. 450 at 486 where the author &tes: "It was a forgone
conclusion that the Court's prestige would be undermined by the possibility that costconscious litigantscouid leapfrog it entirely by the per sultum procedure for appeal directly
fiom provincial courts to London's Privy Council. The Privy Council M e r eroded
confidence in the Court by overruiing it in numerous early decisions ..." See also Bora
Laskin "The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians" (1951) 29 Can.
Bar Rev. 1038 at 1038- 1040. At 1040 Professor Laskin (as he then was) wrote: How far the
intermediate position of the Court tended to its obscur@ is difficultto estimate. 1do not refer
to any obscuriîy in a professional legal sense. The Court made itself felt whenever the
opportunity offered. But it is clear that the Court has not hitherto been regarded by the public
at large as a potent element in Canadian self-government. Perhaps this is a role which a
national tribunal can essay only if it has ultimate judicial authority." See also Peter Russell
"The Political Role Of The Supreme Court of Canada In Its First Century" (1975) 53 Can.
Bar Rev. 576.
" ~ e eLaskin,supra note 43 at 1O38 where the author states: "It was a [constitutional]
system under which Canadianjudicial dependence on Imperid authority was of a piece with
Canadian subservience in both legislative and executive areas of govemment."
4SGibson,supra note 43 at 480.

Efforts to make the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions 'W and conclusive" under its
founding legislation proved unsuccessful and prerogative appeals to London continued."
However, in the field of criminal law-an exclusive federaljurisdiction under S. 9 1(27) of the
B.N.A. Act, 1867-a movement was doot to assert exclusive appellate jurisdiction for the

fledgling national court

In 1887 criminal appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were
abolished under Canadian legislation.'" Apparently, the legislativeinitiativewas prompted by
Louis Riel's appeal of his treason conviction to the Pnvy C ~ u n c i l .Like
~ Riel's appeal, the
new initiative did not survive the scruthy of the Pnvy Council, and this attempt to restrict
British influence, at least in respect of criminal appeals, was crushed by the Privy Council's
1926d i n g in Nudun v. The King49The Privy Council held that the Dominion legislation was
invalid because it purported to restrict prerogative appeals to the Crown and was, thereby,

&lbid at 481-482 where Gibson writes: "There has always been some sentiment,
strongest in Quebec, that Pnvy Council appeals should be abolished for al1types of litigation.
This had been the goal of the ineffectual restriction included in the 1875 statute establishüig
the Supreme Court of Canada, and sporadic agitation to replace it with a workable measure
continued over the years." See also Barry L. Strayer, The Canadian Constitution And The
Couris, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butierworths, 1988) at 26 where he writes: "p]uring the 75 years
after the creation of the Supreme Court, parliament] passed a number of measures with the
purpose of making its judgments W."
"See An Act to amend the lm respecting Procedure in Criminal Cases, S.C. 188687, c. 50, am. 1888-89, c. 43, S. 1.
"~ee
Strayer, supra note 46 at 26, n109. Gibson, supra note 43 at 480-48 1 concurs
but adds: "It was just as probable, however, that the change was a personal project of
minister ofjustice J.S.Thompson, who introduced the measures in parliament." pootnotes
omitted].

"[1926] A.C. 482, [1926] 2 D.L.R.177,45 C.C.C. 221 (J.C.P.C.).
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beyond the Dominion's jrnisdiction to enact. Further, the legislation confiicted with two
imperial statutes thereby violating the Colonial Luws Validiity Act. l86'i."

The result in

Nadan was a key factor leading to the imperid conference of 1926 and the resdting Balfour
Declaration "which acknowledged that the senior British colonies were independent in fact,
if not ui law, and that steps would soon be taken to make the law correspond to reality."5'

M e r a five-year interval, the Statute of Weshinister, 193 1" was enacted by the Imperial
Parliament Canada gained forma1 independence fkom Great Britain and the Colonial Laws
Imperial statutes, once a tool
ValidiityAct, 1865 no longer was applicable to the D~rninion.~
of control and domination by the Irnperial Parliament, now were applicable only at the

Dominion's express request and consent."
Seizing upon this new era of independence, the 1888 initiative in respect of criminal
appeals was resurrected, and, in 1933, a provision was added to the Criminal codeSS

*"28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (U.K.). See Hogg, note 36 at 3-3 to 3-5.
SIGibson,supra note 43 at 48 1. See also Hogg, supra note 36 at 3-4 to 3-5.
"22 Geo. V, c. 4 (Imp.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendk II, No. 27.
"See Laskin, supra note 43 at 1069. But see Bnan Slattery "The Independence of
Canada" (l983), 5 S.C.L.R.369 at 391.

%Sec Slattery, supra note 53 at 384 where the author discusses the impact of irnperial
statutes on colonies: "To understand the process by which a colony becomes independent,
it is necessary to examine more closely a basic principle of British colonial law ... The d e
States that the Imperial Parliament may legislate for British colonies overseas in any matters
whatsoever; such legislation is not only binding in the colonies but possesses ovemding
force there, so as to nullify any existing or future local laws that conflict with it."
'9n Act to amend the Criminal Code, S.C. 1932-33, c. 53, S. 17.

abolishing criminal appeds h m all courts to the Privy C ~ u n c i l .The
~ ~ legislative initiative
was upheld by the Privy Council two years later in British Cool Corporation v. The ~ i n g . ' ~

Ultimately, al1 civil and criminal appeals becarne the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of C a ~ a d a ? ~

Thus, with the 1949amendments to the Sqreme CourtAct (192 7) 59 the Court entered
adulthood, 18 years after Canada had gained formai independence from Great Britain under

the Statute of Westminister, 193 31. As the court of final appellate jurisdiction in this country,
the Supreme Court of Canada has been striving, ever since, to carve a niche for itself in the

Canadian political and legal landscape. Moreover, it is apparent b m the foregokg brief
historical description, that criminal law has been a signifcant arena for this struggle since the
early days of Codederation.
1 do not intend to delve M e r into the history of the Supreme Court of

anad da.^"

%Sec Strayer, supra note 46 at 27.
n[1935] A.C. 500,[1935] 3

D.L.R.401,64 C.C.C.

145 (J.C.P.C.).

" S ~ ~ A - Ont.
G . v.A.G. C m , [1947]A.C.127,[1947] 1 Al1E.R. 137,[1947] 1 D.L.R.
801.

s 9 ~Act
n to amend the Supreme Court Act, S.C. 1949 (2d session), c. 37, S. 3. That
section stated, in part:
3. Section fifty-four of the said Act is repeded and the following substituted
therefor :
"54. (1) The Supreme Court shall have, hold and exercise exclusive ultimate
appellate civil and criminaljurisdiction within and for Can and the judgment
of the Court shaII, in al1 cases be ilml and conclusive.
p o l d in original]
-or a detailed history of the Supreme Court of Canada's roots in English legal
institutions and principles, see W. R. Lederman "The Independence of the Judiciary" (1956)
34 Can. Bar Rev. 769. And see Martin L Friedland, A Place Apmt: JudiciaZ Independence
and Accouniobility in Cam& (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1996). For a general

SuEcient for the purposes of this work is a rudimentary understanding of the Court's
evolving statu since its creation by federal statute in 1875? Such understanding facilitates,
fiom this writer's perspective, an appreciation of the maelstrom surroundhg the Court today,

a consequence of its having gone from a position of relative obscur@ to one of unprecedented
visibility since the Charier 's inception?

11. Constitutional Supremacy in a Parüamentary Democracy
The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that Canada is to have a

history see, Gibson, supra note 43; Laskin, supra note 43; Bora Laskin "The Supreme Court
of Canada: The First One Hundred Years, A Capsule Wtutional History" (1975) 53 Can.
Bar Rev. 459; J-C. McRuer ''The Supreme Court As A National Institution" (1980) 1
S.C.L.R.467; and Hogg, supra note 36 at c. 8.

%uprerne and Erchequer Coutts Act, 1875, S.C. 1875, c. 1 1.
" ~ e eBrian Dickson "The Role and Function of Judges" (1980) 4 L. Soc. Gaz 138
at 172-73 where Justice Dickson (as he then was) writes: "Throughout its first century in
history the Supreme Court did not command public attention: itsjudges were not well-known
public figures; media coverage was meagre and often inaccurate. But this has changed ..."
See also Russell, supra note 8 at 335 where the author States:
The powerful role the Supreme Court is now assuming in Canadian
government is one for which neither the Court nor the public have had much
preparation. For most of its history the Supreme Court of Canada was a
subordinate, secondary institution. ... The Court's long penod of
underdevelopment tells us something both about the slowness of Canada to
mature as a nation and the slowness of the judiciary to acquire the stahis of
a separate branch of govemment in Canada
See dso Claire Beckton and A. Wayne MacKay, Research Coordinators, The Courts and the
Charter (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 38 where they write: "Ody in recent
years has the practical impact and the policy-mfig role of the Supreme Court of Canada
corne to the attention of the Canadian public.... It is this document [the Chorrer] which
greatly extends the policy b c t i o n of the Supreme Court of Canada and accentuates the
growing public presence of the Court." And see Peter McCormick and Ian Greene T h e
Supreme Court of Canada" in R-S.Blair and T.T. MacLeod eds., The Canadan Political
Tradition: Basic Readings, 2d ed. (Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1993) at 506-507.

"Cotlstitution sunilar in Principle to that of the United K.ingd~rn.'*~One such principle is
that of parliamentary supremacy, a principle which stands in uneasy juxtaposition to that of
constitutional supremacy heralded uuder S. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982? The heated

63SeeRefirence re Remuneration ofJudges ofthe Provincial Court of Prince E k d
Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R 3, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 193 [hereinafter the
Provincial Court Judges Case cited to C.C.C.] where Lamer C.J.C.(at 23 7-244)elaborates
the importance of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 in giving legai effect to
unwritten n o m , such as the principle of judicial independence, which complement the
written constitution itself.
"See Christopher P. Manfiedi, Judciial Power And The Chmrer (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1993) at 14 where the author states: "As a whole, section 24 of the
Charter and section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 push Canada f.urther away fiom the
tradition ofparliamentary supremacy inherited fkom Britaintoward a regime of constitutional
supremacy enforced by judicial review." He elaborates this statement M e r at 36-39 where
the author discusses the paradox of liberai constitutionalism noting (at 37): "Counter
majoritarianism and judicial finality are the very reasons why judicial review continues to
be controversial in liberal democracies." But see Bnan Slattery "A Theory Of The Charter"
(1 987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 70 1 [hereinafter "Theory of the Charter"]. This author argues
that a "Coordinate Model" of the Charter-as opposed to a "Judicial Model" which assigns
a central role to the courts-is the prefened approach. Slattery states (at 7 13):
The Coordinate Model holds that the duty to observe Charter
standards &ects every aspect of the process by which laws are enacted and
implemented, including the formation of the initial policy, the drafting of the
detailed provisions of a bill, the debates in the legislature and legislative
cornmittees, the voting of individuai members of the legislature, the cirafting
of statutory orders and reguiations, and the exercise of any powers conferred
by the statute or its regulations. In principle, every person or body involved
in this process has the responsibility to advert to Charter standards in making
decisions that fall within that person's cornpetence. ... mhere is more than
one way to Mplement Charter standards; it would be wrong to assume that
the judicial mode is the only one or the best.
And see Provincial Court Judges Case, supra note 63 at 236 where Chief Justice Lamer for
the majority &tes: "[Tlhe constitutional history of Canada can be understood, in part, as a
process of evolution 'which nias] culminated in the supremacy of a definitive written
constitution'." However, he stipulates (at 243) that "the express provisions of the
Constitution should be understood as elaborations of the underlying, unwritten and
organizing principles found in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. Even though S.
11(d) is found in the newer part of our Constitution, the Chmer, it can be understood in this
way, since the Constitution is to be read as a unined whole ..." And see Russell, supra note

debate surromding judicial adjudication under the Chcuter,and the rise of the Comt's star at
the alleged expense of elected representatives, ignores or trivializes the legislative ovemde
provisions of the ~onstitution.~~
This despite the existence of a comparable precedent in the

Bill of ~ights." Specifically, S. 33(1) of the Charter provides :
Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case rnay be, that the Act or a provision
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or
sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.

8 at 364 where the author asserts that "[a] more enduring and benign constraint on the Court
is the ambivalence of Canadians about judicial power. ... Notions of parliamentary
supremacy d l dance in our heads."

" ~ e e'Theory of the Charter", supra note 64 at 702 where the author writes:
The Charter is stdchgly different fiom the American Bill of Rights.
.,. The most notable difference is that section 33 of the Charter allows
legislatures to enact ''notwithstanding clauses" that shield statutes fiom
judicial scrutiny for confonnity with many Charter provisions. One would
have thought that this provision would figure prominentiy in any debate about
the relative roles of legislatures and courts under the Chmer. But curiously
this has not been the case. Section 33 is usually ignored or treated as an
embarrassment.
But see Russell, supra note 8 at 364 where the author asserts that s.33, '%y relieving judges
of the burden of f d t y , may encourage some to be bolder thm they might otherwise have
been. But in the long tem, for citizens as for judges, it should serve as a reminder of the
limited nature of the judicial mandate." And see Patrick Healy "hother Round O n
Intoxication" (1995) 33 C.R. (4th) 269 at 274-275 where the author, writing in response to
the Daviault decision, stated: ''Until Parliament acts, the law is that stated in Daviault. ...The
difficuity with any direct challenge to the correctness of the court's conclusion is that it
would have to be justifiable under s.1 or an exercise of parliamentary supremacy through
reliance on S. 33 of the Charter."
66Section2 of the Bill of Righfs states: "Every law of Canada shall, unless it is
expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate
notwithstmding the C d a n Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate,
abridge or a g e or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment of infigement of any of the
rights or fkedoms herein recognized and declared ..." See supra note 37 for clarification of
the phrase "every law of Canada".

The 'hotwithstandingyylegislation remains operable for five yerirs and may be renewed every
five years thereafter.
Clearly, S. 33 is a powerful anirmation of parliamentary primacy in this legal era of
constitutional supremacy.6' Professor Peter Hogg writes:
Section 33 of the Charter ... enables the Parliament or a Legislatue to
"override" most of the provisions of the Charter. This is accomplished by
including in a statute an express declaration that the statute is to operate
notwithstanding a provision included in s.2 or ss.7 to 15 of the Charter. Once
this declaration is included, the statute will operate free of the invaiidating
effect of the Charter provisions specifïed in the declaration. In this way, the
Parliament or a Legislature, provided it is w i l h g to include the express
declaration required by the ovemde provision, is able to enact a law that
abridges rights guaranteed by S. 2 or ss. 7 to 15 of the Charter. The override
provision thw preservesparliamerrt~mpremacyover much of the charter.
[Emphasis added] pootnotes omitted]
While Professor Hogg speaks of"par1iamentary supremacy", arguably the term ''parliamentary
primacy" reflects more accurately the political context in which the ovemde provision

"See Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712,54 D.L.R. (4th) 577,90 N.R. 84
[hereinafkr Ford cited to S.C.R.] where the SupremeCourt of Canada (at 740-74 1) held that
S. 33 does not mandate substantive review of legislative policy in exercising the ovemde;
rather, it is restricted to matters of fom. For a case commentary on Ford and the S. 33
ovemde see A. Wayne Mackay and Diane Pothier "Developments In Constitutional Law:
The 1988-89 T e r m (1990) 1 S.C.L.R. ( 2 4 81 at 172. The authors note that "[wlhile we do
not object to the result in this case, it is not clear why the Court feit compelled to give such
a broad scope to legislative action under section 33 of the Charter. It does not appear to be
consistent with the Court's fkquently declared liberal approach to enhance the rights and
freedoms in the Charter."[Footnotes omined]. They conclude (at 173) that %e Court has
make a significant value choit-ne which asserts the importance of legislative supremacy
even in the context of the Charter." See also Brian Dickson "Keynote Address" in Frank E.
McArdle, ed., The Cambridge Lectures 1985 (Montreal: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1987)
[hereinafter "Keynote Address] at 4 where then Chief Justice Dickson stated: "Thus, in
Canada, legislative supremacy is subordinate to Constitutional supremacy, except to the
limited extent that it is presewed by s.33 of the Chmter, the so-called 'non obstante' or
'opting out' clause."
''Hogg, supra note 36 at 12-4 to 12-5.

operates: the political consequences of invoking S. 33, more so than constitutionaltheoretical
principles, will determine that Section's efficacy in a given situation."
At this juncture of the discussion it is important to qualfi the phrase ''parliamentary
supremacy". Former Chief Justice Brian Dickson aptly explains the limited scope of the
concept of parliamentary supremacy in the Canadian context:
Padiamentary supremacy has never been absolute in Canada The principle
of unlimited parliamentary sovereignty is unique to the British Constitution,
ultimately derived from the English common law which attaches only to the
Parliament at Westminister, the "Mother of dl Parliaments". Other legislative
bodies established in what was once British temtory derived their powers and
authority, not from the common law, but rather fiom the English parliament
and specific statutory grants made in the exercise of unlimited legislative
cornpetence. These derivative parliaments had no inherent powers of their
own; such powers as they might validly exercise were always to be found
within the four corners of the constitutive British legislation which gave them
Iife.
In the case of Canada, the basic constitutive instrument is the
Constitution Act, 1867."

The divisions of powers under ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 limited the
sovereignty of the feded and provincial levels of government by restricting each to their

"See Michael Wttington and Richard

Van Loon, Cunudian Government and

Politicsr Imtitutionî andProcesses (Toronto: McGraw-Hi11 Ryerson, 1996)at 151where the
authors state:
The immmity fiom the Charter provisions that is given to a law by a
'notwithstanding' clause has a five-year 'sunset,' but may be renewed for
further five-year periods. Its effect is to allow govemments to override key
sections of the Charter at will, but to force the politicians who wish to do so
to 'own up' to what they are doing by having to publicly 'redo the diay deed'
every five years.
While accepting that the supremacy of Parliament has been limited by the Charter despite
ss. 1 and 33, the authors write (at 152): "But Parliament and the legislatures are stiil the only
institutions with the authority to define the changing values and noms of o u . society over
time."

'()"Keynote Adciress", supra note 67 at 3-4.

respective fields of legislative cornpetence." Additiody, since the advent of the Charter,
these jurisdictional Limitations on legislative sovereignty have been complemented by
"substantive restriction^".^
The supremacy of constitutionally entrenched restrictions on legislative and
government action, and the dictates of the principle of Rule of Law, explicitly
recognkd in the preamble to the Comtitation Act. 1982, necessarily combine
to limit the supremacy of Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
Legislative or other govermental action not in conformity with this supreme
law must be struck down, no matter how wise or how desirable it may be.
Outside this realm of restricted activity, however, Parliament and the
legislatureremain supreme and any laws not inconsistent with the Constitution
must be upheld by the judiciary no matter how unwise or ili-considered one
might deem them to b e n
[Emphasis in original]
Despite its limited nature, the concept of parliamentary supremacy remains strong in the

Canadian psyche.
Perhaps the true bastion of parliamentary supremacy lies under Charter section 1-the
"reasonable limits" provision."

If one accepts that al1 players in the process of making and

"See Charter J m c e , supra note 10 at 3 where the author writes:
It is quite clear that none of these rights are absolute. Part of the
political compromise that made possible the entrenchment of a Charter was
the recognition that Parliament or a provincial legislature could expressly
declare a law to operate notwittistanding the Charter. Furrhermore, andfm
more signijicant in the context of criminal lm, where no legrslature has
resorted to the notwithstandingclause, is the so-called "Guaranteeof Rights
and Freedoms " in clause I of the Churter. The heading of "guaranteey' is a
misnomer because the section is designed to allow courts to recognize limits
on rights and fieedoms.
[Emphasis added] Footnotes ornittedl

implementing Iaws-Parüament, the provincial legislatures, and the courts-have an equal
responsibility to incorporate Charter values into their respective tasks, then a Limitation on
a given Charter nght may be viewed as a considered decision by the enacting legislative
body.75 Sopinka J. in R. v. ~ a b a 'demonstrates
~
this perspective in undertaking a S. 1 analysis

See also "Theory of the Charter", supra note 64 at 703.
"See "Theory of the Charter", supra note 64 at 715-716 where he maintains:
The same constitutional duties that bind a govemment in its
legislative fiinctionsalso affect its stnctly executive activities, in the exmise
of prerogative and statutory powers and generally in the administration of the
law. The implication is that governmentalofficiais and administrative boards
genedly are obligated to observe applicable Charter standards in carrying
Pootnotes
out their legai functions.
ornittedl
See also "Keynote Address", supra note 67 at 8 where the author States:
The law-making component of the legal community, the legislators,
have, of course, a critical role to play in Charter matters and in ensuring the
evolution and attainment of social justice in our country. ...Effective efforts
by legislators to bring their legislation into line with the Charter is certauily
preferable to the process of challenging the constitutionality of legislation
before the courts.
It must always be remembered that it is the responsibility of al1 organs
of govemment to ensure that the guanintees of the Charter are made manifest
in Canadian society. Protection of the principles of fieedom, democracy and
social justice which form the foudation of the Charter is not solely reposed
in the judiciary, but is, rather, the duty of al1 facets of the Canadian
Government The courts and the legislatures are both concerned with
upholding the constitution and shaping a better society for al1 Canadians. To
adopt Professor Lederman's words in a recent address to the Academy of
Hurnanities and Social Sciences:
...independent courts and democratic legislatures have been,
are, and will be partners and not rivals as primary decisionmakers in a very complex total process, with heavy demands
being made on both institutions.
"[1994] 3 S.C.R.965,94 C.C.C. (3d) 385,34 C.R.(4th) 360 [hereinafterLoba cited
to C.R.]. Sopinka J.'s analysis of section 1 issues had the unanimous support of the Court,
including Chief Justice Lamer.

of S. 394(1)(b) of the Criminul Code,

" the provision in dispute. He begins with an overview

of the test to be applied in the S. 1 analysis:

In the context of this background, 1 tum to the question whether S. 394(1)(b)
c m be upheld under S. 1 of the Charrer. The test for determinhg whether this
is the case was set out in R v. Oaks, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103,at pp. 138-39.
Taking into account the modification suggested by the Chief Justice in his
reasons in Dugenais v. Canadian Broadcating Corp. ...released concurrently
herewith ... the test can be stated as follows:
(1) In order to be sufnciently important to warrant oveniding
a constitutionally protected right or fieedom the impugned
provision must relate to concems which are pressing and
substantial in a free aad democratic society;
(2) The means chosen to achieve the legislative objective must
pass a three-part proportionality test which requires that they
(a) be rationally connected to the objective, (b) impair the nght
or fkedom in question as Little as possible and (c) have
deleterious effects which are proportional to both their
salubrious effects and the importance of the objective which
has been identified as being of "SUfficient importance".78
Having articulated the S. 1 test, Justice Sopinka, in discussing the minimal impairment portion

of the three-part proportionality test, put the necessity for deference to legislative efforts at
realinng an objective in the context of constitutional principles which are the domain of the

The legislature is entitled to some deference in choosing the means of
attaining a given objective. As Lamer C.J-C. stated in R. v. ChauZk, [1 9901 3

"R.S.C. 1985,c. C-46mereinafter the Criminal Code]. Section 394(1)(b) States:
Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a
term exceeding five years who
m..

(b) sells of purchases any rock, mineral or other substance that contains
precious metals or unsmelted, untreated, unmanufachued or partly smelted,
paaly treated or partly rnanufactured precious metals, unless he establishes
that he is the owner or agent of the owner or is acting under lawful authority;

78Laba,supra, note 76 at 390.

S.C.R. 1303, at p. 1341, "Parliament is not required to search out and adopt
the absolutely least intrusive means of aaaining its objective" (emphasis in
original). However. it is also important to remember that this is not o case in
which the IegisIature has attempted to strike a balunce between the interests
of competing individuals or groups. Rather ir is a case in which the
government (as opposed to other individuals or groups) c m be characterized
as the singular antugonist of an individual aîternpting to assert a Iegal right
[the right to be presurned innocent] which isfundmental to our system of
criminal justice. As the majority wrote in Imin Toy Ltd. c. Quebec
(Procureur generd) ... in such circumîtances the courts me in as good a
position as the legislature to assess whether the leest drastic means of
achieving the governmental pwpose have been chosen, especiaily given the
inherently legal nature of the rights in question and the courts' accumulated
experience in dealing with such matters."
m p h a s i s added]
Parliament's right to pwsue its objectives, therefore, does not preclude "second ordeFm
scnitiny of the meam employed to realize those objectives. The means must be measured
against constitutional, not political, standards. The goal of the Supreme Court in a S. I anaiysis
is not to tnimp Parliament, but to give legislative initiatives-especially those compromising

core legal principles of the criminal justice system such as the presumption of
innocence-sober second thought8' in a non-partisan venue. a

"sec 'Theory of the Charter", note 64 at 707 where Slattery uses the term "second
order function" in descnbing the review function under the Charter: "The Charter also
authorizes and binds certain bodies to review the acts of others for confonnity with Charter
rights where the latter are bound in a first order way to take account of the Charter in acting."
[Emphasis in original]. In reference to the %
' nt order fiuiction", the author writes (at 708):
"The Charter imposes first-orderduties on three sorts of governmentai bodies: the executive,
the legislature, and the courts. Each of these branches of government has the constitutionai
duty to comply with the Charter, regardless of whether any other body can enforce this
obligation."

"~horrerJustce, supra note 10 at 345 observes:
One can only h o p that the Supreme Court [in Loba] has at 1 s t settled on a
tougher approach to section one justification in the context of criminal law.

This by-no-means-exhaustive discussionof ss. 1 and 33 of the Charter highlights that,
as Canadians, we have inherited h m Britain a political and legal tradition rooted in
democratic and liberal principles, a tradition cornplemented by the 1982 constitutional

initiative^.^ Just as Canada c m o t escape its British heritage, so too, the judiciary of the
Supreme Court of Canada cannot escape the impact of the liberal democratic tradition upon

their firnction. I cannot improve upon the words of then Justice Brian Dickson in this regard:

The Court's task brings with it the great responsibility of applying and
developing the laws of Canacia. The role of the judiciary and the attitudes
fowmdr decision-makng held by ourjudges have been shrrped by the political
philosophV and legal tradition unique to Canaah ...
1refer to proximate legal traditions to emphasize the point that judicial
attitude is shaped by the institutionsand experience unique to each system of
law, whether it be Amencan, English or Canadian. But in any IegaZ order
founded upon the cornmon law, afundumental philosophic issue sutjkees to

Hopefully, the court will in future be consistent in its Laba view that reverse
onuses cannot be saved without consideration of the alternatives. If so the
Court wiU have embarked on a new course much more protective of the
presumption of innocence and for [sic] less receptive to arguments of law
enforcement expediency.
As will be discussed later in this work, Law enforcement or crime control values, and due
process values, impact upon the decision-making process in the criminal law-particularly,
for our purposes, the law of homicide.
82The principles of judicial independence and judicial impartiality act to neutralize
the partisan nature of legislative debates which inform the content of the Iaw. For a
discussion of these two vital principles see infia at 49-72.
"See Lamer J. in Refrence Re M. KA. (B.C.). infla note 107 at 305 where, after
refening to ss. 1 and 33 as "intemal checks and balances", he stated:
The overriding and legitimate concern that courts ought not to
question the wisdom of enactrnents, and the presumption that the Iegislator
could not have intended same, have to some extent distorted the discussion
surroundingthe meaning of "principles of fundamental justice": This has Ied
to the spectre of a judicial "super-legislature" without a fidi consideration of
the process of constitutionaladjudicationand the sipnincance of ss. 1,33 and
52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

require our sctutiny and careful rejlection. The dilemma-that o/mapping the
bounds ofjudiciol actlvitpis worthy of the attentim ofjudges, students-orl m , a d the public alike.
The challenge is to leam the limits of thejudicial fa& In relating this
theme to the Supreme Court of Canada,if is whe to recall thut we speak of a
young court. Through the Court's history, British traditions served it well.
We will continue to benefit fiom that influence, but henceforth Canado will
chart ifs own course, cognùant of its mangolà roles in the development of a
distinct& Canadiunjurisprudence."
Emphasis added]

To appreciate the impact of liberal democratic principles on the evolving role of the Supreme
Court of Canada judiciary, it is necessary to clan@ what may be perceived to be the key
principles involved.

III. Liberaiism, Democracy and the Role of the Supreme Court of Canada
Sections 3 to 5 of the Charter are entitled "Democratic Right~".'~These provide that
every citizen of Canada has the right to vote and to be qualified for membership in either the
House of Commons or a legislative assembly; that, absent special circumstances such as real
or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, there must be an election, at a maximum, five

years after the legislaûve body in question was elected to power; and that Parliament and each
Iegislature must have an annual siaing. Canada, as a democracy, thus gives constitutionai
si@ficance to the right to vote; and to the p ~ c i p l that
e the elected representatives of the

"Dickson, supra note 62 at 176-177.
*.nie Charter speaks of rights and fkeedoms. The difference between the two has
been articulated by Whittington and Van Loon, supra note 69 at 172: "[R]ights],
in the purest
sense of the term, are created through the enactment of positive laws, while liberties [or
fkeedoms] are the residual area of fkedom lei? to the individual after the totaiity of the
positive law is subtracted fiom it." [Emphasis in original]. The authors, referring to Walter
Tarnopolsky, acknowledge that fundamental fiwdorns rnay be augmented by the positive
Iaw.

people should be accountable to the citizenry through elections and annuai legislative sittings.
For the purposes of this paper, "democracy" is viewed as follows:

Popalar sovereignty Canadian political values are traditionally broadly
described as democratic. Democracy may be viewed as a set of ultimate
values, but we prefer to view it primarily as a set of operational procedures f ~ r
realinng certain broad societd goals. Stated as a theoretical abstraction, the
democratic aim or the ultimate democratic value is the common good or the
common interest. Democracy, as a means of reaiizing the common good, is
a system of govemment designed to refiect the will of the people as a whole
rather than the will of any one individual, speciai interest, or elite. The
limitations of demorracy, as stated in such ethereai t e m as these, follow fiom
the fact that there is likely to be impeAect w e m e n t as to what the common
good is. In many cases the common good will codict directly with the
particular short-run demands put forward by individuals and groups within the
society. Therefore. democracy is perhaps best viewed as a fonn of
government that attempts to maximize or optimize the common good by
establishing operational tules thor will satisfl the needr of as many people as
possible. This attempt is expressed in the principle of popular control or
popular sovereignty?
[Boldface in origina. [Emphasis added]
Thus, democracy is perceived as a structurai means of legitimiPng popular sovereignty
through the vote, through widespread eligibility for political office, and through mandatory
elections and legislative sittings." The fundamental democratic fieedoms enurnerated under

86~hittington
and Van Loon, supra note 69 at 97-98. This is the same definition of
democracy used by the authos in the last edition of their text entitled The Canodian Political
System: Environment, Structure undProcess, 4th ed. (Canada:McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987)
at 110.
n ~ is
t not my intention to elaborate the workings of Canadian federalism beyond
noting that there are three branches of governrnent: the executive, the legislative and the
judicial. (Readers interested in the impact of federdisrn on judicial review should read W.R
Lederman "Unity And Diversity In Canadian Federalism: Ideals And Methods Of
Moderation" (1975) 53 Caa Bar Rev. 597; and refer to Hogg, supra note 36). Pnor to the
enactment of the Charter, judicial review focused on the division of powers delineated in
the British NorthAmerica Act, 1867. H.S.Fairley "Developments In Constitutional Law: The
1983-84 Terrn" (1985) 7 S.C.L.R. 63 at 120, n3 18 argues that "[tlhe essential difference
between individual rights review necessitateci by the Charter and division of powers review

S.

2 of the Charter-&dom

of religion, fitedom of expression, fieedom of the press, fieedom

of conscience, and M o m of association-"are instrumental in realizing the basic democratic
values of popular sovereignty and political equality ..."88

Infushg this democratic f o m of government with additional values is the ideology
of liberalism:
Classical liberalism includes a cornmitment to individualism and to
individual liberties, a closely related commitment to the principles of
individual private property and individual property rights, and a comrnitment
to economic t k e enterprise and capitalism....[Tlhe protection of rights of the
individual fiom unrea~onableintederence by the government is still an
important cornersforte of our constitutional practice. 89
[Boldface in original][Emphasis added]
Not ail academics accept liberalism's predomiaance gracefully. According to one author:
The classical liberal state is constructed as fundamentaily antagonistic

is that the former entails judiciai nullification of majontarian outcornes in an absolute sense
whereas the latter merely zones the democratic process of decision to one level of
govemment or another." But see Manfkedi, supra note 64 at 3 1 where he writes:
[Jludiciai review becarne, for politicai as well as legal reasons, a principal
rnechanism for mediating federal-provincial disputes. ...Indeed, the division
of powea has also served to provide judiciai protection for individuai
liberties. ...In general, the impact of legislation on civil liberties was of only
secondary importance in determinhg its constitutionality; enactment of
restrictive legislation by the proper level of govement was the threshold
issue. ... Consequently, ...judicial review of the division of powers provided
limited protection for liberties not expressly guaranteed by the Constitution
Act, 1867.
@?ootnotesomitted]
Thus, while division of powersjudicial review had a secondary impact on civil liberties, that
impact was not inconsequential.
88Whittingtonand Van Loon, supra note 69 at 173. The authors appear to treat ss.
2-5 of the Charter as democraticfkedoms, derived fiom our common constitutionalheritage

with Britain, broken d o m into substantive democratic fieedoms (S. 2 of the Charter) and
political rights (ss. 3-5 of the Charter).

to individual interests. As representative of the aii-powemil collectivity, the
state always operates in potentially hostile opposition to individual interests.
This coercive capacity of the state must be kept in check-one checking
mechanism kingjudicial review. Moreover, since the state rather than private
power is conceived as the major threat to individual liberty, state powers of
economic regdation should be lhited to establishing the preconditions of a
cornpetitive marketplace. State interference in the outcome of pnvate market
ordering is presumptively illegitimate. The antagonism between individual
and state, representative of classical liberalism, is reinforced by other
structural oppositions, such as those between fieedom and restraint, and the
public and private spheres?"

gO~oel
Bakan et al. "Developments In Constitutional Law: The 1993-94 Term"(1995)
6 S.C.L.R.(2d) 67 at 69. The authors criticize the tenets of classical liberalism as king
incoherent, particularly (at 7 1) that tenet which presumes a publiclpnvate divide:
Judicial assertion of rights as a means of preventing -te interference with
individual choice is, nom a classical liberai perspective, a positive event.
However, when relied upon to re-order the private sphere, rights, as
statements of public n o m and values, threaten the very individual fieedom
mandating their constitutional protection in the first place, no less than
government intrusion into the same sphere.
See also Hester Lessard et. al. "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-95 Terni"
(1996) 7 S.C.L.R.. (2d) 8 1 at 144. The authors note: "As the previous sections of this essay
have emphasized, the cases this Term on the nature of equality and liberty rights and of the
bdamental freedoms in the Charter, represent a remarkable and disturbing shift into the
political vocabulary associated with classical liberalism." And see also Allan C. Hutchinson
and Andrew Petter "Private Rights/Publîc Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988)
of liberal
38 U.T.L.J. 278. Again, these authors (at 296-97), while recognizhg the bbplatform
legalism on which the Charter is builty'are not enthusiasticabout the future and recommend
an abandonment of "liberal individualism" in favour of a 'bore open-ended form of social
democracy".
Manfiedi, supra note 64 at 10 observes that Patrick Monahan, Andrew Petter, Allan
Hutchinson and Michael Mandel are representative of one field of thought conceming the
impact of judicial review on constitutional rights. He contends, that from the perspective of
these writers, "the predominantly individudistic nature of liberal democratic 'rights' as well
as the cornervative chanicter of judges, means that judicial enforcement of the Charter will
inevitably condtute a serious impediment to progressive social change." Basically, this
perspective holds that an emphasis on individualisrn in judicial review thwarts the progress
of social justice. At the other end of the continuum are those writers such as David Beatty
and Dale Gibson whose perspective "celebrates rights-based judicial review and is
profoundly sceptical about the capacity of popularly controiled institutions and decisionmaking processes to produce just and progressive policy outcomes." In a nutshell, this
perspective holds that judicial review of individual and group rights-based claims is the best
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Liberalism, in this instance, is portrayed as a '%ce-off' between individuai interests and the
pursuit of State initiatives with the State assuming the wgative persona of a Leviathan.

Stuart I. Whitley puts the case for liberalism vis-a-vis the criminal law in more
positive terms?' He traces the history of constitutional theory in Canada fkom the Magna
Carta to the Charter,= examines S. 7 of the Charter in light of Canada's histoncal ties to

British legal and politicai traditionsg3,and concludes that the themes running through the
criminal law "dl may be gathered under the generai rubnc of 'individual fieedom', [and]
operate to prevent the state fkom oppression through the expedient of the criminal law.'"
However, the writer cautions that "the purpose of the law is to serve the society h m which
it s p ~ g s and
" that "[ilt does that in the administration of criminal justice by the resolution
of c o d i c t between the state's interest in crime suppression and the individual's right to

vehicle for social progress. M d e d i concludes (at 10-11) that the perspective by authors
such as Beatty and Gibson poses the greatest threat to liberal constitutional democracy.
"[T]he attempt to correct policy erroa of democratic institutions through litigation and
adjudication risks undermining the capacity for self-governmenton which liberal democracy
uitimately depends."
9'Criminol Jurlce And The Constitution (Canada: Carswell, 1989). See also
Whittington and Van Loon,supra note 69 at 99-106. After canvassing (at 100-1O 1) " The
Pervasiveness of Liberal Valuesy',"The Persistence of Liberai Myths", and the "Legitimation
of Liberal Values", the authors conclude (at 101): "mhere is a set of political values that we
cal1 liberal, and those values are so deep-rooted in our political culture that they colour the
thinking of even explicitly anti-liberal cntics of our system. We are concluding. then, that
ours is a basically a liberal society whose liberal values have been diluted (or polluted) ..."
[emphasis in original].

gLWhitley,supra note 9 1 at 29-35.

procedural and substantive fairnes~.'*~It is here where the principle of collectivism or
community ri&@, manifested in State policies and actions aimed at crime suppression,

95h5idat 357. See also Dale Gibson, The Lmv of the C h e r : General Principles
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at iü-iv where he States:
My points of view on particuiar questions are informed by certain
basic attitudes about the Charter and its proper place in Canadian society.
The most hdamental of these is my belief that the new opportunities the
Charter has created for the protection of Canadians' rights and liberties are
g e n d l y beneficial, and should accordingiy be maximizedby generous d e r
than narrowly techniai interpretation.. ..
What is required for satisfactory implementation of Charter
protections is a partnership between judges and politicians in which the latter
act as initiators and leaders, and the judges nonnally remain in the
background. Judges should be vigilant to ensure that basic constitutional
rights are respecte4 but should not otherwise intedere with the democratic
process.
See also The Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Law (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1976) at 1 where the commissioners write: "Coping with crime is a two-sided
problem for a just society. Crime uncoped with is unjust: to the victim, to potentid victims
and to all of us. Crime wrongly coped with is also unjust: criminal law-the state against the
individual-is always on the cutting edge of the abuse of power. Between these two extremes
justice must keep a balance."

%Sec Whittington and Van Loon, supra note 69 at 99 where the principle of
collectivism is explored in greater detail. BasicalIy, the comrnunalist or collectivist aspect
of Canadian liberalism, which recognizes the reality and validity of group rights, moderates
our basic liberal values wherein the individual is the repository of legal rights and fieedoms.
The cornmunalist or collectivist p ~ c i p l efin& expression in the Charter which
constitutionally recogoizes the special status of the French and Aboriginal cornmunities in
Canada.
The equality provisions under S. 15 also facilitate the concept of communal interests
as does the "reasonable limits" qualifier under S. 1which necessitates a balancing of interests
in order to determine if an impugned action, piece of legislation, or cornmon law principle,
although in violation of a Charter provision, is, nevertheless, a reasonable limit. Closely
aligned to the idea of communalism is that of liberal pluralism. The authors state (at 99)
''that the Canadian political culture can be broadly described as 'liberal-pluralist'." They
explain (at 105) that "pluralism is rooted in liberal individualism. ... Individuals belong to
as many groups as they choose, and multiple, overlapping memberships tend to be the d e
rather than the exception. Individuals also have legitimate rights of their own, separate fkom
their gmup identities." Thus, individuals may confkont the law on either an individual or a
group bais.

collide with individuai interests in Liberty and autooomy. The justices of the Suprerne Court

of Canada are positioned as final arbiters of the proper balance between the two." In the law
of homicide, for example, the application of such liberal tenets a s the autonomy of the

individual and the individual's right to be free from unwarraoted state intrusion have
influenced the Supreme Court of Canada's adjudicative fûnction to an unprecedented level.
That influence, in tum,has sparked an ideological controversy encompassing the concepts
of subjective and objective standards of fault, criminal responsibility, moral
blameworthiness, stigma and pend consequences?'
Infonning this ideological dispute is, again, traditional liberal philosophy in which
individual autonomy is prioritized as is the concomitant p ~ c i p l eof fieedom from state
interference with the liberty and privacy of the person through the politics of a privatelpublic
divide? Much of the judicial discord at the Supreme Court of Canada level on hornicide-

"See Russell, supra note 8 at 5 who maintains that it is ''the coercive element in
judicial decision-making-the judge's ties to the coercive powers of the state-that imbues
adjudication with a political character ..." He reiterates this point at 6-7:
[Clourts will determine whether the evidence adduced about a person's
behaviour meets the legal standard of tortious negligence or criminal liability.
These disputes go beyond the private to the public realm, for what is at issue
is whether or how the law, as society's system of binding niles, is to be
applied. Here again we see the inherently political dimension of
adjudication-its comection tu the law, its application of the noms of the
political community which are backed by the coercive powers of the state.
This controversy and its defining concepts is not peculiar to the law of homicide.
The offence of sexual assault, for instance, also raises paralle1 concerns. See Douglas
Alderson "R.v. O'Connor and Bill C-46: Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right" (1997) 39
C.L.Q.181. However, this thesis will focus primarily on the law of homicide.
98

%ee Fairley, supra note 87 at 119 who writes: "The two Charter cases fding within
the 1983-84 Term indicate unreserved acceptance by the Supreme Court of its duty to
Widicate constitutionally protected individual rights." The cases refmed to were the first

related issues also can be Linked to the Chmter and the new era of constitutional supremacy.
As Chief Justice Lamer stated in R v. Vuiilancourt

'" concerning the offence of constructive

murder:
Pnor to the enactment of the Charter, Parliament had full legislative
power with respect to the T h e Crimirial Law"(Constitution Act, 1867, S.
9 1(27)), includïng the determination of the essential elements of any given
crime. It could prohibit any act and impose any perd consequences for
infiingingthe prohibition, provided only that the prohibition served "a public
purpose which can support it as being in relation to criminal law": Re$ re S.
5(a) of the Dairy Indust. Act ...Once the legislation was found to have met
this test, the courts had very Little power to review the substance of the
legislation. For example, in R v. S d t Ste. Marie (City), ...Dickson J. (a
he then w e ) held that, when an offencewas criminai in the hue sense. there
was a presumprion that the prosecution must prove the mens rea However,
it was always open to Parliament expressly to reiieve the prosecution of its
obligation to prove any part of the mens rea, as it is said to have done in S.
2 13 of the Criminal Code with respect to the foreseeabiiity of the death of the
victim. It is thus ciear that,prior to the enactment of the Charter, the vaiidity
of S. 213 could not have been successfuZly challenged loi
[Emphasis added]

Charter decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada: L m Society of Upper
C o n d a v. SknpinRer, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 9 D.L.R.(4th) 161, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 481
[hereinafter Skupinker] ;and A. Q. Quebec v. Quebec Ass 'n of Protestant School Boardr,
[1984] 2 S.C.R.66,lO D.L.R.(4th) Z l , 9 C.R.R.133. But see Hutchinson and Petter, supra
note 90 at 283-284. The authors acknowledge (at p. 283) that "[tlhe Charter is at root a
liberal document. Its enactment was a constitutional aiErmation of liberal faith." However,
in their critique of a liberal interpretation of the Charter, they conclude at 295:
Liberalism is a failure; it cannot pass conceptual, social, legal, or political
muster. A continued reliance on its inteilectual assurnptions and ideological
prescriptions is iodefensible. The challenge is to replace it with a substantive
vision of social justice that is capable of responding to the vast inequalities
of economic and political power that iiberaiism and its disciples permit ...and
condone.
Footnotes omitted]

'*[1987] 2 S.C.R. 036, 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118, 60 C.R. (3d) 289 [hereinafter
Vaillancourt cited to CR.] .
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Justice Lamer's comments comprehend the new role for the Supreme Court of Canadato2
emerging as Charter litigation matures with a corresponding dilution of the doctrine of
parliamentary supremacy. Whereas there had been a pre-Chmler deferenceto the legislature

in matkm of statutory interpretation, as for example, in presuming, rather than requiring,
that the Crown had to prove the mens rea of an offence beyond a reasonable doubt,

'" the

Supreme Court of Canada in VaiIIancourt elevated that very presurnption to a constitutional
imperative. The essential elernents of ail offences now included 'hot only those set out by
the legislature in the provision creating the offence but also those required by

S.

7 of the

Charter."'w

'"1n the pre-Charter case of R v. Fanant, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 124,4 C.C.C. (3d) 3 54,
32 C.R. (3d) 289 [hereinafter F m a n t cited to C.R.] Dickson Je, for the majonty, descnbed
(at 291) the Court's position vis-a-vis the legislature: "It might be observed in passing that
the constructive murder d e has been the subject of protracted criticisrn ... The d e may
seem hmh but it is not the function of this court to consider the policy of Iegislation validly
enacted. So long as the section continues in our Criminal Code it must be given effect in
accordance with its tems." As to the Court's pst-Charter statu see Bruce P. Archibaid
"The Constitutionalkation of the General Part of Criminal Law" (1988) 67 Cm. Bar Rev.
403 at 419, n87 where he states: "WhiIe one might not wish to suggest that the Supreme
Court of Canada respond to issues in a 'political' fashion, it is clear that the Charter has
thnist the court into a new law making role and a new relationsbip with the legislature. ..."
But see Fairley supra note 87 at 119-120 where the author predicts a grim future for the new
era of judicid review. "[Audicial review which challenges the merits of majorirarian
outcornes with the potentiai to finally ovemile them suggests a dimension to the role of the
Court far difXerent nom that of neutrai umpire in a federal state." @!oontoets
omitted]
Io3SeeR v Sudt Sle. Mmie, [1978] 2 S.C.R1299,40C.C.C. (2d) 353,3 C.R. (3d)
30 [hereinafter SàuZf Ste. Mmie cited to C.R..].
IM

VailZancourt.supra note 100 at 326.

tn Hunter v. Southam ~nc.,'O~
Justice Dickson writing for a d o u s court which
included Lamer J., discussed the d e of the court in the postCharter era:
The task of expowding a constitution is cruciaily different fkom that of
coastniing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is
easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted
with an eye to the fùture. Itsfinction is to provide a continuingfiamework
for the legitimate exercise of governmentalpower 4whenjoined by a Bill
or a Charter of rights,for the unremittingprotection ofindividual rights and
liberfies. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repeaiedor amended.
It must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over tirne to meet
new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its fiamers.
ïkjudiciary is the guardian o f h e Constitution a d murt, in interpreting its
provisions, bear these considerations in mind'M
[Emphasis added]
Justice Lamer echoes this perspective in Reference re Section 94(2) Motor Vehicle Act

(B.C.)'O7 where he states that the principles of fundamental justice under S. 7 of the Charter
"do not lie in the reaim of general public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary

as guardian of the justice ~ystem."'~' He then goes on to quote with approval the words of
Estey J. in Skapinker that "[wlith the ConstitutionAct. 1982 cornes a new dimension, a new
yardsJck of reconciiiation between the individual and the community and their respective
rights, a dimension which, like the balance of the Constitution, remains to be interpreted and
applied by the C ~ u r t . "Whether
'~
or not the Supreme Court of Canada has used the Churter

'"[l984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 1 1 D.L.R.(4th) 641,14 C.C.C.(3d) 97 [ h e r e s e r Hunter
v. Southam cited to C.C.C.]. Chief Justice Laskin did not take part in this judgment.

107[1985]
2 S.C.R.486,48 C.R. (3d) 289,23 C.C.C. (3d) 289 [hereinafter Reference
Re ktKA. (23.C.)cited to C.R.].

as a "yardstick of reconciliationy'between the individual and society in the law of homicide
is, as the ensuing case law analysis in Chapter 3 will reveal, open to debate.
It is within this burgeoning political and legal philosophical context that the Supreme
Court of Canada must now operate.

"O

What does it mean to be the "guardian of the

Constitution" in this new legal and political era of constitutional supremacy? Arguably, that

the Supreme Court of Canada has a coxnmiûnent to fiuidamental legal principles, including
those basic to the criminal law. Such a cornmitment must not be blindly subverted to popular
opinion. To develop this theme an d y s i s will be undertaken in Chapter 3 of the decision-

making of Chief Justices Bnan Dickson and Antonio Lamer bearing on the law of homicide

"'Chief Justice Laskin laid the groundwork in his eloquent dissenting and concurring
judgments wherein he expounded the impact of the Bill of Rights for, inter aliu, Canadian
criminal law. See, for example, Miller and Cockriell v. The Queen (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R.
680, 38 C.R.N.S. 139, 3 1 C.C.C.(2d) 177 [hereinafter cited to C.R.N.S.] where Laskin
C.J.C. gave a concuning judgment holding that the death penalty for accused persons
convicted of killing a policeman or prison guard did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment conto the Bill oflighrs. In so doing he stated (at 153): "[qhe legislation
of Parliament falls to be tested as to its operative effect by what the Canadian Bill of Rights
prescribes; othenvise, the Canadian Bill of Rights becomes merely an interpretation statute,
yielding to a contrary intention in legislation measured against it." He held (at 156) it to be
the duty of the Court 'hot to whittle down the protections of the Canadian Bill of Rights by
a narrow construction of what is a quasi-constitutionai document." The limited application
of the death penalty to homicides involving policemen and prison guards was key to Laskin
C.J.C.'s decision. Capital punishment had been abolished in Canada that same
year-197Gby the Criminal Law Amendments Act (No. 2). 1976, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 105.
Laskin C.J-C.'s activist approachto thejudicial fiuiction has not met with unquaîified
approval. See Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Leg~dizationof Politics in
Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989). He considered (at 20) Laskin's assent to the
Chief Justiceship as "a very important step in the legaiization of politics." Especially so in
the post-Charter context. He contends (at 71) that the "Charter of Rights in its substitution
of judicial for representative forums and of abstract/principle for concretelpolicy foms of
argument for the resolution of political contmversy, represents a fhdamental change in the
structure of Canadian political life, a 'legalization of politics'."

under the Charter.'" The controversy engulfing the Iaw of homicide, today, c m be traced
to the respective interpretations of the scope of the adjudicative fimctionll*espoused, in part,
by these Justices and the reaction to their interpretations both inside and outside the Court.

This discussion of democracy and liberalism in the Canadian judicial context is not
intended to be exhaustive; rather, it is meant to give the reader a means to evaluate not only
decisions emanating fiom the Supreme Court of Canada, but also the commentaries of
academic authors writing in response to those decisions. Not al1 academic authors advocate
deference to the office of the judiciary and decisions emanating therefiom. Professor Peter
Russell writes of ''radical realists" who perceive of the judiciary as a group of political actors

"'1 am constructing my analysis around the decision-making of the Chief Justices
because of their leadership role on the Bench. The Canadian Institute For The
Administrationof Justice, Compendium of information On The Siutus And Role OfThe Chief
J h c e in Canada (Montreal, 1987). writing of the office of the Chief Justice in general,
stated (at 207-208):
The influence of a Chief Justice on the way cases are decided can be
enormous. First of dl, a Chief Justice will often be involved in very
important cases or those involving a high degree of public interest. Secondly,
because the Chief Justice is often more widely know, his decisions may
receive more attention than those decided by ordinary judges. Thircily,
because of the respect for and the ability of the Chief Justices, their decisions
will tend to be followed and relied upon by judges and lawyers as authorities
in later cases.
The Chief Justice of Canada bears the additional distinction of being the highest judicial
officer in Canada.As well, the Chief Justice chairs the Canadiau Judicial Council which was
established in 1971tu investigate cornplaints against thejudiciary of the supenor courts. For
m e r discussion on, and statistical malysis of, the role of the Chief Justice, and his
influence on the law and the Court, itself, see Peter McCormick "Assessing Leadership on
the Supreme Court of Canada: Towards a Typology of Chief Justice Perfomüuice" (1993)
4 S.C.L.R.(2d) 409; and see Friedland, supra note 60 at 225-23 1.
1'2Russell,supra note 8 at 40 contends that adjudicationis the essence of the judicial
fiinction: "Adjudication is the h c t i o n of settling disputes about legal rights and duties. It
is a political activity insofar a s it is authoritative and backed by the power of the state."

perpetrating their subjective values and agendas on the larger unsuspecthg community:
From this perspective the distinctive aspects of judicial institutions and the
judiciai process-the concem for the independence and impartidity of the
judge, the procedural requirement of giving each side a fair hearing, and the
provision of reasons explaining a decision in t e m of legai d e s and
principleeare presumably nothing more than a cunning camoufiage behind
which judges are fke to hdulge their own political fan~ies."~

This thesis is not premised on such a radical realist approach. Rsither, the ceneality of the
principles of judicial independence and impartiality to the judiciai fùnction will be argued.

W . The Criminal Process and the Adjudicative Fnnction
The individual encounters the intrusive power of the State when he or she cornes into
conflict with the criminal law.'14 More so when the crime alleged is a culpable homicide.
Liberalism champions the fkedom of the individual but only to the point where his or her
actions h m others."'

While the term "hami" is capable of and has been given wider

'131bid at 16-17. See also Richard Devlin "We Can't Go On Together with
SuspiciousMinds: Judicial Bias and Raciaiized Perspective in R v. R.D.S." (1 995) Dai. L.J.
408 at 434-438 where the author discusses the formalist and realist view of the judicial role.
The author, himself, is a realist who argues that the fomalist conception of impdality, and
the fomalist approach to race, are nonfunctional in Canada's multi-cdhiral and diverse
society.
ll4SeeR. v. Paré. [1987l2 S.C.R.618,38 C.C.C. (3d) 97'60 C.R. (3d) 346 at 368
[hereinafier Puré cited to C.R.] where Wilson J. for a unanimous court (Uicluding Dickson
C.J.C.)writes: "Criminal law remains, however, the most dramatic and important incursion
that the state makes into individual liberty."
lSSeeJohn Stuart Mill,Wtilitarianism,Liberty, Representutive Government (London:
J.M. Dent & Sons, 1910). Mill writes (at 73): '"'mhat the sole end for which mankind are
wamuited, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any rnember of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others."

meaning beyond physical harm,"6 the harm to the victim consequent upon a homicide is the
uitimate phpical M e a t h . The issue of criminal nsponsibility, absent proof of mental
incapacity,"' involves an analysis of both the mens rea and actus reus of the offence in
question."*

~ervadingthis inquiry are values particular to the criminal process. These

values in h m encapsulate society's normative perspective on different types of criminal
tKha~iour,"~
specifically, for the purposes of this project, behaviour adjudged to be culpable
homicide.
Herbert Packer identifies two rnodels of the criminal process: Crime Control and

Due ~rocess.'~'The former, he maintains, is characterized by the "presumption of guilt"

"%ee R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R 452,70 C.C.C. ( 3 4 l29,ll C.R.(4th) 137 where
the Supreme Court of Canada did a h m analysis under S. 1 of the Charter and concluded
that social h m was a valid consideration in evaluating legislation. At issue in Butler was
the obscenity definition under S. 163(8) of the Code.

"'Sec S. 16 of the Criminal Code (Defence of Mental Disorder).
"8niat analysis, relative to the law of homicide, will be undertaken in Chapter 3.
IL9seeOur Criminal Law, supra note 95 at 5 where it is stated:
Criminal law, then has to do with values. Naturally, for crime itself, is
nothing more nor less than conduct senously contrary to our values. Crimes
are acts not only punishable by law but also merithg punishment. As
Fitzjarnes Stephen said, the ordinary citizen views crime as an act "forbidden
by law and revolting to the moral sentiments of society". Crimes are not just
forbidden, they are also wrong.
[Emphasis in
original]
And further (at 16): "In tnith, the cnminal law is fiuidamentally a moral system. It may be
crude, it may have faults ... but basically it is a system of applied morality and justice. It
serves to underline those values necessary, or else important, to society. When acts occur
that seriously transgress essential values ...society must speak out and reafEm those values.
This is the true role of criminai law." [Emphasis in the original].
'"~heLimits ojlhe Crimiml Sanction (California: Stanford University Press, 1968)
at 149-173.
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with a focus on the efficient suppression of crime, the latter by the "presumption of
innocence" with a focus on the protection of the individual who fin& himself in conflict with

the state. The author recognizes that the criminal process has a direct impact on the
substantive criminal law. What conduct will activate the intrusive power of the State? To
what extent does the answer to this questionreflect the type of criminal process in operation?
To d y z e these issues Packer constructed the two models under discussion. These models
stand at either end of a continuum suggesting that no given society's criminal process is
either one or the other, but an amalgam of both.

That a given society's criminal process may embody elements of both the Crime
Control and Due Process Models is a result of the "common ground" or shared assurnptions
upon which those models rest.'*' Packer identifies four such assumptions comprising the
cornmon ground. First, criminalconduct must be defined, it must be ascertainableto society;
the degree of specificity in defining criminal law will reflect not only policy considerations
but also the values held by decision-makers. Second, the legislature defines what is criminal

conduct for the purposes of prosecution, and al1 players in the criminal process must,as an
operathg premise, defer to the legislature's jurisdiction. Third, the State does not have
unlimited authonty to Uiterfere with the privacy and security of the individual under the guise
of law enforcement, particularly at the investigatory stage. Fourth, an accused is, if he so
chooses, an active participant in the criminal adversarial process; he is entitled to challenge
the charges levied against him at triai before an independent tribunai.

12' fiid. at 154-158. While Packer is ao American author, much of this 'ccommon
ground" is found in constitutional form in sections 7 through 14 of the Charter in Canada.

Stuart Whitley, referring to Packer's two models of the cruninal process, writes:

Packerproposed that the criminaljustice system is a balance between
two cornpethg value systems or models. These are what he tenned the "due
process" and the ''crime control" models. The latter is principally aimed at
the detention [sic] and repmsion of crime, the implicit guilt of the arrested,
a high conviction rate, and support for police action. The 'due process"
model accepts the concept of individual guilt as the foundation of criminal
law, but demands that that conclusion be reached by explicit procedural
safeguards. Implicit in this view is the notion that the protection of the
individual is paramount to the interests of the commmity.
It is certain that the advent of the Charter has explicitly imported the
"due process" model into the Canadian constitution. ln
vootnotes ornittedl
The impact of liberal values on the two rnodels, therefore, is rneasured against the process
for determining individuai criminal responsibility.lu The greater the emphasis on crime
suppression and social control, the less sympathetic the judiciary will be to allegations of
state contraventionof individual nghts and fieedoms. Altematively, a judge may emphasize
one aspect of individualism-that of choiceto the accused's detriment, suggesting that in a
society where criminal conduct is cleariy defined and therefore knowable to the accused, the
choice to indulge in that conduct cannot be tnmped by liberalism's charnpionship of
individual liberty and autonomy.124 DifEerent emphases foster disparate results. Yet, it is the

'*Supra, note 9 1 at 30. See also Manfiedi, supra note 64 at 104- 105.

'*In Laba, supra note 76 at 369, Chief Justice Lamer, who was instrumentai in
overhauling the murder provisions of the Criminal Code, stated: "My analysis will be
grounded in the following premise: when the constitutionality of a law is challenged in the
context of criminal proceedings there are effectively two proceedings-the proceedings
directed at a detennination of cdpability and the proceedings directed at a detennination of
constitutionality. They will usually proceed together but rnay, on occasion, proceed
separately."
'24See,for example, R v. Martinem, [1990] 2 S.C.R.633, 79 C.R.(3d) 129, 58
C.C.C. (3d) 353 bereinafter Mmtineau cited to C.R.], a case concerning the constructive
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dynamics of codicting perspectives that detemiines ultimately the characterization of our
criminal process as one favouring either crime control or due process values.
It is perhaps clear to the reader at this junction that the "common grouad'' bridging
the gap between the two criminal process models, in fact, embodies key liberai principles.

How far will the Court deviate nom a narrow or broad Iegislative definition of criminal
conduct? How much deference must be paid to legislative declarations that a particular
action is criminal? What is the relationship between law enforcement activities vis-a-vis the
security and pnvacy of the individual? What are the parameters of the adversarial struggle
in which the accused is pitted against the State? These questions are rooted in the common
assumptions, and the response of the Supreme Court of Canada to these questions in the

criminai iaw context, influences both the substance and the impact ofjudicial activism in the

law of homicide.
The responses generated by the Court to the cases argued before it are not expounded
in a vacuum. Judging is a human endeavour and the law has developed principles, most

notably those of judicial independence and judicial impartiality, to couterbalance the
subjective dimension of the judicial process.

V. Subjectivity and the Judiciai Process
Legal scholars have identified the tension that runs through thejudicial adjudicatory

murder provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, S. 213. Both the majority
reasons of Chief Justice Lamer and the dissentkg judgment of Justice L'Heureux-Dubé
reflect liberal influences, but the different emphases account for the disparate result.
Martineau will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

function. 1BWolfgang Friedman,

'" for instance, posits that whether one is taking of courts

acting under the umbrella of a constitution, or acting within a legal system where a written
constitution is not part of the legal landscape, the problems associated with the judicial
impact on the development of the legal system are the same:
There always wiil be dynamic and static periods, periods in which the urge
for social reform predominates over the desire for stability and certainty, and
other periods when extraordinary legislative activity and the restlessness of
society produce a judicial reaction, and added emphasis on legal stability.
There will always be the conflicts of judicial temperaments as well as the
inevitable divergences in applying any ideais and principles to a given fact
situation. Such tensions are of the essence of law in a fiee society. ... 127
[Footnotes omined]

"sec Benjamin N. Cardozo, n e Nature OfThe Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1921). He wrote (at 12-13):
There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to cal1 it
philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and
action. Judges c a ~ oescape
t
that current any more than other mortals. Al1
their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been
tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions;
and the resultant is an outlook on Me, a conception of social needs, ...which,
when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine were choice shall fall. In
this mental background every problem h d s its setting. We may try to see
things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with
any eyes except our own. To that test they are ail brought-a form of pleading
or an act of parliament, the wrongs of paupers or the rights of princes, a
village ordinance or a nation's charter.
[Footnotes omitted]
Having acknowledged the quintessentially human dimension of judicial decision-making,
Judge Cardom makes no attempt at apology; rather, he proceeds to articulate his conception
of the judicial process through reference to four rnethodologies: (i)philosophy or reasoning
by analogy; (ii)evoIution or reasoning by historical analysis; (iii)tradition or reasoning
influenced by comrnunity customs; (iv)sociology or reasoning influenced by contemporary
values of justice, morality and social welfàre.
126Legalnieoty, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

Friedman's comments express clearly the reality that competingjudicial emphases on either
socid justice,'28 stabdity and certainty, or individuai rights colour the tenor and effect of
judicial decision-making. Further, these competing emphases influence the values which
penneate the judge's approach to a given fact situation. When trial and appellate judges
tackle the question of balancing societal and individuai interests in a period of either change
or stability, the tirne-honoured plinciples ofjudicial independenceand impariiality,recently
accorded constitutionai ~ t a h i s ,deliver
'~
the exercise fiom disrepute.
Accepting the subjective aspect of judicial decision-making does not discredit the
process. The comments of Professor W.R.Ledeman, for instance, concerning the impact
of judicial subjectivity on a division of powers review are equally applicable to individual
rights review under the C h t e r :

D]t is necessary that impartial superior courts should act as umpires of the
essential guide-lines for the respective federal and provincial responsibilities
given by the federal constitution. Of course the value assumptions of the
judges will enter into their decisions. ... Inevitably widely prevailing beliefs
in the country about these issues will be influentid and presumably the
judges should strive to implement such beliefs. Inevitably there will be some
tendency for them to identify their own convictionsas those which generally
prevail or which at l e s t are the right ones. ... In the making of these very
dzflcult decirions of relative values,policy decisions ifone prefers that word.
al1 that can rightly be demanded ofjudges is straight thinking, industry,good
fith, a d a capacity to discount their own prejudices with due humility. No
doubt it is also fair to ask that they be men or women of high projëssional
attainment, and that they be somavhat representative in their thinking of the

i28Davis,supra note 16 at 6 describes social justice as ''justice for segments of the
population*as distinguished îrom justice for individual parties."
'29SeeTle Provincial Court Judges Cuse, s u p note 63.

better stan&&

ojtheir rimes ami theirfelow citizenr."O
[Emphasis added]

The goal is not to undennine the judicial process but to relativize the inescapable
subjectivity of that process. Unharnessed subjectivity is to be eschewed.
Professor Peter Russell offers a similar perspective in discussing the adjudicative
function and its relation to the principles of judiciai independence and impartiality:
Adjudicaton settling disputes as third parties are expected to decide disputes
fairly and without partiality to either of the disputing parties. Thus they
should be independent and not controlled by private parties or the

'30Supra,note 87 at 619-620. On the positive impact, upon fundamental civil
Iiberties, of division of powers review during the 1950's see Dale Gibson, "-And One Step
Backward: The Supreme Court And Condtutiond Law In The Sixties" (1975) 53 Cm.Bar
Rev. 621 at 621-22.
Gibson did not like the approach of the Court during the next
decade-the19601s-because of its failure to give explanatory reasons for decision beyond the
formally legal ones, an apparently deliberate atternpt to defuse criticism of subjective bias
in decision-making. He observed (at 639) that "if the court fails to disclose its true
assessment, and instead offers empty exercises in forma1 logic, it becomes extremely dificuit
for those who differ with its views to engage in intelligent criticism." He added: "Without
such fimk and Uiformed criticism, the ability of the Supreme Court to continue making wise
decisions is dangerously weakened." The author then asserted the following (at 639-40):
[Clounsel who appear before the court are at a great disadvantage if the
outcome of their cases is in any way dependent upon policy factors which
they are prevented fiom dealing with openiy in argument because of the
court's refisal to acknowledgetheir significance. It is one of the touchstones
of democracy that satisfactory progress requires the uninhibited clash of
competing ideas. This is as true in the judicial arena as in al1 others.
My research to date has revealed no dearth of academic comment and criticism on the
operations of the Supreme Court of Canada and its decisions since the advent of the Charter.
Whether this is a resuit of a better or poorer quality of decision-making is debatable: the
activism of the post-Charter era on both thejudicial and academic fronts awaits thejudgment
of posterity.
However, the articuiation of philosophicd considerations in judicial decisions, e.g.,
that crime suppression is panunount in an individual-rights constitutional analysis, is not to
be confusedwith superfiuousjudicial pronouncements on the subject matter of the litigation.
The latter are intolerable especially where thcy touch on matters, such as witness credibility,
essential to a judicial determination of the issue in dispute.

govemment. But as social scientists we are sceptical of the possibility of
complete or absolute independence and impartiality. This scepticism may be
well founded, but it does not justify dismisshg the ideals of independence
and impartiality as irrelevant to a proper understanding of the judicial
process. The challenge to politicai scientists is to ascertain the degree to
which these ideals c m and must be realized if a society's judicid system is
to perform its essential adjudicative fiui~tion.'~'
A comparable challenge faces the legal professional and academic communities.

Independence and impartidity are Ideals to be sought, not goals to be ridicuied. As Martin
Friedland states: "Independent and impartial adjudicationis essential to a fke and dernomtic
society."13* He argues that "[tlhe judiciary plays a major role in Canadian society in
resolving disputes and, particularly, under the Charter, in developing the law.

... Society

therefore has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the judiciary collectively and individually
acts wisely, properly, and

efficiently-as well as impartially."'33
A- Judicial Independence
The concept of judiciai independence was explored in the Provincial Court Judges
Case. 134 Chief Justice Lamer for the majonty stated:

Valenté was the first decision in which this Court gave meaning to S. 1I(d)'s
guarantee of judicial independence and impartiality. In thatjudgment, this
Court held that S. 11(4 encompussed a guarantee, inter a h , of financial
security for the courts and tribunals which corne within the scope of that
provision. ...It held that for individualjudges to be independent, their salaries

131Supranote 8 at 40.
'32Supranote 60 at 1.
'331bidat 2.
'%pra, note 63.

must be secured by law, and not be subject to arbitrary interference by the
executive.13'
IErnphasis added]

Individual financial independence, the subject of the Vulenté decision, was subsequently
augmented by the Court's consideration of "the content of the collective or institutional
dimension of financial security forjudges of provincial

However, relative to the

guarantee of judicial independence under S. 1 I(d) of the Charter, the Chief Justice clarified
that the principle goes beyond financial independence to embrace '?he independence of the
judiciary £tom the other branches of govemment, and bodies which c m exercise pressure on

the judiciary through power conferred on them by the state."13'
Lamer C.J.C.discussed the comtitutioml basis for the principle of judicial
independence, and linked that principle to the concept of judicial impartiality:
[ q h e purpose of the constitutional guarantee of hancial insecurity-found
in S. l I (d) of the Charter, and also in the preamble to and S. 100 of the
Constitution Act, 1867-is not to benefit the members of the courts which
corne within the scope of those provisions. The benefit that the members of
those courts denve is purely secondary. Financial security must be
tmderstood as merely an aspect ofjudicial independence, which in tum is not
an end in itself. Judicid independence is valued because it serves important
socielol goals-it is a meam to secure those goals.
One of these goals is the maintenance of public confdence in the
irnpartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the eflectiveness of the
court system. Independence contributes to the perception that justice will be
done in individual cases. Another social goal served by judicialindependence
is the maintenanceof the d e of law, one aspect of which is the constitutional
principle that the exercise of al1 public power must h d its ultimate source in

13S&5id
at 207.
%id

at 207. Emphasis in original.

'3'lbid at 245.

a legal de.138
[Emphasis added]
Rooting the concept of judicial independence in both the Charter and the preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867enabled Chief Justice Lamer to circurnvent the limitation set out in
s.1 l(d) of the Chmter-that it appiies only to persons accused of 0ffen~es.I~~
"Judicial
independence" he stated,

"

is an unwritten nom, recognized and aamied by the preamble

to the Constitution Act, 1867. In fact, it is in that preamble, which serves as the w d
entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution, that the true source of our cornmitment to this
foundational principle is located.""
Twelve years earlier, the Canadian Bar Association felt both compelled and uniquely
positioned to explorethe concept ofjudicial independence in Canadian law because "lawyers
have a special relationship to the judges since both are vital elements in Canada's justice
~ystem."'~'The Special Committee on the Independence of the Judiciary in Canada argued
that judicial independence, as a componentof legal dispute resolution, required "(a) thejudge
be not associated in any way, even in appearance, solely with either of the parties to the
dispute;142
[and] @) thejudge not have any association or interest beyond the specific dispute
before him which might cause him to be, or appear to be, biased in favour of one side or the

r
The Independence of the Judiciary in Canada (Ontario:
14'Canadian~ aAssociation,
Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985) at 4.
''This dimension of judicid independence identified by the Special Committee is
akin to the idea of judicial impartiality to be discussed in the next section of this work.
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other."'"

Here, the symbolic importance of judicial independence was highlighted, for

"[o]nly if these conditions are satisfied, if the judge is compietely independent, wiffthe
contestmirs hnve the realîty and the semblance of af a i r trial?"

This is particularly hue of the criminal triai given that
-tees

S.

I l(d) of the Charter

persons charged with an offence "a fair and public hearing by an independent and

impartial tribunal." One cannot have a fair trial without at least the perception of judicial
independence. Chief Justice Lamer in Provincial Court Judges Case observed that in
addition to the objective aspects of judicial independence, %e court or tribunal [must] be
reasonably perceived as indq~endent"'~'for "the guarantee of judicial independence has the

goal not only of easuring justice is done in iodividual cases, but also of ensuring public
confidence in the justice system."lMAbsent that public confidence, the correlation between
the criminal law, as a symbolic reflection of community values, and the prevailing social

reality would be strallied if non-existent.

B. Judicial Impartiaiity
Not al1 academic authors accept that the foundationai p ~ c i p l e of
s impartiaiity and

judicial independence form the backbone of thejudicial fiution. Professor Richard Devlin,

for example, argues that judicial independence historically has been treated as the desired
"end" to which other principles informing fair decision-making, such as impartiality, are
- -

'"Supra note 1 4 1 at 7-8.
'Ulbid at 8. Emphasis added.

'4'Supra note 63 at 245. Emphasis in original.
%id
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sub~rdinate.'~'Devlin argues that in effect, the weaknesses in these supporthg principles
are camouflaged by the sweeping importance accorded the principle of judicial
independence. He posits that the concept of impartiality shouid be revamped, that the

judiciary ought to "corne cleanY'abouttheir hitherto uaspoken operating a~sumptions."~It
is preferable, he argues, for a judge to articulate what he or she thinks rather than have the
'iinspoken" decide the issues before him or her and form the true basis of otherwise carefiilly
scnpted written decisions. While Professor Devlin's three conceptions of impartiality are
thought-pro~oking,'~~
the difficulty is that instead of operating fiom one concept of
impartiality-"Themis b1Wolded"-practitioners and academics would be grappling with
multiple variations on the theme. In effect, there would be no common point of reference

147bcJudging
and Diveaity: Justice or Just Us?' (1996) 20 Prov. Judges J. 4 at 6-7.
'48ibidat 19. See also Martha Minnow "Stripped Down Like A Runner Or Enriched
By Experience: Bias And Impartiality Of Judges And Jurors" (1991-92) 33 William And
Mary L.R. 1201 at 1213 where the author writes: "The problem of bias for juries and for
judges arises not only when they are too close to or too far fiom those they judge but also
when they fail to identw an entrenched and biased assumption about whose perspective is
the nom." Further (at 12 17) she States:
None of us can know anyihing except by building upon, challenging,
responding to what we already have known, what we see fiom where we
stand. But we can insist on seeing what we are used to seeing, or else we can
try to see something new and fiesh. The latter is the open mind we hope for
fiom those who judge, but not the mind as a sieve without pior reference
points and commitments. We want judges and juries to be objective about
the facts and the questions of guilt and innocence but committed to building
upon what they already know about the world, human beings, and each
person's own implication in the lives of others. Pretending not to know nsks
leavhg unexamined the very assumptions that deserve reconsideration.
Unlike Devlin, it may be that while Minnow encourages personal examination of the
unspoken assumptions deriving fiom one's life experiences, their elucidation in the trial
process is not a pre-requisite for justice.
'49Supra note 147 at 8-20.
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upon which to base critique and analysis. As it is, al1 litigants and their legal representatives
theoreticaily have a level playing field. Nor should academics cry foui, for, in reality, issues
such as race, colour, gender, previous criminal record, and kquency of the offence in the
community, ought to be foremost in the mind of any defence or crown counsel in preparing

his or her case and in anticipating the trial judge's "Unspoken operathg assumpti~ns."'~~
Supreme Court of Canada justices al1 have a practical legal background idomiing the
subjectivedimension of their adjudicative h ~ t i o n . ' ~It 'is this legal practising background,
cornplementedby academic contributions to the ongoing legal dialogue, that deliversjudicial
subjectivity fkom dishonour; that tempers the impact of discretionary justice; and that
informs the concept of judicial impartîality.
'~
Devlin, himself,
Although advocating "judicial opemess and c a n d o ~ r " ,Professor
reveals the tautological nature of acadernic arguments decrying subjectivity as the poison in
the judicial process. The author articulates thRe questions'53that ajudge might ask himseif

15qtis common practice to make idormal inquiries of the local Bar if appearing
before a judge whose adjudicative style is unlaiown to the litigator. Such inquiries are
supplemented by an unofficial "grapevine" about the sitting judges and justices.
'"See R v. S. (R D.),supra note 3, where Cory J. observes (at 393): "It is obvious
that good judges will have a wealth of personal and professional experience, that they will
apply with sensitivity and compassion to the cases that they must hear."
lSzSupranote 147 at 19.

Is3lbidat 18-19. The three questions are: (1) "How am 1 to judge adother?" (2)
"Would 1 reach a different decision if the parties in question were white or people of
colour?"; and (3) ''If I were the person appearing before the judge, do 1think that suffcient
reasons have been given to satisfy me that 1have been treated in a fair mariner, even if 1have
not won my point?".

or herself in pursuit of the situationalist approachlYto the concept of impartiality. He then
concludes his discussion as follows:
Rather, they [the thRe questions] can be understood as regdative
mechanisrns through which we can monitor some of our own taken for
granted assumptions. Moreover, a situationalist approach is not a panacea.
It dues no# mean that we will always be beyond reproach. but if we me
mistaken then others c m demonstrate to us uur weaknesses and we c m l e m
fiom o w rnistahs. In short, the development of a pluralistically sensitive
conception of impartiality cannot corne prepackaged: it can oniy be achieved
by trial and error.
[Emphasis added]

"'

Who are these "others" who will demonstrate to the judiciary their weaknesses? 1s this not

merely substituthg one form of subjectivity-that ofthe unidentined monitors-for the alleged
subjectivity of the judiciary?'" Professor Devlin's analysis also fails to situate properly the

"'fiid. at 14-20. This approach, favoured by the author, is described as follows at

The act of judging, within this situationalist conception, is an inescapably
social act. Situationaiism emphasizes that everyone who is involved in the
legal process-both those who judge and those who are judged-are deeply
af5ected by their experiential contexts. Specifically, it suggests that cultural
forces are always crucial variables and that judging can only aspire to
impartiality if it is sensitive to social phenornena such as racialization.

IS6niesame observation applies to Jennifer Nedelsky's article entitled "Embodied
Diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 91. Relying on the work of
neurologist Antonio Damasio who explores the impact of the affective upon effective
reasoning, the author writes (at 105- 106):
If reason and judgment are impaired without the the aid of somatic
markers, how does one generate the appropriate &ect? The problem, as
Young notes, is that once affect is perceived as distinct fkom an interfering
with reason, there is no room for reflecting on affect, for evaluating it, for
educating it; feelings are simply the raw data of nature to be controlled by
reason. There are, however, parts of the Western intellechialtradition that do
d prey to that error. Atistotle, for example, discussed the need to
not f
educate affect in order to develop character. In the Arisfotelionqproach, we

concept of discretion as a controlled exercise of subjectivity relative to individualized
justice.'51
The Supreme Court of Canada recently canvassed the issues of bias and judicial
impartiality in R. v. S. (R.D.).''~The dissenting rasons of Major J. (C.J.C.Lamer and

should l e m what things it is appropriate tu be pleased by, and displeased
by. And ifwe do not-ifthe good does not please us-no amount of du@ can
generate good moral character.
The idea that goodjudgment requires lemning appropriate Meetive
responses h a interesting impIications for the education of lawyers and
judges. For example, it may be through great literature that jwists can best
be exposed to individual characters who exemplifi and thus teach the virtues
necessary for the profession: integrity, decency, compassion and wisdom.
Similmly, the project of educating lawyers andjudges in issues of race and
gender may be best understood not simply as a process of imparting
informution, but as an attempt to shzp Mecrive response.
pmphasis added] [Footnotes omitted]
Who, in a diverse muticuitural Canada, defines what is "good"? Who defines the
"appropriate affective responses" that goodjudgment requires? For instance, does a feminist
ideology defme the parameters of gooâness, and, if so, which branch of feminism?
Altematively, since the Charter is at root a liberal document, should liberal values be central
to the inquiry?
Is7SeeDavis, supra note 16 at 17 where he writes: ''Rules without discretion cannot
Mly take into account the need for tailoring results to unique facts and circumstances of
particuiar cases. The justification for discretion is often the need for individualizedjustice.
This is so in the judicial process as well as in the administrative process." A trial judge uses
his discretion, for example, in deterrnining the question of witness credibility, in d i n g on
legal arguments raised during the course of the trial, and in sentencing a convicted accused.
In these instances, the facts of the particuiar case and the generally applicable law WU be
detenninative of the discretionary decision but against the backdrop of general criminal law
principles. Thus, in sentencing an accused, the trial judge will consider appellate direction
on the appropriate range of sentence; in deciding a legal argument, he or she will apply the
relevant law to the facts in issue. See also R.J.Deslisle, Evidence: Principles cmdProblems
4th ed. (Ontario: Carswetl, 1996) at 18-22.
Supra note 3. The case focussed on a summary conviction trial involving an
accused black youth and the anesthg police officer. During the course of her oral judgment,
Judge Sparks made what could be considered improper and speculative remarks about white
police officers in their encouuters with "non-white" groups.
15'

S o p W J. conciimng), and his articulation of the justiciable issue, are preferable to those
of the majority:
This appeal should not be decided on questions of racism but instead
on how courts should decide cases. In spite of the submission of the
uppeilant und intemeners on his behalf; the case is primari& about the
conduct ofthe trial. A fair trial is one that is based on the luw, the outcome
of which is determined by the evidence, fiee of bias, real or upprehended
Did the triaijudge here reach her decision on the evidence presented at the
trial or did she rely on something else? ...
The trial judge stated that 'police officers have been known to
[mislead the court] in the past" and that "police officers do overreact,
particularly when they 're dealing with non-white groups" and went on to Say
"[tlhat, to me, indicates a state of mind nght there that is questionable." She
in effect was saying, "sometimes police lie and overreact in dealing with nonwhites, therefore 1have a suspicion that this police officer may have Lied and
overreacted in dealing with this non-white accused." This was stereotyping
ail police officea as lias and racists, and applied this stereotype to the police
officer in the present case. The trialjudge might be perceived as assigning
less weight to the police oflcer 's evidence because he is testifiing in the
prosecution of an acwed who is of a diflerent race. Whether racism exists
in our society is not the issue. The issue is whether there was evidence before
the court upon which to base a fmding that this [emphasis in original]
particular police officer's actions were motivated by racism. There was no
evidence of this presented at trial.'"
[Emphasis added]
Framing the issue in reference to the presence or absence of supporthg evidence is a

"9~upru
note 3 at 361-362. Cory J. (at 402 ) also addressed the issue of whether
there was evidence before the Court linking the police officers's actions to racist motivations.
He concluded that no such evidence existed. Contrarily, Justices L'Heureux-Dube and
McLachlin found (at 375) that there was evidence of a " 'racially motivated overreactiony7
by the police officer in that he put both the accused and his hand-cuffed cousin in choke
holds "purportedly to secure them." R J. Deslisle "Annotationy' (1997) 10 CR.(5th) 7 at
10 is somewhat dubious about the connection: "L'Heureux-Dubé J. fin& that the fact that
both boys were placed in choke-holds is evidence that his ovemeaction was racially
motivated. The link in left unexplained. ... Of what relevance is the 'overreaction' to the
issue of racism?"

necessary first step to M e r analy~is.'~"
Absent an evidentiary basis for her comments, a
judge in the position of the trial judge in S. (RD.) ought to exercise caution in voicing
apparently gratuitous staternents about a wit~ess.'~' To do othewise sabotages the

'"See Wendy Baker "Women's Diversity: Legal Practice And Legal Education-A
View From The Bench" (1996) 45 U.N.B.L.J. 199 at 206 where the author states:
While 1 am an enthusiastic proponent of judicial education,
particuiarly education which includes a focus on "social context", I cannot
ernphasize too strongly that judicial sensitivity and W h g cannot
compensate for a failure by counsel to properly analyze, plead and prove
matters conceming gender or racial equality or culnual diversity arising in a
lawsuit. Judges m o t substitute "judicial notice" for evidence or
compensate, to any signincant extent, for a failure by counsel to identie the
issues and present the appropriate facts and law. [Emphasis added]
Madam Justice Baker concludes (at 208):
Judges must continue to educate thernselves to increase their
awareness of and sensitivity to women's diversity and the context in which
decision-making occurs in the society that is Canada today. Law schools m d
continuing legal educators m u t prepare students and lawyers to identzfi,
anal'e, research, plead andprove the fucts and l m necessas, to permit
courts to reachfuir andjust decisiom in the context ofo diverse society.
[Emphasis added]
1 concur in this approach to the issues of diversity and equality and to the deterrnination of
related issues at trial based on the evidence adduced.
See also Beverly Mclachlin "Judicial Neutraiity and Equality" (Address to the
Rendering Justice Conference, Hull, Quebec, November 17-19,1995) at 24 where she writes:
My own view is that the fact that a judge or decision maker has expressed
particular points of view on a subject should not in the normal case disqualify
her. The reasonable onlooker would recognize, as Dickson C.J.C. did, that
judges necessarily corne to the bench or the case with views ... some of which
may touch the case at hand. The reasonable onlooker would also recognize
that judges and a@udicators by their profession und outh assume the
obligation of setting their personal views aride and rendering a verdict on
the law and the evidence.
[Emphasis added]
16'Whentrialcounsel engage in any type of speculativesubmissionsto the Court, they
are quickly put in their place by a vigilant trial judge! The issue of gratuitous judicial
statements in the triai context was addressed by J.O. Wilson, A Book for Jwlges (Canada:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1980) at 112. The author cites Chief Justice Culliton on
this topic to the effect that "comments of a general nature which [are] related to the issue
before him, mut] are not necessary to its determination" are best left unsaid, for "[s]uch

appeanuice of faimess in the triai process.
Justice Major determined that since there was no evidentiary foundation for the
judge's remarks, their propriety was indefensible:

The life experience of this trial judge, as with al1 trial judges, is an
important iogredient in the ability to understand huma0 behaviour, to weigh
the evidence, and to determine credibility. It helps in making a myriad of
decisions arising during the course of most trials. It ir of no value, however,
in reaching conclusions for which there is no evidence. The fact that on
some other occasions police officers have lied or overreacted is irrelevant.
Life eqverience is nota substitutefor evidence. There was no evidence before
the trialjudge IO support the conclusions she reached

....

Judges, as arbiters of tnith, cannot judge credibility based on
irrelevant witness characteristics. Al1 witnesses must be placed on equal
footing before the court.'62
[Emphasis added]
Justice Major concluded that "we are concemed with both the faimess and the appearance
of faVness of the trial, and the absence of evidence to support the judgment is an irreparable
defect."Ig Nor was the situation salvageable by speculating on what the judge might have

comments u d l y do no more that reflect the opinion of the judge." See also David M.
Paciocco cbJudicialNotice in Criminal Cases: Potentid and Pidalls" (1998) 40 C.L.Q.35
[hereinafler "Judicial Notice"] at 66 where the author, referring to the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal decision in R (D.S.), notes:
The problem is, how does one get from the general information that there is
systemic racism in a police force to the conclusionthat this particular officer
on this particdar day overreacted because of the race of the accused? Those
observations, however correct, are d i n k e d by evidence to the facts and are
therefore gratuitous. ... Without being arbitrary, there is simply no way to get
fkom the generai proposition that there are racist police officers, to the
specific conclusion that this officer was a racist
'62S~pra
note 3 at 364,365.

meant.'"

Had there been an evidentiary b i s for the comments and their relevancy in the

first place, nich a speculative exercise would not be necessary. Applying the test for h d i n g
a reasonable apprehension of bias as articulateci in, inter alia, Cornmitteefor Justice and
Liberty v. National Energy Board'",

Major J. concluded that the trial judge's comments

gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Fundameataily, what the dissenting justices did in S. (RD.)was staa with basic
principles. Was there evidence, on the record, to support the disputed comments of the trial
judge? That preliminary question ought to be the focus of any inqujr into gratuitousjudicial
comments that impact, or appear to impact, on the impartiai adjudication of a case.

'"

A trial

is not about the race, gender, religion or other personal characteristics of the accused. It is
about the proof (or lack thereof) of an allegation of wrong-doing by the accused, "a public
demonstration to denounce the crime and re-affirm the values it [the crime] infrh~ged."'~'

If the accused's personal characteristics are pertinent to the question of guilt or innocence,
then evidence on that point should be led through skilful cross-examination of Crown

1651nfia
note 172 and accompanying text. And see S. (R.D.), supra note 3 at 363.

166Foran excellent discussion of the importance of an evidentiary basis for judicial
reasoning see "Judicial Notice", supra note 161. Paciocco discusses (at 65-67) the S. @.De)
decisions at boththe trial and Nova Scotia Court of Appeal levels, concludingat 67: "As this
case demonstrates, taking judicial notice of matters not in evidence presents the risk of
creating a perception of bias. ... The lesson in this for trial judges is clear. When facts that
are not proved in evidence mggest themselves, they should not be relief [sic] on or even
referred to unless they are necessary to the decision and are of unquestionable relevance."
[Footnotes omitted].

1670ur
Criminal L m ,mpra note 95 at 23.

witnesses, through defence evidence, or both. Divorcing the individual accused's cultural,
ethnic, sexuai andor gender background fiom evidentiary collstraints threatens the trial
process a s the issue of guiit or innocence for the aileged wrongdoing is subverted to issues
of race, gender, sex and ethnicity where their relevancy to an issue before the Court has not
been established.

The law governing reasonableapprehension ofbias applied by Major J. in dissent was
that articulated in thejudgment of Justice Cory (Iacobucci J. con~urring).'~~
Major J. reached
a different conclusion based on his application of the test to the facts in S. (RD.). According
to Cory J., "bias denotes astate of mindthat is in some way predisposed to a particuiar result,
or that is closed with regard to particular issues."169His Lordship notes that irnpartiality, on
the other han& goes beyond the fact that a decision-maker has certain beliefs, opinions or

even bisses.'" "It must be dernonstrated that those beliefs, opinions or biases prevent the
juror (or, 1wouid add, any other decision-maker) fiom setting aside any preconceptions and
coming to a decision on the basis of the evidence ..."'7' Having clarifed the concepts of bias

and impartiality, and the potentially negative impact of the former upon the latter, Cory J.
elaborates the test for fhding a reasonable apprehension of bias:

I6'Supra note 3 at 366.
1691bidat 388. See dso Provincial Court Judges Case, supra note 63 at 245 where
Lamer C.J.C.discusses the Merence between independence and impartiality. "hpartiality
was defined by LeDain J. in Valente']as 'astate ofmind or attitude of the tribunal in relation
to the issues and the parties in a particular case. ... (emphasis added). Independence, by
contrast, focussed on the stufus of the court of tribunai." pmphasis in original].
1 7 0 ~ pnote
r u 3 at 389.

When it is alleged that a decision-maker is not impartial, the test that
must be applied is whether the particular conduct gives nse to a reasonable
of bias. ...It has long been held that actual bias need not be established This
is so because it is usuaüy impossible to detemllne whether the decisionmaker approached the matter with a truiy biased state of mind ...
It was in this context that Lord Hewart C.J. articulated the famous
maxim: "[iP is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" ...
The manner in which the test for bias should be applied was set out
with great cl*
by de Grandpré J. in his dissenthg reasons in Cornmittee
for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (IVutionaIEnergy Board), [I 9781 1 S.C.R.
369 at p. 394 ... :
...the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by
reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to
the question and obtaining thereon the required information.
... [The] test is "what would an informed person, viewing the
matter realistically and practicdy-and having thought the
matter through-conclude."
This test has been adopted and applied for the past two decades. It contains
a two-fold objective element: the person considering the alleged bias must be
reasonable, and the apprehension of bias itself must also be reasonable in the
circumstances of the case. ... Further the reasonable person must be an
infomed person, with knowledge of al1the relevant circumstances, including
%e traditions of integrity and impartiality that fom a part of the background
and apprised also of the fact that impartiality is one of the duties the judges
swear to uphold" ... To that 1 would add that the reasonable person should
also be taken to be aware of the social reality that forms the background to a
particular case, such as societal awareness and acknowledgement of the
prevalence of racism or gender bias in a particular ~ommunity.'~
[Emphasis in original]
The onus of proof is high-that of real liJselihood or probability of b i s as opposed to mere
s ~ s ~ i c i o n ~ ~ ~a -finding
f o r , ofreal or perceived bias is one that "calls into question not simply
the personal integr@ of thejudge, but the ïntegrity of the entire administrationofju~tice."~'~

Cory J. emphasizes that % M e r a reasonable apprehension of bias arises will depend
e n h l y on the facts of the case" and that "dl judges are subject to the same bdamental

duties to be and to appear to be impartial."'75 in addition, "it is vitai to bear in mind that the
test for reasonable apprehension of bias applies equally to al1 judges, regardless of their

background, gender, race, ethnic origin, or any other characteristi~."~'~

In applying the test for reasonable apprehension of bias to the facts in the case, Cory

J. concludedthat no reasonable apprehensionofbias occurred. He achowledged, like Major
I., that "there was no evidence before Judge Sparks that would suggesi that anti-Black bias
iafluenced thispcrrticulm police officer 's reactiom."In However, he held that thejudge was

in fact responding to the Crown Attorney's closing submission urging the Court to accept the
evidence of the police officer over that of the young person, R.D.S.
While both Major J. and Cory I. expressly dissociate themselves Corn the reasons of

Justices L'Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin,"' they are, at least, in agreement as to the test for
reasonable apprehension of biadn This common ground aside, their Ladyships discuss the

"%id at 402. Emphasis in original.

'" See Bruce Archibdd "The Lessons of the Sphinx: Avoiding Apprehensions of
Judicial Bias in a Multi-culturai Society" (1997) 10 C.R.(5th) 54 at 55-56 observes that al1
judges agreed that the test for reasonable apprehension of bias was that articulated by de
Grandpré J. in Cornmitteefor Jusfice and Liberw and that there exists a presumption of
judicial integrity. Archibald goes on to state (at 56) that while the application of the test for
bias appears contentious, "it is the 'treatment of social context' which became the most
significant point of contention among the justices." Deslisle, supra note 159, also

'Yailacy of judicial ne~trality"'~,the impossibility of objectivity"' but concede the
desirability of impartiality.la However, their view of impartiality necessitates a b'conscious,
contextual inqujr"."' This concept of impartiality compels the judge to put hirnself or
herself in the shoes of the accused and attempt to see the situation which gave rise to the
criminal charge from the accused's perspective. The workability of that exercise is doubtful

in that no one tnily can get into the mind of another, particularly when the judge and the
accused are meeting for the first t h e at trial.Iu Further, L' Heureux-Dubé's deference to
expert witnesses in establishing case context is problematic in that justice potentially

commented on the points of agreement in the three separate decisions. He writes (at 7): "It
is tme that the court, by a six-three majority, voted to restore the acquittais registered by the
trial judge, but a five-four majority referred to her rem& as 'unfortunate', 'troubiing',
'womsome', and 'unnecessary' per Cory and Iacobucci JJ., and 'stereotypical reasoning',
and %relevant', per Major and Sopinka JJ. and Lamer C.J.C."

'80Supranote 3 at 369.
But see McLachiin, supra note 160 at 34 where she states:
The end resuit of these practices-the putting aside of personai views,
the preserving of an open mind, the mental act of placing oneself in the
position of each of the parties, and finally, the use of reason to draw
inferences nom carefully considered facts imtead of stereotypical
assumptions-might be called the art of judging. .. It is much more than
according aprofonna hearing, much more than amiving at a conclusion that
makes us cornfortable. It is a professional process which has been used by
the most respected judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers for centuries
to attain the degree of objectivity requiredfor goodjudging.
It appears as if Justice McLachlin concedes the possibility of objectivity in this article,
contrary to her position in S. (R. D.).
%id

Insupra note 3 at 369.

'%s

charges.

presupposes that the accused has not appeared before the judge on previous

becomes a battie of the experts rather than a reasoned consideration of the evidence by the

hier of fact An expert opinion is, in f a just that-an opinion open to refbtation by
someone else in the field. Today's social context built on the opinion of Expert X may be
discarded tomorrow in favour of another m ~ d e l . ' ~
Whïie d l the justices in S. (RD.) agreed that social context had some relevance, they
were not unmimous as to the degree of relevance nor the manner in which social context
would be brought to the court's attention. This is problematic, especially for the effective
exercise of judicial discretion relative to the admissibility of social context evidence. If, as
Justices L'Heurewc-Dubé and McLachlin argue, a judge can take his or her Iife experience
a decision, independent of evidence on the issue to
into account in the course of r e n d e ~ g
which that life experience relates, to ensure trial fairness, that judge should hear only cases
involving persow of a similar background to him- or herself. In effect, segregated justice
would become mandatory in order to ensure that those of a similar race, gender, sexual
orientation, and ethnic background benefited from the presidingjudge's empathy. Hopefully,

the criminaI justice system in not heading in that direction. "Themis-blindfolded" may not
be a perfect model of impartiality as a response to the increasingly diverse nature of our

society, but it at least ensures a common point of departure for the adversarial process. The

'"Sec, for example, Robert P. Mosteller "Syndromes And Politics In Criminal Trials
And Evidence Law" (1996) 46 Duke L. J. 461. He States (at 46 1-462):
The perceived misuse of syndrome evidence is a major focus of criticism of
American criminal trials. 'Trash' syndromes, such as the 'Urban Survival
Syndrome,' ...attract national attention. Other syndromes, such as Battered
Child Syndrome, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, and
Battered Woman Syndrome, are more widely accepted. Even for this latter
group, however, the scientifîcvalidity and dimensions oftheir legitimate use
remain unclear and controversial.
m t n o t e s omitted]

prenimption of impartiality is not carved in stone; it can be rebutted through evidence, a
process open to al1 who h d themselves in a court of law.
This andysis of the S. (3.D-)case hopefully enlightens debate on the principle of
judicial impartiality in the decision-making process. But perhaps the singuiar most
important affimiation of judicial impartiaiity as a principle of pervasive influence upon the
issue of subjectivity is the statement of Lord Hewart in Rex v. Sussex Justices: "Pt] is of
hdamental importance that justice should not ody be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be d ~ n e . " ' ~The debate over subjectivity and the feasibility of
impartiality in the decision-making process shouid not focus on whether it is established,

as irrefhtable fact, that judicial impartiality operates at the subjective level of each judge.
Instead, energies wodd be better directed to an examination of whetherjustice has been seen
to be done. Justice Major in R

(SB.)captures the essence of such an examination when he

States:

Canadian courts have, in recent years, criticized the stereotyping of
people into what is said to be predictable behaviour patterns. ... Our
jurisprudence prohibits tying credibility to something as irrelevant as gender,
occupation or perceived group predisposition.
Simîlarly, we have eliminatedthe requirement for corroboration of the
complainant's evidence. ... The elimination of corroboration shows the
present evolution away fiom stereotyping vanous classes of witnesses as
inherently unreliable.
It can hardly be seen as progress to stereotypepolice officer witnesses
as Iikely to lie when dealing with non-whites. This wodd r e m us to a time
in the history of the Canadian justice system that many thought had passed.
El9241 1 K.B.256 at 259. Quoted in Wilson, supra note 161 at 3. The author,
who compiled the text at the request of the Canadian Iudicial Council, notes: "This
pronouncement, so simply stated, so profound in its sagacity c m never, how often repeated,
become a cliche. ... Justice, of course, cornes nrst but the appearance of justice is also of
major importance."

This reasoning, with respect to police officers, is no more legitimate than
stereotyping of women, children or minorities.'"

Clearly, stereotypical reasoning violates the principle of impartiality and the appearance of
justice suffers. Why should any witness waik away fiom a criminal courtroom labeiled a
racist or a liar in the absence of supporthg evidence? The sad fact that such may have been
done in the past as a result of a person's race, colour or gender is no justification for a
recurrence in today's colirtrooms. Cornmon sense dictates that if impartiality, at a minimum,
does not appem to have been exercised, then the M e r question of irnpartiality as a fact
is pointless. In the fuial anaiysis, judicial impartiality and independence are unwritten
constitutional noms. They are integral to the "cornmon core" of the criminal process
identifïed by Herbert Packer. "Themis-Blindfolded" stands at the gateposts of that process.
Admissible evidence, that is what will inform the trier of fact of the social context of crime,
not the marticulated and unlaiowable background of thejudge or the parties to the dispute. lS8
The principle of judicial impartiality, like that of judicial independence, is critical to

the constitutional guarantee of a fair tnal under S. 1l(d) of the Charter. The perception of
irnpartiality is crucial to the integrity of the criminal trial. Thus, in ~estray,'~~
the majority

found that the trial judge's actions in telephoning senior Crown personnel during the course

'8.supru note 3 at 364-365.

' I f , as in S. @D.), a social context issue of significanceto the disposition of the case
arises independent of the evidence before the Court, the presiding judge ought to give
counsel an opportunity to be heard, and to cal1 evidence, on that issue.
'8gSupranote 14.

of the trial 'kas sunicient in itseif to raise the issue of apprehension of bias."'"

The

majoriîy reasons did not delve M e r into the facts of the case in the interests of faimess:
It is important that a new trial be held, and as a result as Iittie as
possible should be said regarding the issues that may arise or the evidence.
... Particdarly, the trial judge shouid not be inhibited either by our
colleagues' view of the evidence and issues or ours, which could well be
different. At the new trial, both the Crown and the defence cari take whatever
steps and raise whatever issues they consider appropriate. The trial of ihese
accused like al2 whoface criminal charges should be fair and be perceived
to befair. To achieve this goal the issues raised at the new trial and thefucts
upon which they rest muît be detennined by ajudge who is not on& impurtial
but is seen by all to be impartial. m i s is clearly in the best interests of the
aceused and the c~rnrnunity.~~'
[Emphasis added]

Thus, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and of the Court's adjudicative process
depends upon an independent impartial judiciary capable of deciding cases on the bais of

legal principles and admissible evidence. Anything less would seriously erode the criminal
law's legitimacy and be a disservice to the rule of law in society.

V. Parliament and The Supreme Court of Canada-Ailies or Adversaries? Defhing
the Boundaries of Criminal Liability

Thus far, the major ideological influences operathg on the justices of the Supreme
Court of Canada as they M

I their adjudicative role have been canvassed. The resulting

ideological mix comprises the concepts of parliamentary and constitutional supremacy,
democratic and liberal traditions and values, due process and crime control considerations,
and challengesto the foundationaiprinciples of judicial independenceand impartiality. This

post-Charter ideologicai blend has transfomed the law of homicide. The Charter and the

Constitution Act, 1982 are the catalysts in the mix: the Supreme Court of Canada's
increasing activism under a system of constitutional supremacyln is the primary source of

the legal metamorphosis this area of the law has undergone.
The concept of constitutionai supremacy under S. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
and the concomitant responsibility of the Supreme Court of Canada to measure criminal
legislation against coIlStitutional imperatives and standards, has facilitated the Court's
activist leanings. Lamer J. in Vaillancourt Ig3 ( Dickson C.J.C.concmhg) identifies the
operating tension between a constitution-wielding judiciary and an elected Parliament
responsible for defining criminal behaviour. Conceming proof of the mens reu of an offence,
he stated unequivocally:
As a result, while Parliament retains the power to define the elements of a
crime, the courts now have the jurisdiction and, more important, the duty,
when called upon to do so, to review that definition to ensure that it is in
accordance with the principles of hdamental j ~ s t i c e . ' ~
Substantive review, under a Charter analysis, will engage the Supreme Court in the deiicate

task of balancing its new constitutional directive'95against the diminished, but d l powemil,
'"See "Keynote Address", supra note 67 at 4. n i e then Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Canada, speaking of the Charter's impact upon the principle of parliamentary
supremacy, stated: "Thus, in Canada, legislative supremacy is subordinate to Constitutional
supremacy, except to the limited extent that it is preserved by S. 33 of the Charter ..." For
a discussion of the concept of legislative supremacy as that term is understood in the
Canadian context see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
193Supra
note 100.

Ig5seeStrayer, supra note 46 at 32 where he writes:
Now we need look no f d e r that s.52 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 for the

principle of parliamentary supremacy in the interests of criminal justice.

in the Provincial Court Judges Case, Larner C.J.C.,speaking specincally of the
principle of judicial independence, articulates the Link between our founding constitutional
documenî, the Constitution Act, 1867and the Charter:
The preamble identifies the organizing principles of the Constitution Act,
1867, and invites the courts to turn those principles into the prernises of a
constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express
tenns of the constitutionai texî.
As 1said earlier, the express provisions of the Constitution should be
understood as elaborations of the underlying, &tten,
and organizing
in the preamble of the ConstitutionAct, 1867. Even though
p ~ c i p l e found
s
S. 11(d) is found in the newer part of our Constitution, the Charter, it can be
understood in this way, since the Constitution is to be read as a unified
whole. '"

Constitutional litigation rooted in the Charter is, therefore, not a legal exercise isolated fiom

Canada's constitutionaipast; rather, it is an extension of that past into the ongoing evolution
of our legd and political institutions. Canadians inhented a "Constitution similar in
Principle to that of the United ~ingdom".'" Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982
principle of supremacy of the constitution, for a partial definition of the
constitution covering the core statutes, and for the intended consequence of
supremacy: that is, the invalidity of inconsistent laws. While the section does
not specifically provide for judicial review to determine if there is
inconsistency, its adoption after 1 15 years of such judicial review under the
constitution implies that the courts are to continue to exercise such a role.
'%Supranote 63 at 242-243.

'"~ee Strayer, supra note 46 at 38-39 where the author States: "As noted above,
Canada m u t in some way have inhented the concept of parliamentary supremacy since the

preamble to the B.N.A. Act says we are to have a 'constitution similar in principle to that of
the United Kingdom'. Yet judicial review of legislative action has thrived in Canada while
in the United Kingdom its legitimacy is still very questionable." Strayer compares (at 42)
the grundnom of the British constitution/that the laws of the United Kingdom Parliament
are supreme and must be followed by the courts"-to that of the Canadianconstitution,where,
in addition %e laws of the United Kingdom Parliament are supreme" [emphasis in original].
He concludes (at 43):
In short, we have had a modification in our grundnom. We stiIl

maintains that the constitution is the supreme law of the land, and insofar as the principle of
parliamentary supremacy enjoys constitutionai statu^'^^ through the preamble to the

recognizethat the constitutional laws as enacted by Westministerfor Canada,
including the Ca& Act, 1982and its schedule, the ConstitutionAct, 1982.
are the supreme law of Canada, but we now aiso recognize that in the future
the supreme law-making authority ..mil1 belong to those Canadian legislative
bodies prescribed in the new constitutional amending formula ...
Thus while Parliament and Legislatures have legislative authority
Limiteci now by both the distribution of powers and the Charter guarantees of
individual rights and fieedoms, within the areas of authority left to each they
enjoy parliamentary supremacy. This means that, like Westminister, they
make laws which, if otherwise valid, the courts must respect.
See also Henri Brun in Beckton and MacKay, supra note 62 at 6, who writes:
The supremacy of Parliament has been weakened in the sense that the
laws of Parliament may now be challenged in the courts by virtue of specific
criteria set forth in the Charter. It remains unweakened, however, in the
sense that the parliarnents are still the bodies authorized to express the
uItimate standards of the state in accordance with the Constitution. And
dynamic law, the body of law that a society gradually creates for itself as its
needs evolve, continuesto flow, at the very highest level, from parliamentary
legislation. ...
The Charter of Rights has in no sense deprived the legislative bodies
of their responsibility to act as the primary agents in the continuous evolution
and refonn of the law.

"'In the Provincial Court Judges Case, supra note 63, Chief Justice Lamer (at 237)
wrote: "In my opinion, the existence of many of the unwritten d e s of the Canadian
Constitution can be explained by reference to the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867."
He added: '4t [the preamble] recognizes and afnmis the basic principles which are the very
source of the substantive provisions of the ConstitutionAct. 1867. ... It [the preamble] is the
means by which the underlying logic of the Act can be given the force of Iaw." The Chief
Justice found (at 238) that the preamble's "reference to 'a Constitution similar in Principle
to that of the United Kingdom', ... indicates that the legal and institutional structure of
constitutional democracy in Canada should be similar to that of the legal regime out of which
the Canadian Constitution emerged." Lamer C.J.C.found (at 240-241) that the preamble,
in recognizing and af3rming Parliamentary democracy "speaks to the kind of constitutional
democracy that our Constitutioncomprehends." See also Southam Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General),infra note 202 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Iacobucci's (as he then was)
discussion of the significance of the reference to "a Constitution similar in Principle to that
of the United Kingdom" in the preamble to the Comtitution Act. 1867 was cited with
approval by Lamer C.J.C.in Provincial Court Judges Case at 24 1. See also "Keynote

ConstihrtionAct, 1867, it remains a powemil influence on the '"nature of the legal order that
envelops and sustains Canadian society."'"

How ought the Court to approach its task of recognizing constitutional supremacy
in the context of a Parliamentary democracy where, untill982, the principle of parliamentary
supremacy was the primary restraint on judicial activity? In keeping with Chief Justice
Lamer's comrnents in the Provincial Court Judges Case,the Coordinate Model of the
Charter expounded by Brian Slattery offers an altemative to the portrayai of constitutional
and parliamentary mpremacy a s opposing rather than complementary principles:

Generally the Coordinate Model holds that the Charter allows for a
continuhg dialogue between the courts and legislatures as to the tnie nature
of Charter rights and the reasonableness of limits on them. But this dialogue
can occur ody if it is accepted that the roles of the executive, legislative and
judicial branches under the charter are reciprocal and not co&o&ional and
that their attitudes to one another should be flexible and founded on mutual
respect
Viewed thusly the Charter may be perceived "as the development and extension of the best

Address", supra note 67 at 2 where he States:
The preamble of the Constitution Act. 1867, fonnerly h o w n as the Brirish
North America Act, 1867, speaks of Canada functioning under "a
Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom". The British
Constitution involves the interplay of three unwritten principles, namely: (1)
the sovereignty of the Crown; (2) the Rule of Law protected by an
independent judiciary; and (3) the supremacy ofParliament.
pmphasis
added]
And see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Procedure: Control of the Process,
Working Paper 15 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975)at 23 where the commissiones write:
"Ourd e n constitution, the British North America Acts, and, to a lesser extent, the Bill of
Rights, place restrictions on the powers of our legislative bodies. Subject to these
limitations, parliamentary sovereignty remains a fcundamental constitutional doctrine."
199ProvinciulCowt Judges Case, supra note 63 at 239.
2w'Theoryof the Charter", supra note 64 at 710.

of Canadian constitutional tradition^."^"' This cannot be accomplished without growing
pains. Striking the baiance between old collstitutional traditions and new constitutional
mandates is a challenge, not a recipe for decoIlStNcting the legal system, especially if the
detractors have no viable substitutes?

This is particularly the case in the area of criminal

Law where the values embodied in the criminal justice system, and reflected in sections of

the Churter, do and must continue to underlie the decisions which result fiom litigation
arising fiom the criminal justice process.

2 m ~ eSoutham
e
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney-Genercrl),[1990] 3 F.C. 465, 73 D.L.R.
(4th) 289,114 N.R. 255 (C.A.) at 305-306 where Iacobucci C.J.(as he then was), delivering
the judgment of the Court, stated:
Strayer J. was of the opinion that courts had such a juxisdiction [to
apply constitutional restraints to the exercise of privileges by the Senate or
one of its committees] and found, in particular, that the adoption of the
Charter fundamentally aitered the nature of the Canadian Constitution such
that it is no longer "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom" as is
stated in the preambie to the Constitutim Act, 1867. Accepting as we m u t
thal the adoption ofthe Churter transformed tu a considerable extent our
former system of purIiamentary supremacy into our nvrent one of
constitutional supremacy, asf m e r Chef Jusrice Dichon described it, the
sweep Sttayer J. 's comment that our Constitution is no longer similm in
principle to that ofthe United KNlgdom is rather wide. Granted, much has
changed in the new coIlStitutional world of the Charter. But just as purists of
federalism have learned to live with the fededist Constitution that Canada
adopted in 1867 based on principles of parliamentary governent in a unitary
state such that the United Kingdom was and continues to be, so it seems to
me that the British system of constitutional government will continue to COexist alongside the Chifnot entireïy, which it never di4 but certainly
in many important respects. B e nature and scope of this CO-existencewill
dependnaturallyon thejurisprudence t h resultsfiom the questions brolrght
before the courts.
pmphasis added] [Footnotes omitted]
This passage was cited with approval by Chief Justice Lamer writing on behalf of the
majority in the Provincial Court Judges Case, supra note 63 at 24 1.
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Questions arising during constitutioBal adjudication do not always involve judicial
review of impugned legislation.

S t a ~ o r yprovisions otherwise within Parliament's

legislative cornpetence often are subjected to interpretivetechniques which impact upon the
operational eEect of the provision. The Criminal Code is obviously a key statute in that its
provisions are subjected to this process on a daily bais. As well, common law des-judicial
creations-may be r e f o d a t e d subject only to the discretion of the Court and such doctrines
as stare decisis. Reforrnulating common law d e s in the post-Charter context underscores
the impact of Charter values upon the law's evolution. This, too, is very important in the
criminal law context where S. 8(3)'03 of the Criminal Code ensures the continuing relevance
and importance of the common law to the criminal process. The impact is more subtle, yet
equally as forceful, when the Court engages in statutory or common law interpretation where
the challenged section or d e otherwise meets constitutional requirements. The case law
analyses undertaken in Chapter 3 will illuminate the subtleties of statutory interpretation and
reformulation of the cornmon law. Again, the issue of criminal liability is central to the
resolution of these cases.

VI. Summary
The Supreme Court of Canada is at the apex of the Canadian legal system, its justices

'03section 8(3) states:
Every d e and principle of the common law that renders any circunstance a
justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge continues in force
and appiies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act or any
other Act of Parliament except in so far as they are altered by or are
inconsistent with this Act or any other Act of Parliament.
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rendering decisions that have repercussions for the very fabric of Canadian society. The
Coint has gone from a position of relative obscurity to one of much-scnmnized visibility.
Originally created by federal statute in 1875, the Court bas been thrust fkom its largely
supe~sory
role under the auspices of parliamentary or legislative supremacy, into a more
active one under the Charter, a document rooted in the principle of constitutional
supremacy. The challenge ahead for the Court is to strike an acceptable balance between its
historical roots in a tradition of parliamentary supremacy and its new role as constitutional
arbiter under the Chmer. The impact of these respective doctrines on judicial decisionmaking at the Supreme Court of Canada level will be assessed in the law of homicide
analysis which foilows. S a c e it to Say at this point that there is considerable tension
between the historical traditionof deference to legislative pronouncements and the fledgling
concept of constitutionai primacy.
But other influences are at work. The tenets of Iiberalism, with their roots in the
protection of individual rights fkom unreasonable or unwarranted interference by the State,
have been diluted in the Canadian context by a communalist or collectivist principle which

accepts the legitimacy of group interests and nghts. The Court must grapple with these
realities in fashioning a t d y Canadian legal jurisprudence in our post-Charter liberal
democratic society. Superimposed on these philosophical underpinnings are the values
inherent in our ciiminalprocess, values vacillating between concem about crime control and
respect for due process. The Court has the unenviable task, in its role as adjudicator,to strike
a workable balance.
It is in its adjudicatory role that the Supreme Court of Canada faces the wrath of the

80
academc community's radical wing as that august body patrols the policy-making
implications of the Court's new mandate under the 1982 constitutional initiatives.
Subjectivity is portrayed as a destructive weakness penneating the judicial fûnction. Tirnehonoured principles of judicial independence and impartiality are under attack as being no
more than convenient shields for the political agenda of the individual justices. However,

as decisions like S. (RD.) illustrate, basic theoretical concepts, such as the presumption of
judicial integrity, the principle of judicial impartiality, and the overarching principle of
judicial independence, are the mainstays of fairness in the criminal process. The content of
those principles may be contested, but reliance on the intangibility of subjectivity as
justification for their irrelevance is unconvincing. If the approach of the radical realists is
taken to its extreme, the contention that subjectivity-that inescapable dimension of any

human activity- cannot be harnessed, itself, is a subjective opinion to be accorded no more
weight than an opinion to the contrary. Legal dialogue becomes peripheral and circular, a
screen behind which the real questions, such as the extent and scope of discretionaryjustice

as a legitimate exercise of subjectivity, are never addressed.
The principles ofjudicial impartialityand independence mould subjective influences
in the adjudicatory process. In the interests of fairness and justice, these principles are open
to refutation, a recognition that the human aspect of the judicial function, if not channelled
appropriately, threatens the truth- and fact-finding process. The d e s of evidence have
become increasingly responsive to the multi-culturaland diverse nature of o u society, to the
need to get at the truth through evidence that meets the tests of reliability and
trustworthiness. Evidence duly adduced and admitted into the record-this is the guarantee

ofdiversilied impartiaüty, this is the means of infonning the Bench of the cultural,racial and
gender dimensions of crime. Al1 of these institutional and normative concerns are brought
to bear in the criminai context, a detailed examination of which is the subject of the next

chapter of this thesis.

Chapter 3

From S a d Sta Mark to Feeney:
FoiIowing the Ebb and Flow of Legd Libemlism in the Law of Homicide
1. Criminai Liabiiity and its Pre-Charter Constitutional Context

Parliament's definition of criminal activity and the Supreme Court's review of the
adequacy and content of that definition in detennining criminal responsibility is at the
forefiont of the Court's struggle to synchronize its tradition of deference to Parliament with
its new mandate to measure Iegislation against Charter values. Over and above this
potentiaily codrontational aspect of judicial review of legislation, the Court's adjudication
of the constitutionalvalidity of Criminal Code provisions, and its reformulation of comrnon
law principles in the light of the Charter, have had an appreciable impact on the issue of

criminal liability.
The detennination of criminal responsibility is of fiindamental concem to any person
who is or may be in conflict with the criminal law. More so for persons charged with
homicide offences where the pend consequences upon conviction almost invariably involve
a period of Ilicarcerati~n.~~
The Supreme Court of Canada, buttressed by the Charter's
ovenvhelmingly liberal character as an individual ~ g h t sdocument, has undertaken a
reconsideration of the requisite mental elements of the homicide offences.fo5most notably

'"‘'Sec Isabel Grant, Dorothy Chunn and Christine Boyle, The L m of Homicide
(Ontario: Carswell, 1994) at 4-7 where they write: "The distinction between the three
offences [murder, maoslaughter and infanticide] is very important because they are subject
to vastiy different penalties."
2051bid
at 4-1 where the authors write:
Section 222(4) provides that ail culpable homicides are murder,

murder and manslaughter. Chief Justice Lamer's comments in the 1987 VailZancourt
decision, concerning the offence of constructive murder, bear repeating:
Prior to the enactment of the Chmter, Pmfiament hodfull legislativepower
with respect to the "TheCriminal Law "(ConstitutionAct, 1867, S. 91(27)),
including the deteminution of the essential elements of uny @en crime. It
codd prohibit any act and impose any pend consequences for infikgkg the
prohibition, provided only that the prohibition served "a public purpose
which can support it as k i n g in relation to criminal law": Ref: re S. 5(a) of
the Dairy Indm Act ... Once the legislation was found to have met this test,
the courts had very litile power to review the substance of the legislation. For
example, in R v. Sauit Ste. MMrr (City), ...Dichon J. (ar he then war) held
that, when an offence was criminal in the true seme, there was apresumption
that the prosecution mustprove the mens rea. However, it was dways open
to Parliament expressly to relieve the prosecution of its obligation to prove
any part of the mens rea, as it is said to have done in S. 2 13 of the Criminal
Code with respect to the foreseeability of the death of the victim. It is thus
clear that. prior to the enactment of the Chmter, the validiv of S. 2213 could
not have been successflly challenged '06
Fmphasis added]
The Chief Justice qualified his comments by stating: "However, federal and provincial

legislatures have chosen to restrict through the Charter this power with respect to criminal

manslaughter, or infanticide. ... The structure adopted in the Code presents
difficulties. The foundation actus reus elements for al1 three homicide
offences can be found in the underlying requirement that a death be caused,
as well as in the list of ways of committing culpable homicide in subsection
(5). n e distinction among the crimes is primariiy based on the mental or
fmlt elements requiredfor each, rather than on the actus rem. Thus, the
distinguishing fault elements for murder can be f o n d in s.229, and the
distinctive aspects of infanticide can be found in s.233. Manslaughter alone
is left without any special section setting out its distinctive fadt features.
They have to be found in the judicial interpretations of s.2U(S) and through
a process of eliminating those culpable homicides which are murder or
infanticide (s.234).
[Ernphasis added][Footnotes omitted]
206Supranote 100 at 324.

law."2M
These passages encapsulate the Charter's impact on the judicial consideration of
criminal intent. Previously, the concept of parliamentary supremacy fostered a deferential
attitude towards duly enacted legislation, even where an impugned provision, such as then

s.213 of the Criminui Code,'''

relieved the Crown of proving the mental elernent of the

crime. Parliament was supreme within itsjurisdiction as demarcatedb y the ConstitutionAct,
1867 and decisions rendered theremder. Federalism was the prirnary limitation on what

Parliament could and could not do?' The Charter changed this, for the essential elements
of dl offences now included 'hot only those set out by the legislature in the provision
creating the offence but dso those requkd by

S.

7 of the Charter.'""

Additionally, the

Court became more activist in overhauling common law principles impacthg on the fault

andysis and in interpreting duly enacted criminal legislation such that both the cornmon law
and the statutory provisions as interpreted were consistent with Chmter values.

'09See Provincial CourtJudges Case,supra ote 63 at 250 where Lamer C.J.C.,in
referring to Beauregad and recounting the sources of the judiciary 's independence, stated:
The institutional independence of the courts emerges fiom the logic of
federalism, which requires an impartiul urbiter to settle jwisdictional
disputes between the fideral and provincial orders of government.
Institutional independence also adheres in adjudication under the Chmter,
because the rights protected by that document are rights against the state. As
well, ...the preamble and the judicature provisions of the Constitution Act,
1867, [are]additional sources of judicial independence.
[Emphasis added]
'O

V~ilZancourt,
supra note 1 O0 at 326.

It is significant to note that the majority in Vaillancourt did not prioritize the dual
impact of criminal legislation and the Charter on its deliberations. Indeed, it may be argued
that the wording of the statutory provision and the relevant constitutional principle will
assume different weight depending on the context of the case. In the articulation of the
requisite mental element for murder, for instance, the Charter was a~cendant;~''
however,

in upholding the murder classification provision of the Code, Parliament's exclusive
jurisdiction in matters of criminal policy was the determinative factor.'12 But there were
significant legal precedents pre-dating VailZancourt bearing on the criminal fault analysis
that warrant discussion, particularly the pre-Charter case of R v. SauIt Ste. Mmie. 2"
The 1978judgmert in Sauli Ste. Marie set the stage for post-Charter developments

in the law of murder. Dickson I. writing for a unanimous Court, including Chief Justice

Laskin, canvassed the issue of mens rea relative to criminai and absolute liability offences214
preparatory to introducing into Canadian law a third category of o f f e n c e d c t liability
offences-to which the defence of due diligence would apply. Justice Dickson (as he then

was) stated:
The doctrine of the guilty mind expressed in tenns of intention or

*IISeeVaillancourt, supra note 100; Martineau, supra note 124; and Sir, in& note
298.

'12See Paré, supra note 1 14; Luxion, s u p note 302; and Arkell, supra note 302.

213Supru,
note 103. In this case the city of Sault Ste. Marie had been charged with an
absolute Iiability offence under Ontario pollution-control legislation.
214"6[~]bsolute
liability' entails conviction on proof merely that the defendant
cornmitted the prohibited act constituting the achis reus of the offence.": Supra note 103 at
40.

recklessness, but not negligence, is at the fomdation of the law of crimes. In
the case of t m e crimes there is a presumprion that aperson should not be
held liable for the wron&lness of his act ifthat act is without mens rea ...2's
[Emphasis added]

The mental element for a true criminal offence, thmefore, consisted not in negligence, but
in the intentionalor reckless commission of the impugned act coupled with knowledge of or

wilfid blindness towards the facts constituting the offence?

The Smlt Ste. Marie decision

reflected the Court's abhorrencein convicting an accused who, although causally responsible

for the offending conduct, might be 'hiorally innocent in every sense" given that his mental
state had been immaterial to the issue of legal guiitt2" This decision was one of the
highwater marks of the subjectivist approach to the issue of mens rea in Canadian criminal

law." * Crimjnai guilt in the absence of moral turpitude was an abhorrent prospect given the
punitive consequences following a conviction for murder. Proportiondity between legal
g d t and mord blameworthiness was deemed mandatory albeit in this pre-Charter context

the principle of subjective fadt was not accorded constitutionai status. David Paciocco, in
exploring the subjectivist tenor of the Sault Ste. Marie decision, explains the relationship

between the requisite mental element of an offence and moral fadt:

The paradigm criminal intends the consequences of his acts and knows the
circumstances in which he is acting. "Recklessness" and 'kilful blindness"
demand less, but they are still subjective States. A "reckless" actor does not

215Supranote 103 at 34.

218SeeDavid M. Paciocco "Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offences
and Defences" (1995) 59 Sask. L. R. 271 at 274.

intend the prohibited consequence but sees the risk that it will occur and
unjustifiably goes ahead despite that risk. The subjective fadt emerges fiom
the deliberate and knowing decision to take that nsk. An accused will be
''wilfùlly blind" when that person "àeliberately choose[s] not to know
sornethiag when given reason to believe inquiry is necessary". Not wanting
to know the tnith, the accused chooses to remain in ignorance. Moral fadt
emerges fiom the conscious decision not to confirm the existence of a fact
that the accused knows is almost certain to exist, so that ignorance can be

lea ad?^

It appeared that absent a subjective mental state, be it "intent", ''wilful blindness", or
bbrecklessness",presumptively, criminal liability couid not be established. Of necessity, the
parameters of subjective and objective fauit for criminal offences "lies at the very heart of
the debate about what we want criminal law to be?'

In tuni, the demarcation of those

parameters involves the interplay between Parliament, through its criminal legislation, and
the SupremeCourt of Canada through its decision-making in its constitutional, interpretative
and cornmon law capacities.
The Supreme Court of Canada,in deciding Sa& Ste. Marie,was not operating under
the auspices of the Charter when it introduced the defence of due diligence in respect of
public welfare offences. It was not measufing statutory content a g a k t constitutional values.
Mead, the Court premised its decisioo on the basic principle that liability should not be
divorced fkom the issue of fault?' The Court felt fiee to pursue its articulation of the strict
liability category of offences because "a jural category of public welfare offences [was] the

-

*191bid
nofiidat 272.

*'Supra note 103 at 54.

product of the judiciary and not of the legislat~re.''~Deference to Parliament, therefore,
was not an impediment to judicial activism in the area of judge-made law."

Nine years later when the Supreme Court of Canada heard the Vaillancowt case, the
legal lamiscape had changed immeasurably with the advent of constitutional supremacy as
a w o r b g premise for judicial decision-making. Distinctions between statutory and judgemade law no longer were a prerequisite to judicial consideration of the substantivenature of
the disputed legislative provision. The Court reformulated common law d e s deemed
outdated in the post-Chmter context, and interpreted vaiid criminal legislation in keeping
with the values and n o m of a post-Chmter Canada. During and d e r that nine-year interval,
the Court continued to build upon its legal guilt-moral fault criteria for detennining the

requisite mental elements of the homicide offences."
between Sault Ste. Marie and Feeney

An analysis of the case law decided

" will reveal the impact of both constitutional

supremacy and Parliamentary supremacy, as foundational constitutionalprinciples, upon the

"In the pst-Charter context see Swain. supra note 3 at 286 where Lamer C.J.C.,
speaking of the common law d e permitting the Crown to raise evidence of the accused's
insanity despite the accused's wishes to the con-,
stated: "If a new common law nile
could be enunciated ...1can see no conceptuai problem with the Court's sirnply enunciating
such a d e to take the place of the old d e ... Given that the common law rule was fashioned
by judges and not by Parliament or a Legislature, judicial deference to elected bodies is not
an issue."
U 4 ~ eAlan
e Mewitt and Morris Manning,Mewitt And Manning On CriminalLaw, 3d
ed. (Ontario: Buttemorths, 1994) at 58 where they *te: T h e principle of fundamental
justice propounded in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act Refrence was that of the requirement of
mens rea, of the need that criminal offences contain some mental element that ensures that
the 'morally innocent' are not brought within its ambit." Footnotes omitted].
U I ~ n f inote
a 373.
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Supreme Court of Canada's restnicturing of the homicide provisions and the determination
of criminal liability thereunder. Undercurrents of liberalism and of due process and crime
control values have greatly influenced the restruchiring process.

II. Ancio, Logan and Hibberl:
Attempted Murder-Principal and Party Liabiiity
In the 1984 case of R v. ~ n c i o the
. ~Supreme
~
Court of Canada considered the
requisite mental element for attempted murder. The specinc intent to kill was held by the
Court to be the requisite mental element, proof of which could found a conviction. The
following passage fiom Mchtyre J . 3 majority decisionm foreshadowed subsequent
developments in the law governing the offence of m~rder:~'
It was argued and it hm been suggested in some of the cases and
academic writings on the question, that it is iilogical to insist upon a higher
degree of mens rea for attempted murder, while accepting a lower degree
amounting to reckiessness for murder. 1 see no ment in this argument. The
intent to kill is the highest intent in rnurder and there is no reason in logic
why an attempt to murder, aimed at the completion of the full crime of
rnurder, should have any lesser intent. Ifhere is ony illogic in this matter,

"6[1984] 1 S.C.R.225, 10 C.C.C. (3d) 385,39 C.R.(3d) 1 [hereinafter Ancio cited
to C.R.]. The accwed had k e n convicted of attempted murder through the combination of
S. 24(l )-the bbAttempts"
section-and S. 213(d) [subsequently S. 230 (d), repeaied ,S.C. 1991,
c. 4, S. 11 of the Code, the constructive murder provision.

ZZ'Laskin, C.J.C.took no part in this judgment. Both Justices Lamer and Dickson
concurred in the majority decision.
228SeeDon Stuart "Annotation" (1984) 39 C.R. (3d) 2 at 3 where, in reference to
Justice McIntyre's remark concerning the illogic of characterizhg an unintentional kii1ing
as murder, the author alludes to "[tlhis hint of an attack on the legitimacy of foms of murder
short of intentional killing ..."

if is in the statutory charucterizotion of unintentional killing as murder. zw

[Emphasis added]
Responding to the illogical statutory characterization, itself a product of Parliament, the
Ancio case compeiled the seven-member majority to ove-

its previous decision in Lajoie

v. R" where the phrase "intent to commit an offence" under S. 24(1) of the Criminal Code
231

was held to mean, in relation to the offence of murder, an intention to conunit that

offence in any of the ways provided in the Code.*2 The Charter was stiil in its infmcy, but
the Court was flexing its muscle in the post-Charter criminal law context albeit as an
exercise in statutory interpretation. A subjectivist ideology compatible with liberaiism's
emphasis on the autonomy and liberty of the individual began to emerge, facilitated, in part,

229S~pra
note 226 at 25. But see the pre-Charter case of Fmant, supra note 102
where Dickson J. for the majority (which included Mchtyre J.) held (at 291) that the court
could not consider the policy of legislation validly enacted. In Farrant the Court upheld the
accused's second degree murder conviction under the constructive murder provisions of the
Criminal Code.
='(1973), [1974] S.C.R. 399,20 C.R.N.S. 360, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 313.

=' R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. This section retains the same numbering and content under
the curent Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Section 24(1) states:
Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do
anything for the purpose of carrying out his intention is guilty of an attempt
to commit the offience whether or not it was possible under the circumstances
to commit the offence.
"See Grant, Chunn and Boyle, supra note 204 at 4-34:
Before the Supreme Court of Canada began to tinker with the
Crimiml Code's murder provisions in 1987, S. 229 and S. 230 included a
gradation of definitions of murder based largely on the level of mens rea
involved fiom intentional, reckless, and negligent murder in S. 229 to
constructive murder in S. 230, where there was no mental element required
with respect to causing deatb. AU of these definitionsconstituted murder and
were subject to the same penalty.

by the Court's hcreasing detachment fiom a tradition of parliamentary deference in its

adjudicative fhction.

Six years later in R v. Logan, the Court constitutionalizedthe Ancio niling requking
a specifk intent to kill as the requisite mens rea for attempted murder?'

At issue was the

constitutionality of S. 2 1(2) of the C'mina1Code. That section states:
Where h ~ or
o more persons f o m an intention in common to carry out an
unlawfid purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of hem, in
carrying out the comrnon purpose, cormnits an offence, each of them who
knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence wotdd be
a probable consequence of carrying out the cornmon purpose is a party to that
offence."
Lamer C.J.C.subjected S. 21(2) to a s.7 anaiysis under the Chmter: ''If an offence is one of

the few for which s.7 requires a minimum degree of mens rea, Vaillancourt dues preclude
Parliament from providing for the conviction of a party to that offence on the basis of a
degree of mens rea below the constitutionally-required

He concluded: "Given

that a minimum degree of mens rea (subjective foresight) is codtutionally required to
convict a principal of the offence of attempted murder' the restriction of s.7 in this case is in

U3[1990]2 S.C.R.731, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 391, 79 C.R. (3d) 169 at 177 [hereinafler
Logan cited to C.R.]. The accused had been convicted of attempted murder through the
operation of S. 21(2) of the Criminal Code. Lamer C.J.C.on behalf of the majority which
included retiring Chief Justice Dickson stated (at 177): "Ancio, supra, established that a
specific intent to kill is the mens rea required for a principal on the charge of attempted
murder. However, as the constitutional question was not raised or argued in that case, it did
not decide whether that requisite mens rea was a constitutional requirement. The case simply
interpreted the offence as currently legislated." [Emphasis in original]. ui Logan,the Ancio
d i n g , which was restricted to principals, was extended to include non-principals.
m ~ S . C 1970,
.
c. C-34, S. 2 1. The section maintainsthe same content and numbering
under R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

Ussupranote 233 at 177.

convicting, through the operation of S. 2 1(2), a non-principal who does not have that same
degree of mens rea"u6 In the subsequent S. l analysis, the Court struck a balance between
the legitimate legislativeobjective underiying s.2 1(2),and the constitutional requirement for
a minimum degree of mens rea before finding a non-p~cipaicharged with attempted
murder guilty of the offence through the operation of s.2 l(2):
This differentid treatment of parties and principals charged with attempted
murder is the restriction which must undergo the S. 1 test.
h this case, the objective of such a differentiation is to deter joint
criminal enterprises and to encourage persons who do participate to ensure
that their accomplices do not commit offences beyond the planned unlawful
purpose. This is a legislative objective of sufncient importance to justify
ovemding the nghts of an accused under s.7 of the Charter?'
[Emphasis in original]
Although the Court dtimately determined that the legislative objective could not justify the
objective portion of s.2 l(2) contained in the phrase "or ought to have k n o ~ n " , ~it 'restricted
its ruling to that small class of offences where "it is a constitutional requirement for a

conviction that foresight of consequences be s ~ b j e c t i v e ~such
' , ~ ~ as murder, attempted
murder, and theft. "Because of the importance of the Iegislative purpose, the objective

=%ee Isabel Grant "Developments In Criminal Law: The 1993-94 Term" (1995) 6

S.C.L.R.(2d) 209 at 2 12 where the author, commenthg on Logan stated: "In the Supreme
Court of Canada, the high point in terms of a cdpability analysis came in 1990 with R v.
Logan, where the Court equated the stigma of attempted murder with that of murder,
characterizing an attempted murderer as a 'lucky murderer'." Footnotes omitted]. The
author explained (at 212) that a culpability analysis cYocuseson the mental state of the
accused and on the blameworthiness we attach to that mental state".
239~upra
note 233 at 181.

componentof s.2 l(2) can bejustified with respect to most [other] off en ce^."^^ The Supreme
Court used the language of coIlSfitutional adjudicatiowot staMory interpretation-in
rendering the objective portion of the impugned provision inoperative vis-a-vis those
offences requiring subjective foresight of consequences. Logun is an illustration of the Court
bdancing, quite effectively, the foundational principle of parliamentary primacy with that

of constitutional nipremacy.
Section 21(2) again came before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. ~ i b b e r t . ~ ~ '
In interpreting the meaning of the phrase "intention in common", Chief Justice Lamer for a
unanimous Court stated: "[Wlhen Parliament drafts a statute in language that, on its face,
supports more than one meaning, it is appropriate for a court to consider which of the
alternative interpretations that are available best accords with Parliament's intention ...,3242

One of the guide's used by Lamer C.J.C. in detennining Parliament's intention was the
common law governing party liabilit~?'~ Mer reviewing the relevant common law

"1[1995] 2 S.C.R.973,99 C.C.C. (3d) 193,40 C.R.(4th) 141 mereinder Hibbert

cited to C.R.]. The accused had been charged with attempted murder through the operation
of S. 21(2) of the Code. The Crown alleged that he had been a party to the shooting of the
victim, Cohen. At trial the accused was acquitted of the main charge, but convicted of the
includedoffence of aggravated assault. The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the accused's
appeal fiom conviction. On M e r appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the conviction
was set aside and a new triai ordered.

243hid
at 160. Lamer C.J.C.stated: "Although S. 21 of the Code was intended to

simpli@ the law governing parties by eliminating the old distinctions drawn at common law
between principals in the first and second degree, accessories before and d e r the facf etc.,
there is no indication, in the section or elsewhere, of any intention by Parliament to radically
alter the basic principles of party liability, including its mental element."

94

authorities, he concluded :"These English cases reveal that the mens rea for party liability
at common law is not of the sort that is capable of being 'negated' by duress. Put another
way, it is not a precondition for party liability at common law that an accused actively desire
that the underlying criminal offence be successfbliy completed.""

Chief Justice Lamer

applied this reasoning in determinhg the meaning of both S. 2 1(l )(b) and S. 2 1(2).245

Speaking speciiicaily of

S.

21(2) he concluded: "Lnterpreting the expression

'intention in common' as connoting a mutuality of motives and desires between the party and
the principal would restrict the scope of this section in a manner that is difEcult to just* on

*'%id at 161. Emphasis in original.

2451bid
at 164-167. See also Kenneth Campbell "Party Liability In Homicide Cases"
in Frank Armstrong, ed., Crown's Newdetter, vol. 3, 50th Anniversary Issue (Ontario:
Ontario Crown Attorneys' Association, 1996) 3 1 at 3 1-32. The author writes:
In R. v. Hibbert, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the context of considering
whether the defence of duress negated the mental element for "party"
liability, considered the general mens rea requirements of S. 2 1 of the Code.
In the course of his analysis of the provisions of S. 21, Larner C.J.C.,on
behaif of a unanimous Court, enunciated the following two important legal
propositions:
(1) The mental element for "aidiog", reflected in the phrase in S.
21(1)@) of the Code, which bases criminal liability of an alleged "aider" on
whether or not the act or omission was done 'Tor the purpose of aiding"
another person to commit the offence, means only that the alleged "aider"
must have "intende#' the act. It does not relate to the "desire" or ''ultimate
object" of the accused in performing the act.
(2)Sunilarly, the mental element in S. 21(2) of the Code, which
requires that a number ofpersons form an "intention in common'' to carry out
some unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein, means no more than
that the two or more persons "must have in mihd the same unlawfui
purpose." It does not require that the individuais share the same motives or
subjective views with respect to the desirability of the c'uniawfÙlpurpose".
[Bold-face italics in original] Footnotes omitted]

the basis of Parliamentary

In reaching this conclusion, the comments of

Martland J. in previous case law to the contrary were held not to reflect the law in Canada
on the relation between duress and mens rea under S. 2 l(2) of the Code.247 Of signifïcance
to this paper, were the Supreme Court of Canada's efforts in Hibbert to conduct its exercise

in statutory interpretation with due regard to Parliament's decision to broaden the reach of
criminal culpability under the party-liability provisions of the C~de.~~%uentheticalIy,
the

Court qualïfied its deference to Parliament by noting that Parliament's ability to do so is
limited by the restrictions imposed by the Charter?

Logan was cited as a case in point.z0

III. B.C. Motor VeliicleAct Reference, Vailiancourt,Par&,Mafiineau and Cooper:
The Requisite Mentai Element for Murder

The pre-Charter Suult Ste. Marie decision was revisited by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the 1984case of Reference Re M.KA. (B.C.)?' At issue was the constitutionality

of the absolute liability offence of dnving while prohibited contrary to provincial motor
vehicle legislation. Speaking forthe majority, which included Chief Justice Dickson, Lamer
J. stated:

2 4 S ~note
a 241 at 166.
"'fiid. at 166- 167.
2481;bid
at 165- 166.

2491bid.at 165.
Uolbid.at 165-166.
U'Supranote 107.

Indeed, as 1 said, in pend law, absolute liabiliîy always offendr the
principles offyndamenntoljustice irrespective of the nature onhe offence; it
offends s.7 of the Charter if, as a resdt, anyone is deprived of their life,
liberty or security of the person, irrespective of the requirement of public
interest. In such cases it rnight only be salvaged for reasons of public interest
d e r S. 1.252
[Emphasis added]
The impugned provision was found to be inconsistent with the Chorrer. Professor Stuart
noted that the case estabiished that "a due diligence defence was the minimum standard of
fault required by the Charter for any type of offence threatening the liberty interest ..."ZS3

Penneating the entire decision was the legal guiltfmoral fault dilemma evidenced by Lamer
I's comment that "[ilt has from t h e immernorial been part of our systern of laws that the
innocent not be p ~ n i s h e d . "Challenges
~
to the sufficiency of the fault standards for Criminal
Code offences were imminent.u5

According to the majority in Refereren Re M. KA. (B.C.), the administration of the
justice system is "founded upon a belief in 'the dignity and woah of the human
personY@reamble
to the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C.. 1970, App. III) and on 'the d e of

z3Churter Justice, supra note 10 at 67. And see Rosemary Cairns Way "The
Charter, The Supreme Court And The Invisible Politics of Fault" (1992) 12 Windsor Y .B.
Access Just. 128 at 134.
WSupranote 1O7 at 3 18.

2SsSeeDon Stuarî, Canadm Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995)
[hereinafter Canadian Criminal L m ] at 182 where he writes:
Once the Supreme Court decided in Motor VehicleAct Reference that
a due diligence defence was a minimum standard of fadt required by the
Charter for any type of offence threatening the liberty interest, it was only a
matter of time before the Supreme Court wouid have to decide whether that
standard was sufficient for Criminal Code offences.

Iaw' (preamble to the C d a n Charter of Rights and F r e e d o ~ ~ l ~The
) . "phrase
~
'cprincpIes

of fiindamental justice" was subjected to a purposive analysisZnand was held to be "a
qualifier of the right not to be deprived of the ri@ to life, liberty and security of the

As a quaiifîer, the phrase serves to establish the parameters of the interest but
it cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to nustnite or stultifjr them. For the

narrower the meuning given to "principies offindamental justice" the
greater will be the possibility ?bar individids may be deprived of these most
basic rights. ThThis latter resull is to be avoidedm e n that the rights involved
are asfundamentai as those which pertain tu the life, liberty andsecurity of
the person, the deprivation ofwhich 'haF the most severe consequences upon
an individual" ...z9
pmphasis added]
The individual-the darling of liberal ideology-had become the focus of S. 7 rights, and 'Wie
task of the court [was]

... to

secure for persons 'the full benefit of the Charter's

protection'...'7260 In fulfilling its task, the Court refused to limit the scope of review under

U6Supranote 107at 309. See also Swain, supra note 3 at 280 where Lamer C.J.C.,
refers to, inter alia, Reference Re M. KA. (B.c)as iilustrative of the fact that the Supreme
Court of Canada has "on numerous occasions, acknowledged that the basic principles
underlying our legai system are built on respect for the autonomy and intrinsic value of al1
individuais."
U 7 ~ oardiscussion of the purposive approach to C?zarter ùiterpretation see R v. Big
M h g M m , [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295,18 D.L.R.(4th)321,18 C.C.C. (3d) 385 and Hunter v.
Southam, supra note 105.
?hipra note 1O7 at 308.

260fiid
at 306. See aiso Eric Colvin, Principles of C r i m i d Law, 2d ed. (Canada:
Carswell, 1991) at 18- 19. The author states (at18):
"In Reference re S. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, the Supreme Court was
faced with an issue about the relationship between punishment and
culpability. ....

98
S. 7 to alleged procedural breaches, but widened that scope to include

substantive ma-

as well. Lamer J. found that substantive review of the content of legislation was not new
to Canadian law.6' rather, the scope of constitutional adjudication, itself, had merely
expanded beyond the histoncal distribution-of-powers analysis to encompass individual
rights.

However, Larner J. took great pains to demarcate judicial encroachment on

Parliament's criminal law power under its expanded reviewjurisdiction: "In neither case, be
it before or after the Charter, have the courts been enabled to decide upon the appropriateness
of policies underlying legislative e ~ t m e n t s . " ~ ~ ~

They [Refrence re 94(2) of the Motor Vehide Act, VailZancourt, and
Marlineau] have, however, put into question much existing law on the scope
and level of culpability for criminal offences. Legislative prescriptions
respecting cuipability m e no longer of paramount authority. ïkey are
subject tojudicial reviav in Iight of the constitutional requirement thot the
[Emphasis added]
principres offindamentaIjustice be o b s e d
*%ipra note 107 at 303-304.
IbM at 304. And see Patrick Monahan and Andrew Petter c'Developments In
Constitutionai Law: The 1985-86 Tem" (1987) 9 S.C.L.R.69 at 74-75. The authors Mite:
"mhe Supreme Court itself has repeatedly acknowledged that its role under the Charter is
a limited one. The Court believes that it is confined to applying the text of the Constitution
objectively and is not permitted to assess the wisdom of legislation." M e r a discussion
(at75) of the underlying liberal tenet that "the state's power is uot absolute; individuals
retain for themselves some residual elernents of their original liberty", the authoa conclude:
"This is why Mr. Justice Lamer in the Motor Vehicle Reference was so quick to dismiss the
argument that the courts have been asked to review the 'wisdom' of emctments According
to Larner J., the Charter issue is not whether the legislative policy is desirable but rather
whether the state possesses the power to interfixe with individual liberty, a Werent matter
entirely."
262

The Supreme Court of Canada favoured a liberal approach to the Churter, with-as
we shall seôconsequences for the law of homicide.263 As well, the Court continued to
espouse its guardianship role while verbaiiy acknowledgingthe supremacy of Parliament in
matters of criminal p o l i ~ y However,
.~~
the impending overhaul of homicide law under the
auspices of

S.

7 of the Charter catapulted the Court into a confiontational role with

Parliament whatever its pronouncements or protestations to the ~ontrary.~~'

263SeeJohn D. White "Annotation" (1986) 48 C.R. (3d) 29 1 at 292 who &tes:
"mhe h e between the administration of legal n o m and general political supervision by
the courts has grown dimmer by this decision."
2m'SUpanote 107 at 304-305 where Justice Lamer responded to the argument that

expanding the scope of review under S. 7 wodd "inexorably lead the courts to 'question the
wisdom of enactments', to adjudicate upon the merits of public policy", by reminding
detractors "that the historie decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution was taken
not by the courts but by the elected representativcs of the people of Canada." He added (at
305): "It was those representativeswho extended the scope of constitutional adjudicationand
entnisted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility. Adjudication under the
Charter must be approached fiee of any lingering doubts as to its legitimacy."
265See,for example, R v. Jobidon [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714,7 C.R. (4th) 233,66 C.C.C.
(3d) 454 [hereinafter Jobidon cited to C.R.] where, one year after the decision in Reference
Re A4. KA. (B. C.), the common law defence of consent, under the umbrella of unlawful act
manslaughter, came before the Supreme Court of Canada. The accused and the deceased
were involved in a fight in the parking lot of a hotel. The deceased suffered severe trauma
to the head and died as a result. The accused had been acquitted of the manslaughter charge
at trial when thejudge found that the defence of consent negated the underlying unlawful act
of assault. The trial judge was overtumed on appeal and a guilty verdict on the charge of
manslaughter entered. The Ontario Court of Appeai was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Canada following its conclusion that the unlawfui act of assault, on the facts in Jobidon, was
not subject to the defence of consent.
GorîthierJ. for the majority &amer C.J.C. did not take part in this decision] identified
(at 242) the main question to be decided as foilows: "The principal issue is whether absence
of consent is a material element which m u t be proved by the Crown in all cases of assault,
or whether there are common law limitations which restrict or negate the legal effectiveness
of consent in certain types of cases." He held that the defence of consent to a charge of
assault under S. 265 of the Criminai Code was subject to common law lirnits despite the
unqualified statutory wording to the contrary. Section 265 (I)(a) states: "A person commits

In the 1987 Vailluncourt decision, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the
constitutionality of S. 2 13(d)266 of the Crimimi Code."

The accused was convicted at trial

of second degree murder. The culpable homicide had occurred during the armed robbery of
a pool hall. To begin his d y s i s , Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, explicated the
mental state to be proven under S. 213 (d), as weil as its nature and scope, by analyzing that

provision in the context of the other murder sections?

The requisite mentai element for

an assault when without the consent of anotherperson, he applies force intentionaiiy to that
other person, dîrectly or indirectly." [Ernphasis added]. in effect, a person cannot consent
to bodily h m .
Canadian Criminal Law,supra note 255 at 18 notes: "[Tlhe effect of the majority
interpretation was to create a new crime ... and to read the words 'without the consent of
another person' out of the assault definition in section 265 of the Cnminal Code." And see
(1992) 7 C.R (4th)235 at 236: "Surely a construction that
S.J.U@ch c6Ann~tationy'
jenisons 'the plain words of S. 265' goes beyond interpretation." And see also Clayton C.
Ruby and Suzanne Jarvie "Developrnents In Criminal Law And Procedure: From Seaboyer
to Stinchcombe: A Review of the Major Decisions of the 1991-92 Temi" (1993) 4 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 379 at 396.
266Section2 13(d), repeaied by S.C. 199 1, c. 4, S. 1, stated:
Culpable homicide is murder where a person causes the death of a human being while
committing or attempting to commit high treason or treason or an offence mentioned in
section 52 (sabotage), 76.1 (hijackhg an aircraft), 132 or subsection 133(l) or sections 134
to 136 (escape or rescue from prison or lawful custody), 143 or 145 (rape or atternpt to
commit rape), 149 or 156 (indecent assault), subsection 246(2) (resisting arrest), 247
(kidnapping and forcible confinement), 302 (robbery), 306 (breaicing and entering) or 389
or 390 (arson), whether or not the person means to cause death to any human being and
whether or not he knows that death is likely to be caused to any human being, if

.*.
(d) he uses a weapon or has it upon his person
(i) during or at the thne he commits or attempts to commit the offence; or
(ii) during or at the tirne of his flight after cornmitting or attempting to commit a
offence,
and death ensues as a consequence.

268S~P
note
r ~ 100 at 3 18-320.
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murder under the CFhimZ Code provisions ranged h m subjective foresight of death on the
part of the perpetrator to objective foreseeability or negligence?

Lamer J. then turned to

the Charter and isolated two principles of fiindamentai justice under S. 7 pertinent to his
analysis. First, in keeping with the hdings in Sait Ste. Marie and Reference Re M KA.
(B.C.), he found mens rea to be an essential elernent of any offence where the penalty,

following conviction, constituted a restriction on the accused's liberty."

M. KA. (B.

"[Refeence Re

thus elevated mens rea fiom a presumed element in Saulr Ste. Mmie, supra,

to a constitutionality-required element.'"'

However, those two cases left undecided the

furthet question concerning what "level of mens rea was constitutionally required for each

type of offence"."

Vailancourt was the first opportunity the Court had to consider the

secondary question of the level of mens rea constitutionaily required for the offence of
murder. Thus begins the controversy over whether an offence calls for a constitutionallymandated subjective or objective level of mental intent.
To assist hixn in the determination of the requisite level of mens rea for murder,
Justice Lamer introduced the concept of stigma into the Iegal guilthoral fault equation.

2 6 % ~see
t Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 103 at 40 where Dickson J. says that
negligence has no place in the criminal Iaw. The issue of negligence and an objective
standard of intent came before the court in the Creighron quartet, infi note 391.

270Supranote 100 at 324.

But, whatever the minimum mens rea for the act or the result may be, there
are, though few in number, certain crimes where, because of the speciai
nature of the stigma attached to a conviction therefor or the available
penalties, the principles of fiindamentaljustice requUe 3mens rea reflecting
the particdar nature of that crime. Such is the& where, in my view, a
conviction requires proof of some dishonest.. Murder is another such
offence. The punishment for murder is the most severe in our society, and
the stigma that attaches to a conviction for murder is similarly extreme. in
addition, murder is distinguished fiom manslaughter only by the mental
element with respect to the death. It is thus clear that there must be some
special mental element with respect to the death before a culpable homicide
can be treated as a murder. That special mental element gives rise to the
moral blumavorthiness whichjustzFes the stigma and sentence uttached to
a murder conviction "
[Emphasis added]
He concluded by h d i n g that "it is a principle of fundamentai justice that a conviction for
murder cannot rest on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective

Stigma, as an analytical comtruct in defking the collstitutionally-required fadt
element for criminal offences, was linked by Justice Lamer to both social opprobrium and
pend c o n s e q ~ e n c e s . ~In~ effect,
~
the moral fadt of the accused should justify both the

penalty and the stigrna consequent upon conviction.276 Stigma as social opprobrium is a

'"Sec Alan Brudner "Proportionality. Stigma and Discretion" (1 996 ) 38 C.L.Q. 302
at 303-304. See also OM CrimiMI L m ,supra note 95 at 22 where the commissioners,
under the caption "The Meaning of Guilt" stated: "Real crimes consist of seriously won@
acts, and anyone sent to prison or otherwise punished for a real crime is being stigmatized
[emphasis added] for wrongdoing. Justice, therefore, demands that he should have meunt
to do the act forbidden ..." [Emphasis in the original].

problematic concept given that there is no criminal fault-public opprobrium scale matching
the two in a principled way for the purposes of sentencing where ciifferences in moral fault
potentially could be compensated?

Further, in the absence of this criminal fault-social

opprobrium scale, it wouid be left to the appellate courts, in the interests of justice and
faïmess, to fetîer judicial sentencing discretion by setting up a hierarchy of offences
prioritized according to their level of fault. In effect, the courts would be c'ususurping the
constitutional fiinction of Parliament to enact criminal l a ~ s . "Again,
~ ~ the Supreme Court
of Canada appears to be walking a fine line between its own jurisdiction and that of
Parliament, a line that must be respected if the two branches of government are to CO-exist
effectively?

2"fiid at 306-308. See also Don Stuart "Continuhg hconsistency But Also Now
insensitivity That Won't Work" (1993) 23 C.R.(4th) 240 at 245 where the author, referring
to the Creighton decision, writes:
The court seems to require that the ciifference between deliberate and
negligent conduct be addressed in sentencing. This suggests, for example,
that Parliament's new scheme for sexual assadt,which pedizes in the same
prohibition but subject to a flexible penalty, one who is deliberately aware of
a risk of nonconsent and one who did not take reasonable steps to ascertain
whether there was consent, will survive Charter scrutiny. However, if the
Supreme Court is consistent, it will insist that upon conviction a deliberate
accused rnust receive a higher sentence than one who acted without taking
reasonable steps. Even ifthis is the outcorne of Charter challenges to the
substantive semal assault r e f o m , there wiii still be much to be said on the
busis of fair Iabelling and jusrice and also for eme of administration,for
separate c@kencs with separate penalties. This is now the case with murder
and maoslaughter, and intentional and negligent arson.
[Emphasis added] Footnotes omitted]

278~rudner,
supra note 275 at 303.
27% Logan, supra note 233 at 178-179, Lamer C.J.C.again considered the stigma
criterion. He stated (at 178):
It should be noted that, as a basis for a constitutionally-requiredminimum

Stigma as a reflection of blame, on the other han& would "require that the accused
exhibit the level of blameworthiness that defines the criminal category under which he is
subsumeci ...'"m

DEerences in relative levels of fault would be refiected linguisticaily in

such terms as murderer, manslayer, thief, rapist, and so

The "stigma-as-blame

version of the proportionality principle in relation to ~tigma"~*
offers, through the principle
of imputability, a more just interpretation of the stigma criterion:
The blameworthiness that incurs stigma in the notional sense is not
simply a characteristic of an act, outcome, or mental disposition that public
opinion happens to blame. Rather, it is detennined independently of
empirical opinion both by the importance to h m well-king of the interest
harmed by the wrongdoer and by the degree to which the harm is imputable
to his agency as distinct fiom chance. Whatever public opinion might be, the
negligent actor is less blameworthy for an uniawfùl outcome than someone
who produces the same outcome intentionally, for the outcome belongs less
to the former's agency than it does to the latter's. ... In assessing someone's
blameworihiness for a deed or outcome, the crimllial law focuses narrowly
on the degree to which the deed and its consequences are imputable to his
moral agency so as to render him legally answerable for them. An outcome
negligently caused, however, is comected to agency more loosely than one
intentionaily produced, for in that outcome we see not only a refiection of the

degree of mens rea, the social stigma associated with a conviction is the most
important consideration, not the sentence. ... The sentencing range available
to the judge is not conclusive of the level of mens rea coI1Sfitutionally
required. Instead, the crucial consideration is whether there is a continuing
senous bocialstigma which will be imposed on the accused upon conviction.
This passage does not clarifL the use of the term "stigrna", for continuing social stigrna can
be ascribed both to the moral blameworthinessof the offender as well as societal repugnaace
for the act. However, based on the majonty reasons of Lamer C.J.C. in Mmtineau, social
stigma as a determinative factor in the criminal fault analysis, attaches more to moral
blameworthiness than to social opprobrium.

2%rudner, supra note 275 at 305.

agent's prnposes but also the effect of independent causes, whereas in the
outcome intentionally pmduced we see only the agent?
Wphasis in original]

Crimes undifferentatecl as to fault, therefore, offend the principle enunciated in SmZt Ste.
Mmie that [i]n the case of tnie criminal crimes ... a person should not be held iiable for the
"

wrongfulness of his act if that act is without mens rea
The reasons for decision of Justice Lamer (as he then was) in VaiZlancourt support
the argument that proportionality between stigma and moral blame is the determinative

element infonaing the content of the mental element of a crime. His analysis of the murder
provisions of the Criminal Code,2" beginning with

S.

212(a)(i)2" [now

S.

229(a)(i)],

focussed on the relative degrees of moral fault distinguishing each provision He observed
that then S. 2 12(a)(i) defined culpable homicide as murder where the accused both caused,

and meant to cause, the other peaon's death. "This is the most morally blameworthy state
of mind in our ~ystern."~" Under

S.

2 12(a)(ii)2" [now S. 229(a)(ii)] there was a "slight

284S~pru
note I O3 at 34.

286Section2 12 (a)(i) stated:
Culpable homicide is murder
(a)where the person who causes the death of a human being
(i) means to cause his death ...

2mS~pra
note 100 at 3 19.
"'section 2 12 (a)(i) stated:
Culpable homicide is murder
(a) Where the person who causes the death of a human king

relaxation" of the subjective foresight of death mandated as the requisite mental element for

murder in the previous section."

To be guilty of murderunder then S. 2 12(a)(ii)the accused

need only intend to cause bodily harrn to the other person albeit he must subjectively have
foreseen the likelihood of death arising from bis actions. Subjective foreseeability,however,
proven on the standard of reckles~ness.~~~
Section 2 l 2 ( ~ ) [now
~ ~ ' S. 229(c)] imported both

a subjective and an objective element. Culpable homicide under this section was deemed to
be murder where, fkom a subjective perspective, the accused, for an unlawfid object, "does
anyrhng ... he h o w s ... is likely to cause death''2n, or, fiom an objective perspective, "does

anything that he

...ought to h o w

is likely to cause death"F3 and thereby causes death to

a human being. The accused's desire to carry out the unlawful object without causing death

. ~ ~objective
~
component of S.
or bodily harm to the victim was irrelevant to the i n q ~ i r yThe
2 12(c) "eliminate[d] the requirement of actual subjective foresight and replace[d] it with

(ii) means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death, and
is reckless whether death ensues of not; ...

2mSupranote 100 at 3 19.

2g'Section2 12(c) stated:
Culpable homicide is murder
m..

(c) where a person, for an unlawfûl object, does anything that he knows or ought to
know is Likely to cause death, and thereby causes death to a human being, notwithstailding
that he desires his object without causing death or bodily harm to any human being.

2*Supra note 1O0 at 3 19. Emphasis in original.
2931bidEmphasis in original.

objective foreseeability or negligen~e."~~
The final section analyzed was S. 2 13* [now S.
2301, the felony murder or constructive murder provision of the Code.
Under this provision, it is murder if the accused c a w s the victim's death
while committing or atternpting to commit one of the enumerated offences
if he perfonns one of the acts in subss. (a) to (d). Proof that the accused
perfrmed one of the acts in subss. (a) to (4 is substitutedfor proof of any
subjective foresight, or even objective foreseeability. of the Iikelihood of
de&.

297

[Emphasis added]

296Thecontent of S. 2 13 was as follows:

Culpable homicide is murder where a person causes the death of a hurnan being while
committing or attempting to commit high treason or treason or an offence mentioned in
section 52 (sabotage), 76.1 (hijacking an aircraft), 132 or subsection 133(l) or sections 134
to 136 (escape or rescue fiom prison or lawful custody), 143 or 145 (rape or attempt to
commit rape), 149 or 156 (indecent assault), subsection 246(2) (resisting arrest), 247
(kidnapping and forcible confinement), 302 (robbery), 306 (breaking and entering) or 389
or 390 (arson), whether or not the person means to cause death to any human being and
whether or not he knows that death is likely to be caused to any human being, if
(a) he means to cause bodily harm for the purpose of
(i) facilitating the commission of the offence; or
(ii) facilitating his flight after c o d t t i n g or attempting to commit the offence,
and death e m e s fiom the bodily harm;
(b) he administers a stupefling or overpowering thing for a purpose mentioned in
paragraph (a), and death ensues therefiom;
(c) he wilfidly stops, by any means, the breath of a hurnan being for a purpose
mentioned in paragmph (a), and death ensues therefiom; or
(d) he uses a weapon or has it upon his person
(i) during or at the time he cornmits or attempts to commit the offence; or
(ü) during or at the time of his flight after committing or attempting to commit
a offence,
and death ensues as a consequence.
297Supranote 100 at 320.

Justice Lamer fiather noted that S. 2 l(2) of the Code, which provided for cTiminal liability
on a party basis, was "a f i d e r relaxation of the mentai state" for murder."'

On the

question of proving an essential element of an offence, such as mens m,by proof of a
substituted element, Lamer J. held that Parliament's constitutional authority to do so was
restricted: "If the trier of fact may have a reasonable doubt as to the essential element
notwithstanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the substituted element, then the
substitution infinnges ss. 7 and 1~ ( d ) . " 'Since
~ ~ the constructive murder provision could not
pass the "substitution" standard, it was struck down.

The majority in Vaillancouri, through Justice Lamer, made a mastefi attempt at
articulating its position on the offence of constructive murder without offending notions of
legislative supremacy on mattes relating to public policy. However, it was not unanimous.
Justice McIntyre's dissent sounded a warning peal for the increasingly activist Court:
It must be recognized at the outset that Parliament has decided that the
possession and use of weapons, particdarly firearms, in the course of the
commission of offences is a gravely aggravahg factor. Experience has
show that the presence of fïrearms leads to personal injury and loss of Me.
Parliament has chosen to term a killing arising in the circurnstances described
here as "murder". ...

.,..

As hm been note4 the appellunt's conviction is based on a
combination of S. 2u2)and S. 213(d) of the Criminal Code. There was in this
case evidence of active participation in the commission of the robbery, the
underlying offence, and the tems of S. 21(2) were fully met. Zt must be
accepted thut the section @es expression to a principle ofjoint criminal
liabiiity long accepted and appZied in the criminal law. I am unable fo say

2981bidThe issue of party iiability was considered by the Court in Logan,supra note
233 andR v.Sit, [1991] 3 S.C.R 124,66C.C.C. (3d)449.
2 9 9 ~ unote
p r ~1O0 at 327.

upon what b& one could exempt conduet which attracts criminal liabiiity,
under S. 213 of the Criminai Code.fiom the appiicution of thatprinciple. '00
Fmphasis added]
McIntyre J. concluded: "ln my view, Martin J.A. [in R v. Mmroe] has stated the policy
considerationswhich have motivated Parliament in this connection, and 1would not interfere
with the Parliamentary decision?"

The majonty and dissenting decisions highlight the

potentid ambiguity indistinguishingjudicial decisions impacting on matters of legislative
policy and those articdated w i t b the boundaries of the Court's constitutionai adjudicatory

The VailZancourt decision appears to have favoured a subjectivist approach to the
homicide-related provisions. Yet, two weeks prior to that case, the Supreme Court of Canada

in the ~ar8"case saw no incongmity in validating the murder classification provisiod03
which mirrored the soon to be struck-dom constructive murder section of the Criminal
Code. For purposes of classifying the substantive offence of murder, no fault element was

''*Supra note 114. The constitutionality of the murder classification provision of the
Criminal Code was upheld in the post-Charter cases of R v. Luxton, [1990] 2 S.C.R.71 1,
58 C.C.C. (3d) 449,79 C.R. (3d) 193 and R. v. Arkeil, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695,59 C.C.C. (3d)
65,79 C.R (3d) 207 (S.C.C.). In Canadimi Criminal Law, supra note 255 at 186, Stuart
expresseddissatisfactionwith the Pare decision and the subsequentsurvival of the impugned
section under Charter scrutiny. Concerning Justice Wilson's contention in Paré that the
organizing principle of then S. 2 M(5) was the unlawfid domination of the victim, he wrote:
"How c m it possibly be said that the list of murders under section 23 1 [previously S. 2 14(5)]
includes al1 murders involving udawfùl domination over the person? Doesn't any murder
involve such domination? ... The ckissification was and is irrational and should have been
declared unconstitutional." [Footnotes omitted].

required?
then

S.

Murder committed in the commission of one of the enumerated offences under

2 l4(S)in the Paré case, indecent assadt-was classified as first degree murder.

Wilson J., for a unanimous Bench which included Chief Justice Dickson, observed that the
enumerated offences involved "theunlawful domination of people by other people."3o5Here,
a harm analysis focussing on the consequences of crime tnunped the doctrine of strict
construction of pend statutes which required an interpretation most favourable to the
accused. The most favourable interpretation, from an accused's perspective, of the phrase
'While committing" in S. 2 14(5) [now S. 23 l(5) ] would require contemporaneity between the
murder and the enumerated underlying offence. Wilson J. rejected this argument in favour

of a "continuing transaction" approach.
This approach, it seems to me, best expresses the policy
considerations that underlie the provision. Section 214, as we have seen,
classifies murder as either first or second degree murder. Al1 murders are
senous crimes. Some murders, however, are so threatening to the public that
Parliament has chosen to impose exceptional penalties on the perpetrators.
One such class of murders is that found in S. 214(5), murders done while
committing a hijacking, a kidnapping and forcible confinement, a rape, or an
indecent a s ~ a u l t . ~ ~

M e r rejecting the Law Reform Commission of Canada's criticisrn of a lack of organizing

3w See Don Shiart "Annotation" (1987) 60 C.R (3d) 346 at 347 where he States: 'Tt
is curious that a Supreme Court which has, both before and after the enactment of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, striven to assert subjective mens rea as the fault
requirement for serious offences, ... has chosen to ignore it in deciding whether a particular
murder falls within the most serious penalty category of nrst degree murder."

305Supranote 114 at 370.

principle to S. 214(5), she stated:
The offences Listed in S. 214(5) are ail offences involving the unlawful
domination of people by other people. 'Ihus an organizing principIe for S.
2 M(S) can be found. This principle is thaî, where a murder is committed by
someone already abusing his power by iIlegaily dominating another, the
murder shouid be treated as an exceptionally serious crime. Parliament has
chosen to treat these murders as murders in thefirsl degree.
Refining, then, the concept of the "single transaction" referred to by
Martin LA. in Stevens, supra, it is the continuhg iilegal domination of the
victirn which gives continuity to the sequence of events cirlminating in the
murder. The murder represents an exploitation of the position of power
created by the underlying crime and makes the entire course of conduct a
"single transaction". This approach, in my view, best @es effect to the
philosophy underlying S. 214(5) .'07
Fmphasis added]
Both Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Larner sat on the Paré bench. Their approach to the
issue of classifying murder for the piirposes of sentencing is intelligible from a criminal
liability perspective: the substantive offence of murder already would have been proven in
keeping with subjectivist prin~iples.'~~Sentencing foilows conviction-legal guilt
cornmensurate with moral fault already has been established thereby preserving a
proportionality between stigma and blarne.

The policy considerations expressed by

Parliament, relative to the constructive murder sections, are deferred to the sentencing stage

after legal guilt has been established?'

'"Sec Canadian Criminal L m , supra note 255 at 186 where Stuart writes:
"According to the Court [inParel, the relationship between the sentence classification and
the moral blamewoahiness of the offender clearly existed. The section o d y came into play
where murder had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
'*Sec also R v. Hmbottle, 1199313 S.C.R. 306,84 C.C.C. (3d) 1,24 C.R.(4th) 137
where the phrase %ben death is caused by that person" in S. 2 14(5) [now S. 23 1(5)] was
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada. Cory J. for a unanimous Court which included

112
The murder classification provisions under

S.

214 [now S. 23 11 simpiy retain the

constructive murder principle deemed unconstitutionalin V a i l l a n c ounder
~
a fault analy sis.
The decision also reflects a crime control perspective in that murderers who commit the
crime while committïng one of the enumerated offences, WU be stigmatized as first-degree
murderers. Nor is there anything to prevent Parliament from broadening the list in now S.
23 l(5) given that the section's judicial interpretation reflects not only victim interests, but

also a reliance on Parliamentary policy to treat murderers who abuse their power over others
as f k t degree murderers. One might speculate that the Supreme Court of Canada,

anticipating its decision in Vaillancourt, delivered a judgment suitably deferential to
Parliament's exclusive criminai poiicy jurisdiction.

Chief Justice Lamer observed (at 148) that the issue before the Court was one of causation.
In determining (at 149) that the test for causation under the section must be a strict one, he
linked his analysis to the issue of moral blameworthiness:
At the outset, it is important to remernber that when S. 2 14(5) cornes
into play it is in essence a sentencing provision. First degree murder is an
aggravated form of murder and not a distinctive substantive offence. ... It is
only to be considered Mer the jury has concluded that the accused is guilty
of murder by causing the death of the victim. An accused found guilty of
second degree murder will receive a mandatory life sentence. What the jury
must then determine is whether such aggravating circumstances exist that
they just@ ineligibility for parole for a quarfer of a century. It is at this point
that the requirement of causation set out in S. 214(5) comes into play. The
gravity of the crime and the severity of the sentence both indicate that a
substmtial and high degree of blamewoahiness, above and beyond that for
murder, must be established in order to convict an accused of first degree
murder."
[Emphasis in original]
See also Allan Manson "Rethinking Causation: The Implications of Harbottle" (1994) 24
CR (4th)153 at 155.
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The substantive content of S. 2 13 [now S. 2301, the constructive murder provision
of the Crimincd Codep3Io
was re-visited in ~mtineau."' Between the tïme of hearing and
the time of judgment, Justice Lamer had succeeded Justice Dickson as Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court of C m & although Dickson J. participated in the decision. A h m analysis
focussing on the consequences of the crimllial act was not central to the majority decision
delivered by Lamer C.J.C. who began his reasons forjudgment as follows: ''The facts of this
case are not central to the disposition of this appeal, and therefore, may be briefly
surnmarized as foll~ws.'"'~ In tmth, the facts were quite brutal as explicitly related in
L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s dissenting reasons where victim interests figured prominently in the
requisite-fault for murder analysis. Specifically, she situated her dissenting reasons in the
context ofhomicide ~ t a t i s t i c sthe
~'~
corresponding duty of Parliament to respondto "a matter

of cntical public ~oncern"~"
and the Court's ill-advised usurping of Parliament's role in
protecting the citizenry through the manipulation of legi~lation."~'T'he criminal Iaw must

31'Supranote 124. The accused in this case, dong with another person, broke into
a trailer, tied up the two occupants, robbed them and their home, and then the accused's
niend shot the two homeowners. The accused was convicted of second degree murder. The
Crown's appeal fiom a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal ordering a new trial was
dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada

reconcile two 'competing claims' as well. Social protection must be measured againstjustice
to the individual a~cused.""~
Striking down the legislation simply because sorne other scheme may

be preferable would be an unwarranted intrusion into Parliament's
prerogative, and would undermine the means it has chosen to protect its
citizenry. The Churter is not designed to aliow this court to substitzite
preferuble provisions for those already in place in the absence of a clecir
constitutionai violation Such a task shodd be reserved for the Law Refonn
Commission or other advisory bodies. This court's province is to pronounce
upon the constitutionalityof those provisions properiy before it. The Charter
does not infilre the courts with the power to declme legisiation tu be of no
force or effecr on the b a i s that they believe the statute to be undesirable as
a matter of criminul lm policy. For the aforementioned reasons, I do not
believe that S. 213(a) offends the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedorndl7
[Emphasis added]
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé thus relied on "significant policy consideration in favour of
upholding the existhg Iegi~Iation"~~~
even though in Refirence Re M. KA. (B.C.)the Court
held that policy considerations were best lefi to arguments of justification under S. 1.3'9

3 1 9 ~ w rnote
a 1 O7 at 32 1. Chief Justice Lamer, discussing the idea of the ''public
interest", stated:
f the public interest is there referred to ... as a possible justification under
S. 1 of a limitation to the rights protected at S. 7, then 1 do agree.
Indeed, as 1 said, in pend law, absolute Iiability always offends the
principles of hdamentd justice irrespective of the nature of the offence; it
offends S. 7 of the Charter if, as a r e d t , anyone is deprived of their Me,
liberty or security of the person, irrespective of the requirement of public
interest. In such cases it might oniy be sulvugedfor reusons ofpublic interest
under S. I .

m

Chief Justice Lamer, for the majority, undertook an abstract legal analysis retuming

again to the concept of stigma, and the proportionality between stigma, punishment and
moral blameworthiness, as a means of constitutionality-mandathg a subjective standard of
fault for murder, namely: subjective foreseeability of death.
The effect of S. 213 is to violate the principle that punishment must be
proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender, or as Professor
Hart puts it in Punishrnent and Responsibility (1968), at p. 162, the
f'undsimental principle of a morally based system of law that those causing
harm intentiody be punished more severely than those causing harm
unintentionally. ...In my view, in crfiee and democratic society that values
the autonomy andfiee wiZ2 of the individual, the stigma and punishment
attaching to the most serious of crimes,murder, should be reservedfor those
who choose to intentionalij cause death or who choose to inflict bodily h m
that they know is likely to cause death. The essential role of requiring
subjective foresight of death in the context of murder is tu maintain the
proportionaiity beîween the stigma and punishment attached to a murder
conviction and the moral bZameworlhiness of the offender. Murder hm long
been recognized as the "worst" und most heinous ofpeace tirne crimes. It
is, therefore, essentid that to satisfj.theprinciples offindamenta2justice, the
stigma andpunishrnent atrachingto a murder conviction rnwt be reservedfor
those who either intend to cause death or who intend to cause bodiiy hmm
thal they know wiil likzly cause deatJiZO
[Emphasis added]

The liberal emphasis on individual autonomy and liberty as against the State was the context
for Lamer C.J.C.'s analysis; the repercussions associated with the exercise of free wil1 had
been secondary to maintaining the proportionality between stigma, punishment and moral
blameworthiness?' L'Heureux-Dubé J. rejected the paramountcy of stigma as an analytical
320Supranote 124 at 138-139.
32'Seealso Sit, supra note 298. Lamer CJ.C ,again delivering the judgment of the
Court, c o n f h e d (at 452) the ratio in Mmtineau "that proof of subjective foresight of death
is necessary in order to mstain a conviction for murder ..." He also confirmed (at 452) the
ratio in Logan requiring the same minimum degree of mens rea for a conviction under the
party section of the Criminal Code if that minimum degree is requ&ed before the principal

too13? chwsing insteadto focus on the question of choice and the concomitant responsibility
that follows upon the accused's exercise of his or her free will:

Section 213(a) deals with one who has already proven to be a "hijackei', a
"kidnapper", a 'kapist", or an "arsonist". Furthexmore, this person has
already proven willing to cause bodily harm to commit the offence or to
enable himself to escape after having cornmitted the offence. In these
ciramstances, if is certainl'y appropriatefor Parliament to put this person
on notice, thut ij'these purposeful acts result in de& you will be charged as
a "murderer" as well.323
[Emphasis added]

Both approaches refiect libeml influences, but the ciifferhg emphases account for the
disparate r e d t . Thus the controversy between Chief Justice Lamer and L'Heureux-Dube in

Martineau typifies subsequent decisions in the law of homicide.
Section 212(a)(ii)324[now S. 229 (a)(ii)] of the Criminal Code was subjected to
statutory analysis in R. v. C o o p e ~ . ' ~The requisite intent necessary to found a murder

c m be convicted of the main offence,

And see Grant, supra note 238 at 212 where the author, reviewing the 1993-1994
term, States: 'In the Supreme Court of Canada, the hi& point in tenns of a culpability
analysis came in 1990 with R v. Logan, where the Court equated the stigma of attempted
murder with that of murder, characterizing an attempted murderer as a 'lucky murderer'. ...
This terni's decisions [includingthe Creighionquartet] reflect a greater emphasis on the need
to punish the causing of hannful consequences and show a move away fiom pinciples of
subjective fault. ... mhere is a clear rnove away fiom subjective culpability." Footnotes
omitted].
'%upra note 124 at 163.

324Supranote

325[1993]
1S.C.R 146,18 C.R (4th) 1,78 C.C.C.(3d) 289 [hereinafter Cooper cited
to C.R.]. The accused in Cooper was charged with the first-degree murder of a former
girlfriend by strangulation. He maintained that he blacked-out after grabbing the girl by the
neck, then awoke to find her dead beside hirn in the back seat. The accused then pushed the

conviction under the impugned section was at issue. Cory J. delivered the rnajority decision

and held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that there were two dimensions to the intent
component of S. 2 12(a)(ii):
The intent that must be demonstrated in order to convict under S.
212(a)(ii) has two aspects. There must be (a) subjective intent to cause
bodily h m ; (b) subjective knowledge that the bodily harm is of such a
nature that it is likely to resdt in death. It is only when those two elements
of intent are established that a conviction can properly f o l l o ~ . ~ ~ ~
Lamer C.J.C., Sitting in lone dissent, agreed. The majonty and dissenting opinions diverge
on the question of when the subjective intent to cause bodily harm coincides with the
subjective knowledge that the bodily hann is likely to cause death." Lamer C.J.C. stated:

Cooper intended to choke the deceased and cause her bodily h m .
Under S. 212(a)(i), it was open to the jury to infer fiom his conduct and on al1
of the evidence that in doing so he intended to kill her. To be found guilty
under S. 212(a)(ii), however, he must have k e n aware of the fact that he
penisted in choking her long enough for it to become likely that death would
ens~e.~~*

deceased's body out of the vehicle and &ove away.

327~his
is referred to as the simultaneous principle. In Canadian Criminal L m ,
supra note 255 at 327, Stuart introduces the principle and writes: "It is well established that
the act and mens rea must occur at the same time (be concurrent, be contemporaneous). ...
The essence of the justification for the simdtaneous principle is one of the need to use the
criminal law sanction fairly and with restraint." However, Stuart observes (at 329) that the
generd principle is not inflexible: "Courts have recognized techniques or exceptions to
avoid the full rigour of the principle." One such technique, as illustrated by the Cooper
decision, is superposing intent on an act. "In Cooper ... Cory J. for the Supreme Court
adopted the Fagun approach and M e r held that it was not always necessary for the
requisite mens rea to c o n t h e throughout the commission of the wrongful act. ... It was
suficient tbat the intent and act of strangulation coincided at some poinf and it was not
necessary that the intent continue throughout the entire two minutes."
328Supranote 325 at 16.

It appears as if the accused couid have been convicted of an intentional killing under S.

2 12(a)(i) but th&, absent awareness of the continuing act of choking, he may have had no
more than subjective foresight of bodily hami under S. 2 12(a)(ii)! Since awareness of the
ongoing conduct leading to foresight of bodily h m is a pre-requisite to the foresight of the
Iikelihood of death, Lamer C.J.C.held that the jury aiso ought to have been instnicted to
consider the impact of evidence of cirunkenness upon the accused's awareness in the
cucumstances of the Cooper case?2g Lamer C.J.C.3 dissenting reasons in Cooper highlight

his ongoing cornmitment to a culpability analysis of the law of homicide be it in the context
of statutory hterpretation or constitutional anaiysis.

IV. Hill and Luvaffee:
Criminal Defences and The Objective Standard
The liberal subjective approach influencing the detennination of criminal fault also
impacted upon the Supreme Court of Canada's statutory interpretation of the reasonable
person standard in the defence of provocation. In R v. Hill " the Court considered the
ordinary penon test in S. 215 [now S. 2321 of the Crimiml code.')'

That test injects an

objective standard into the three-part test for prov~cation,~"a standard "clearly envisaged

"0[1986] 1 S.C.R.313,25 C.C.C.(3d) 322,51

C.R.(3d) 97 bereinafter Hill cited

to C.R.].

332Supranote 330 at 108. The objective test is the threshold test directed to the
question of whether or not an ordinary person would be deprived of the power of self-control
because of the provoking act or insult. Then, the trier of fact must consider if the accused

by the Criminal Code as a harsh first hurdle,""

a standard deemed necessary by Parliament

in the exercise of its responsibility for the criminal law. Dickson C.I.C., delivering the
majority judgment, stated: "It is society's concern that reasonable and non-violent behaviour

be encouraged that prompts the law to endorse the objective standard. The criminal law is
From this
concemed, among other things, with fixing standards of human beha~iour."~~~
perspective, he articuiated the content of the ordinary person standard for the purposes of the
provocation defence:
1 think it is clear that there is widespread agreement that the ordinary or
reasonable person has a nomal temperament and level of ~ e ~ c o n t r o It
l.
follows that the ordinary person is not exceptionally excitable, pugnacious or
in a state of ~ i r u n k e m e s s . ~ ~ ~

In addition to not being exceptioaally excitable, pugnacious or drunk, the ordinary person

may possess other traits that are neither 'bpeculiar"nor "idiosyncratic" to the accused?
With these preconditions in min& the determination of the content of the ordinary person
standard, in a given case, would depend on the 'kelevance of the particular feature to the

provocation in question.'""

Race, for instance, rnight be relevant where the alleged

actuaily had been provoked. A subjective test is applicable at this stage. Fuially, the trier
of fact must detennine if the accused acted on the sudden before his passions cooled.
')'Don Stuart "Annotation" (1985) 5 1 C.R. (3d) 99. The author traces the movement
of the Court away fiom previous decisions in which no subjective factors could idorm the
reasonable person test.
'USqrunote 330 at 108-109.

120

provoking h u i t was a tacial slur; but irrelevant where the alleged provoking Wt
concerned the accused's physical disability?'
considerations peculiar to the

While rejecting personai or subjective

such as dninkemess, the objective standard test

nevertheless is paaially contexhialized to reflect the facts of the case and the circiunstiuices
of the accused?' Su, in Hill, the orduiary person was found to be someone of the same age
and sex of the a~cused.~~'

This partial contextuaiizationof the ordinary penon standard, through the process of
statutory interpretation, served the Court's liberal leanings in favour of individual autonomy

and, indirectly, the a-

of due process over crime control. It also furthered the Court's

subjective approach to criminal liability by personalizing the reasonable person standard,
albeit minimally, when analyzing criminal fault But the persodization of the reasonable

do otherwise would be to defeat the purpose of the objective standard which is
to effect minimum standards of conduct. Dickson C.J.C. stated (ibid at 108):
We seek to encourage conduct that complies with certain societai standards
of reasonableness and responsibility. In doing this, the law quite logically
employs the objective standard of the reasonable person.
See also Mewitt and Manning, supra note 224 at 739-741.
33-'%

540SeeMewitt and Manning, supra note 224 at 741 where the authors write:
The test is, therefore, that of the ordinmy person with these
characteristics of the accused that do not prevent him being, himself, a person
of ordinary tempenunent-his sex, his age, his colour, his education, his
physical condition and so on, but not those characteristics which make his
temperament, at the time, extraordlliary. Fu11hentally, this must refer to
his mental ability and his intoxication ..." [Emphasis in original].
note 330 at 117.

person standard was co&ed

by Parliament's detennination that the objective aspect of

the provocation defence would be a "harsh fkst hurdle".
Progress in Hill made on the secondary fionts-expanded Iiberalism through the
incorporation of the accused's chanicteristics into the reasonable person standard and the
implicit preference for due process values-was offset by Justice Dickson's hding that a

trial judge is not required, in each and every case, to tell the jury the specific attributes
inforrning the ordinary person standard for the purposes of their deliberations. He stated:
The trial judge did not en in f&g to specifythat the ordinary person, for the
purposes of the objective test of provocation, is to be deemed to be of the
same age and sex as the accused. Aithough this type of insîruction may be
hehfil in clmifiing the application of the ordinmyperson standmd, Ido not
think it wise or necessary to make rhis a mandatory component of ail jury
charges on
[Emphasis added]
It seems illogicai to leave an accused person's fate to the common sense of a jury which,
most inconvenientiy, is not subject to judicial review on appeal.

Such judicial

pronouncements attenuate the S. 7 right to Me, liberty and secinity of the person siven that
the trial judge's direction on the objective standard is discretionary, not mandatory. Does it

matter if the age, sex, race or religion of the accused rnight be pertinent to the ordperson test, and therefore to the issue of criminal liability, if not articulated in a clear fashon
to the trier of factp3

343Seealso Stuart,supra note 333. He contends (at 100) that the Supreme Court of
Canada could have adopted the full niling in R v. Camplin,[1978] A.C. 705 (H.L.) requiring
a mandatory direction on the reasonable person standard. See also Mewett and Manning,
supra note 224 at 74 1-742. But see Grant, Chunn & Boyle, supra note 204 at 6- 14 to6- 17
where the authors observe (at 6- 16)that the "HilllCamplin approach appears to expect the

Lamer J.'s agreement in dissent that the trial judge was not required to give an
instruction on the content of the ordinary person standard blurred the issue m e r still:

But 1should like to add that there will, in my view, be cases where failure to
do so, given the paticuiar circumSfances of the case, would be unfitir and
constitute reversible error, but not because of a special rule applicable to
charges on provocation, but rather under the general d e that the judge's
charge to the jury must always be fair?'
Who defines fairness? This perspective may be an extension of the S a l t Ste. Marie
reasoniag that judicial creations, such as the category of public wellare offences and the
'kasonable person", will be creatures of judiciai discretion.

jury to adopt a praiseworthy attitude of racial and religious tolerance, to try to see what
happened fiom the perspective of a person sharing the relevant charsicteristics of the
accused." They go on to caution, however, "that Camplin might require, and Hill assume,
that jurors would 'suspend commitments to fiuidamental liberal values such as racial and
religious tolerance and endorse moral agnosticism or cultural relativism."' Footnotes
omitted].
w ~ u p note 330 at 119. See also the majority reasons for decision of Lamer C.J.C.
in R. v. Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R.314, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 4 C.R. (5th) 280 bereinafter
Jacquard cited to C.C.C.]. Chief Justice Lamer took a functional approach to jury
instructions holding that a judge was not compelled to give specinc jury directions linking
the mental disorder evidence to the question of intent provided his overall charge made it
clear, at l e m to the appellate court, that it did so apply. The accused in Jacquard had been
convicted of first degree murder in the shwting death of his stepfather; and of the attempted
murder of his stepmother. In dismisshg the accused's appeal fiom conviction, Lamer C.J.C.
stated (at 10-1 1):
In many cases, a trial judge need only review relevant evidence once and has
no duty to review the evidence in a case in relation to every essential issue.
...As long as an appellate court, when looking at the trial judge's charge to
the jury as a whole, concludes that the jury was left with a sufficient
understanding of the factsp they relate to the relevant issues, the charge is
proper.
He concluded (at 27): "[A]ppellate courts must adopt a functional approach to reviewingjury
charges. The purpose of such review is to ensure that juries are properly-not
perfectiy-instnic ted."

The subjectivist impact on criminal defences arose again in the 1990judgment of R
v. LovalleeYs, a decision of Wilson J. in which Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J. concurred. At
issue was the evidentiary foundation for a female accused's plea of sekiefence to a murder
charge in the context of domestic violence. The accused built her defence around S. 34(2)

of the Criminal Code. That section States:

(2) Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous
bodily harm in repelihg the assault is justified if
(a) he causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous
bodily h m fkom the violence with whîch the assault was originally made or
with which the assailant purnies his purposes; and
(b) he believes, on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily hann.
"The feature cornmon to both S. 34(2)(a) and S. 34(2)@) is the imposition of an objective
standard of reasonableness on the apprehension of death and the need to repel the assault
with deadly f o r ~ e . "As
~ in the case of the reasonable person test under the provocation
provision of the Criminal ode,^' the Lavallee decision focussed on the content of the
reasonable person standard. Specificaliy, could it be informed by expert testimony, and, if

"S[1990] 1 S.C.R.852,55 C.C.C. (3d) 97,76 C.R. (3d) 329 [hereinafter Lavallee
cited to C.R.]. The female accused shot her cornmon law husband in the back of the head
as he was leaving her room. He subsequently died. She was acquitted at trial. The Manitoba
Court of Appeal reversed the accused's acquittal and ordered a new Inal. The Supreme
Court of Canada subsequently restored the acquittal.

"'See analysis of Hill decision supra at pp. 117- 121.

so, what ought to be the fachial basis of that testimony and the appropriatejury direction if
the factuai basis, either in whole or in part, comprises hearsayp8

InLavallee the accused's deceased common law husband threatened to kiU her "when
everyone else had g ~ n e . "In~assessing
~
whether the accused had a reasonable apprehension
of death, Wilson J. considered expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to be
invaluable to a consideration of the reasonable person standard:
Where evidence exists that an accused is ina battering relationship,
expert testimony can assist the jury in determinhg whether the accused had
a "reasonable" apprehension of death when she acted by explaining the
heightened sensitivity of a battered woman to her partnefs acts. Without
such testimony 1 am skeptical that the average fact-finder would be capable
of appreciating why her subjective fear may have been reasonable in the
context of the relationship. M e r dl, the hypothetical "reasonable man"
observing only the final incident may have been unlikely to recognize the
batter's [sic] threat as potentially lethal. Using the case at bar as an example,
the ''reasonable man" might have thought, as the majonty of the Court of
Appeal seemed to, that it was unlikely that Rust would make good on his
threat to kill the appellant that night because they had guests staying
ovemight.
The issue is not, however, what an outsider would have reasonably
given her situation and
perceivedbut whor the ac~edreasonub~perceived
her experience.3"
@2mphasisadded]
Justice Wilson, in keeping with the subjectifkation of the reasonable person standard stated:

348~o
a rdiscussion of the evidentiary b a i s of expert evidence and the impact of
LmulZee, see R.J. Delisle "Lavallee: Expert Opinion Based On 'Some Admissible
Evidence'-Abbey Revisited" (1 990) 76 C.R.(3d) 366.
Mgsupranote 345 at 347.

If, d e r hearing the evidence (iicludingthe experttestimony), thejury
is satisfied that the accused had a reasonable apprehension of death or
grievous bodily hami and felt incapable of escape, it must ask itself what the
"reasonable person" wouid do in such a situation. The situation of the
battered woman as described by Dr. Shane strikes me as somewhat analogous
to that of a hostage. If the captor tells her that he will kill her in three days
time, is it potentially reasonable for her to seize an opportunity presented on
the first day to kili her captor or must she wait until he makes the attempt on
the third &y? I think the question the jury mtLFl ask itselfis whether. @en
the history, circumstances and perceptions of the appellant, her belkfthut
she could not preserve herselffiorn being M e d by Rurr thar night except by
Ming himfirst was reasonuble. To the extent thut expert evidence can assist
thejury in muking thut determination. I wouldfind such testimony to be both
relevant and necessary."'
[Emphasis added]
As the above quote indicates, Wilson J. discounted the temporal connection which

traditionally had linked the reasonable apprehension of death or reasonable bodily harm held
by the accused to the defensive act?

In effect, Justice Wilson contextudized the concept

of "imminence" through the use of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome such
that what rnight not be perceived as imminent to the reasonable man may be imminent to the
battered woman "given her situation and her e~perience".'~~

353fiid
at 352. See David Watt "The Battered Woman Syndrome: Should She Or

Shouldn't She" (Paper presented to the National Crimioat Law Program, Victoria, British
Columbia, July 13-17 1998) at Section 2.8. Justice Watt (at 1-2) states emphatically: "The
battered woman syndrome is not a defence, justification or excuse for what would otherwise
be crimioal conduct It is not recognized as a defence, justification or excuse by statute, or
the cornmon Iaw. It is, rather, a condition that provides a context for a statutory defence
which, if successful, warrants a complete acquittai, even in cases where the batterer has been
killed. in the result, battered wornan syndrome is superimposed upon, or forced into, the
technical requirements of existing law, rather than king accorded a separate and discrete
place as a justification.'' [Emphasis in onginal][Footnotes omitted].

126
Wilson J.'s analysis in LavalZee potentiaiiy opens the door for accused female
persons with a syndrome to have their s.34(2) defence contextuaiized: "The definition of
what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the
world inhabited by the hypothetical 'reasonable man.'"3" Jury instructions conceming the
cogency of expert evidence would be particularly important given its significance to the
defence of sekiefence, and to the deliberations of the jury on the battering relationship

which, Wilson J. held, was beyond thejury's ken?

Whether Justice Wilson's decision can

properly be said to reflect a victim anaiysis focussing on the harmful comequences of crime
is doubtful. The case conveniently sidesteps the unpalatable reality that the deceased
comrnon law husband was no less a victim, at least in the end result, than his surviving
abused spouse.

'%upra note 345 at 346. See aiso L'Heureux-Dubé's sepatate but concurring
judgment in R. v. MaZott, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123,21 C.C.C. (3d) 456,12 C.R. (5th) 207 where
(at 470) she states: "The expert evidence is admissible, and necessary, in order to understand
the reasonableness of a battered woman's perceptions ... Accordingly, the utility of such
evidence in criminai cases is not limited to instances where a battered woman is pleading
seWefence, but is potentially relevant to other situations where the reasonableness of a
battered woman's actions or perceptions is at issue (e.g. provocation, duress or necessity)."
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé posits (at 473) that whether battered men should be accorded the
same approach cannot be determined ''without the benefit of research and expert opinion
evidence wbich has infonned the courts of the existence and details of 'battered woman
syndrome' ..."
But see R v. McConnell, [1996] 1 S.C.R.1075,48 C.R (4th) 199.42 Alta. L.R. (3d)
225 where the pre-emptive d e reasoning underlying the battered woman syndrome was
deemed relevant to legitimizing the "prison environment syndrome'' raised by the accused
male offender in the selfkiefence context.
3S5Supra
note 345 at 345.

V. Hanter, Slillmon and Feeney:
Characterization of the State in the Adversarial Context
The subjectivist approach to judicial considerationof the mental element of offences
such as attempted murder and of criminai defences such as provocation is a rdection not
only of iiberaiism's focus on the individual as a repository of rights, entitied to liberty and
autonomy, but of the Court's characterization of the "State7'-the Goveniment-as an
oppositional entity. The predominiuitly legal liberai influences acting upon the Supreme
Court of Canada necessitates an appreciation of the Statedlhdividual relationship as defined
by our court of final apped, the Supreme Court of Canada

In the 1984 case of H ~ e v.r So~tharn?~~
the Court, speaking of a constitution,
stated: "Its function is to provide a continuingfiamework for the legïtimaie exercise of
governmental power mi4 when joined by a Bill or Charter of rights, for the unremitting
protection of individual rights and liberties" [Ernphasis added].'"

Justice Dickson thus

viewed '?he legitimate exercise of govenimental powei' and ''the unremithg protection of

individual rights and liberties" as the major innuences guiding the Court in its adjudicative
fun~tion?~
in Hunter v. Sourham the constitutional document was the Charter:

The Canadian Chmter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document. Its
purpose is to guarantee and to protect. within Iimits of reason, the enjoyment
of the rights and fieedoms it enïhrines. It is intended to constrain

Supra note 105. Chief Justice Laskin did not take part in this judgment. In this
case the issue was whether the Combines Imestigation Act, RS.C. 1970,c. C-23,S. 10
violated S. 8 of the Charter. Lamer and Dickson J J. were meinbers of the unanimous
bench.
3s6

govemmental action inconsistent with those rights andfieedoms; it is not in
itselfan Ûuthorizationfor govemmentaI action 359
pmphasis added]
Liberalism's influence can be seen in the Charter's description as a co&t

on

govemment action in respect of the rights and fieedoms guaninteed therein; as a limitation
on the existing powers of federal and provincial governments to engage in search and
seizure activities; and as focussing primarily on the consequences of govemment action for
the individual effected rather than upon the effect of the impugned action in M e r i n g
legitimate government goals.3a The Supreme Court of Canada presented itselfas a buffer
between a Goliath and his unsuspecting prey albeit in decicihg the constitutionality of a
provision under the Combines Imestigation Act, not the law of homicide. Nevertheless, the
decision had subsequent repercussions for the question of criminal liability in the homicide
context.
The majority decision in Hunter v. Southam establishes that the purpose of S. 8 36' of
the Charter is '90 protect hdividuals fkom unjustified State intrusions upon their pri~acy.'"'~~

'?3ee dso Monahan and Petter, supra note 262 where the authors cnticized the
Supreme Court's increasing liberai activisrn. They stated (at 70): T h e popular and elite
rhetoric surroundhg the Charter has emphasized that the document should receive a 'large
and liberal' interpretation. The Supreme Court in particular has embraced this rhetonc ..."
M e r referring to the Hunter v. Southam case as illustrative of this "rhetonc", the authors
stated (at 77): ''Assuming that the h c t i o n of Charter review is to control state intervention,
the Court has equated a large and liberal interpretation of the Charter with an expansion of
rights and f?eedoms."
36'Section 8 of the Charter states: "Everyone has the right to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure."
362~upra
note 1 05 at 109.

Justice Dickson concluded that this purpose codd not be sewed uoless unwarranted

searches were prevented before they occurred: "This, in my view, can only be accomplished

by a system of prior dorizution, not one of subsequent ~alidation."'~~Dickson J.

Such a requirement puts the onus on the State to demonstrate the superiority
of its interests to that of the individuai. As such it accords with the apparent
intention of the Charter to prefr, wherejkzsible, the right of the individual
to befieefiom State interference to the interests ofthe State in a h c i n g its
purposes through such inteMerence. ... m h e r e it is feasible to Obtain pnor
authorîzation, 1 would hold that such authorization is a pre-condition for a
valid search and seinue?'
pmphasis added]
Individual interests will d e the &y unless the State can persuade the Court that its interem
outweigh those of the indi~idual.'~'The Court's approval of the qualifjhg phrase " w k e
feasible" in discussing its championship of individual rights reflects, in part, a crime control
perspective of the search and seinire powers of the State. Specifically, at the arrest or
detention stage, the State may not be similarly constrained. Justice Cory for the majority in

3631bid(Emphasis in original).

365Seeibid at 1O8 where Dickson J.(as he then was) wrote:

The guarantee of security f?om unremonable search and seinire only protects
a reasombze expectation. This limitation on the right guaranteed by s.8,
whether it is expressed negatively as fieedom fiom 'breasonable" search
and seizure, or positively as an entitlement to a "reasonable" expectation of
privacy, indicates that an assessrnent must be made as to whether in a
particular situation the public's interest in king lefi alone by govemment
must give way to the govemment's interest in intruding on the individual's
privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement.
[Emphasis in original]

the 1997case of R v. ~tillrnad~~
observed:

"

In [Hunter]v. Southam Inc., ...it was held that

a search conducted without prior authorization is presumptively uareasonable. However, the

long-standing power of search incident to arrest is an exception to this general d e ..."='
The majorityjudgment in S t i l m a ~
limited the scope of that exception by perpetuating
the perception of the State as a negative force with which to be reckoned.

In the case at bar to proceed in the face of a specific refusat to compel
the accused to submit to the lengthy and intrusive dentai process, to force the
accused to provide the pubic hairs and to forcibly take the scalp hain and
buccal swabs was, to Say the least, unacceptable behaviour that contravened
both s.7 and s.8 of the Charter. It was a signifcant invsion of bodily
3 6 6 ~V. Stillnzan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, 5 C.R (5th) 1, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321
bereinafter Stillman cited to C.R.].The accused was charged with the murder of a 14-year
old girl. She had died nom blows to the head. Her body had been recovered f?om a river.
Semen was found in her vagina and a human bite mark was located on her abdomen. At issue
in Stillman was the admissibility of evidence taken fiom the accused during his detention at
the police station. The evidence comprised samples of hair, dental impressions, buccal
swabs and a tissue containing mucous. The latter was obtained when the accused went to
the washroom, biew his nose, and discarded the tissue in a wastebasket. In the final resuit,
al1 evidence was excluded but the tissue containing the mucous. A powemil piece of
evidence which put the accused at the scene. Although the accused's S. 8 Charter right had
been violated, the majority, which included Chief Justice Lamer, held that the administration
of justice was not brought into disrepute by admitting the tissue into evidence. The Court
found that the tissue's seizure did not interfere with the accused's bodily integrity, even
though the Corn held that the arrest was illegal and that the police had (at 29) "obtained
namely a
surreptitiously that which the appellant had refused to provide them vol~~1tanly:
sample fiom which his DNA profile could be obtained."
The Stillman decision provides a synthesis of the law goveming the exclusion of
evidence under S. 24 of the Charter. Although it is not k i n g cited in this paper for the S. 24
andysis, readers may consult the following sources on that point: Paul L. Moreau ccExclusion
of evidence-section 24(2) of the Charter" (1998) 40 C.L.Q. 148; Hogg, supra note 36 at 3815 to 38-17,45-8,4522 to 45-23; Tom Goddard "Stillman: The Majority Could Not Have
Intended to Exclude Altemative Conscriptive Means fiom Consideration under the
"Discoverability" Principle" (1997) 5 C.R. (5th) 110; Don Stuart ccStillman:Limiting Search
Incident to Arrest, Consent Searches and Refinhg the Section 24(2) Test" (1997) 5 C.R.
(5th) 99.

367Stilhtan,supra note 366 at 23.

integrity. Zt wus an example of the use of mental adphysicall action by
agents of the state to overcome the refus2 to consent to the procedures. It
serves us a powerful reminder of the powers of the police and how
fiighteningly broad they would be in apolice state. If there is not respect for
the dignity of the individual and integrîty of the body then it is but a very
short step to juswing the exercise of any physical force by police if it is
undertaken with the aim of solving crimes. No doubt the rack rind other
stock in lrode of the torturer operated to quickly and eflciently obtain
evidence for a conviction. Yet repugnancefor such acts and a sense of a
needfor fuirness in criminal proceedings did oway with those evil practices.
There mwt alw~ysbe a reasonable control over police actions f a civilized
and democratic socieiy is to be n~aintuined~~'
[Emphasis added]
Not surprisingly, the pubic hairs, scalp hairs and buccal swabs were deemed inadmissiblefor
the purposes of the new trial ordered by the Court. The common law power of search
incidental to arrest was deemed not to extend to the unlawful seinire of bodily substances.
"[Sltate interference with a person's bodily integrity is a breach of a person's privacy and an
f i o n t to human dignity. The invasive nature of body searches demands higher standards

To buttress its conclusion the rnajority in Stillman relied on Parliament's enactment
of legislation authorizing the seizure of certain bodily substances for the purposes of D.N.A.

It is certainly signüicant that Parliament has recently amended the
Crimind Code ... so as to create a warrant procedure for the seizure of certain
bodily substances for the purposes of DNA testing. This suggests that
Parliament has recognized the intrusive nature of seizing bodiiy sarnples. The
section requires that the police have reasonable and probable grounds, as well

36916id.at 26. In the subsequent 1997 Feeney decision, »fia note 373, the Court
extendedthe "higher standardsofjustEcationy'to the warrantless search of a dwellinghouse.

as authorization h m a judicial o5cer. before they can make such seizures.
If this type of invasive search and s e h to arrest came within the common
law power of search incident to arrest, it would not have been necessary for
the governrnent to m a t e a parallel procedm for the police to follow. In my
view, it would be contrary to authority to say that this is no more than a
codification of the common law?
[Emphasis added]
Fuaher, "[tlhe common law power of search incidental to arrest cannot be so broad as to
encompass the seizure without valid statutory authority of bodily samples in the face of a
refusal to provide them. Ifit is, then the common lm rule itselfis urue~~sonab~e.
since it is

too broad and fails to properly balance the competing righls imt~lved"~"The Co~rt's
decision was an amdgarn of common law and statutory considerations aimed at preserving
the autonomy and dignity of the individual fiorn the investigatory arm of the State. The

Court grounded its conclusion as to the inadrnissibility of the evidence in Parliament's
statutory restriction on the right of law enforcement personnel to invade the bodily integrity
of accused persons for investigatory purposes.
n i e Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v. Southam had applied an objective
standard in balancing the interests of the individuai and those of the state. This, again,
reflects the influence not only of liberai philosophy but of a Court operating on the principle
of constitutional supremacy:
The location of the constitutional balance between a jusfifiable expectation
of pnvacy and the legitimate needs of the State cannot depend on the
subjective appreciation of individuai adjudicators. Some objective standard
must be established. ...

Here again it is useful, in my view, to adopt a piirposive approach. The
purpose of a .objective critenon for granting prior authorization to conduct
a search or seizure is to provide a consistent standard for identifyingthe point
at which the interests of the State in such intrusions corne to prevail over the
interests of the individual in resisting them. To associate it with an
applicant's reasonable belief that relevant evidence may be uncovered by the
search, wouid be to define the proper standard at the possibility of finding
evidence. ... It would tip the balance strongly in favour of the State and limit
the right
of the individual to resist to o d y the most egregious intrusions?
[Emphasis in original]
The objective standard for evaluating prior authorization of search and seizures under the

Combines Imestigation Act was seen by the Court as a means of Limiting state intrusion into
the individual's privacy. As well, it was perceived as a tool for the Court to use in guarding

the fluctuating boundary between the State and the individual.

The Hmter v. S o u t h analysis of the individudstate relationship had even furthet
impact on the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1997 case of R v. Feeney'". At issue was
the common law d e concerning warrantless arrests following forcibleentry into a dwelling-

"%upra note 105 at 114.
3n[1997] 2 S.C.R. 13,115 C.C.C. (3d) 129,7 C.R.(5th) 101 [hereinafter Feeney to
C.C.C.]. The accused appealed his second degree murder conviction claiming violations of
his ss. 8 and 1O@) Charter rights. While investigating the vicious beating death of an 85
year old man, the police, acting upon a local resident's suggestion that they speak to the
accused, proceeded to his home. They knocked on the door, announced themselves, and,
receiving no answer, went inside the accused's trailer. The accused who was in bed, was
told to get up and step into the Iight. Obsenring blood stains on his clothes, the officer had
his partner read the accused his rights. The accused's blood-stained shirt was seized. Later,
after eight hours of i n t e ~ e w sthe
, police obtained a warrant to seize the accused's shoes,
Sportman cigarettes, and money hidden under his mattress. The accused did not see a lawyer
until two days later between fingerprinting sessions. Sopinka J. delivered the majority
opinion. Chief Justice Lamer dissented stating (at 138): "My reasons and conclusion are not
to be taken as disagreeing in any way with the principles of R v. StiZZmm ...as expressed in
the reasons of Sopinka J. I agree with those principles as stated therein. My disagreement
is with their application on the facts of this case."

house. The majority r e f o d a t e d the previous judicial exposition of the test, for, the pre-

Chmter context in which earlier cases had been decided, placed insufficient emphasis on the
primacy of the individual's privacy interest:
The analysis in LoMby was based on a baiance between the individuai's
privacy interest in the dwelling-houseand society's interest in effective police
protection. This Court heldthat the latter interestpratoiled and warrantless
m e s t s in dwelling-homes werepennissible in certain circumstances. While
such a conclusion was debatable at the time, in my view, the increased
protection of the privacy of the home in the era ofthe Charter changes the
analysis in favour of the former interest: in general, the privacy interest
outweighs the interest of the police rmd wmantless m e s t s in hueilinghouses are pr~hibited"~
[Emphasis added]

The Court concluded that, in addition to the L a d y formulation of the common Iaw d e
govemingwarrantless arrests in private dwellings, the law enforcementauthorities also must
have prior judicial authorization to enter the dwelling:

To summarize, in general, the following requirements must be met
before an arrest for an indictable offence in a private dwelling is Iegal: a
warrant must be obtaùied on the basis of reasomble and probable grounds to
arrest and to believe the person sought is within the premises in question.;
and proper announcement must be made before entering. 375

Chief Justice Lamer did not agree wîth the reasoning of either Sopinka J. or L'HeureuxDubé J. although he agreed with the result reached, in dissent, by Justice L'Heureux-Dubé.
He preferred the reasoning of Lambert LA. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal who
favoured a crime control analysis, c h a r a c t e h g the situation faced by the police in Feeney

as one of exigent circumstances.

The fiuidamental point in relation to the police conduct in this case
was that there had k e n a savage attack on an elderly man in a mal1

commmity which suggested a kifler out of control in the community and that
the police had a duty to protect the community. They also had a duty to try
to locate and neutralize the killer and if possible to gather evidence that
would satisQ them then and there that the killer had been apprehended, and
that would later tend to establish that the correct person had been
apprehended and made to stand triai.
In those circumstances it is rny opinion that the police were facing a
situation which could be classified as an emergency, or as exigent
circumstances which wouid require immediate action, and that in addition
they were facing circumstances where the possibility of the destruction of
evidence, particularly evidence in relation to bloodstains, was a real one and
had to be a~idressed?~~
Contrarily, the majority in Feeney did not agree with Lambert J.A.'s characterizationof the
situation and added that "even ifthey [exigent circumstances] existed, safety concerns could

not justify the warrantless entry into the tmiler in the present case.'""

Sopinka I. explained

that "[t]o d e h e these as exigent circumstances is to invite such a characterization of every

penod after a senous crime.'"'

1s this, in reality, not the case? The Feeney decision is a

classic example of the confluence of disparate ideological influences on judicial decisionmaking: liberalism in the portrayai of the state, and crime control and due process values in
dividing the Court on the correct application of legal principles to the facts of the case.'"

v. Feeney (1995) 54 B.C.A.C. 228, 88 W.A.C. 228 [hereinafter Feeney
(B.C.C.A.)cited to B.C.A.C.]at 234.

"See Don Stuart "Feeney: New C W e r Standards for Arrest and Undesirable
Uncertaintyy'(1997) 7 C.R. (5th) 175. The author notes (at 177):
Sopinka J. makes a cornpeiling case for the majority that, since prior judicial
authorization is the fiuidamental Chmrer requirement for searches under
Canada (Director of Investigation & Resemch, Combines Ihesiigution

Respondingto the Supreme Court of Canada's reformulation ofthe common law d e
governing arrest in a d w e h g house, Parliament enacted ss. 529 to 529.S3" of the Criminal
Code. The new provisions aim "to ensure that peace officers are able to effeîtively discharge

powers of arrest, and secure protection of the public, while, at the same time, respecthg
privacy interests in residential dwehgs. The net effect of the ... is to legislate and c l a e
the procedures which must be foilowed in the post-Feeney era.''3a'
M. Creighton:
Manslaughter, Pend Negligence and Criminal Liabüity

The common law definition of unlawful act manslaughter was the subject ofjudicial
scrutiny in R. v. Creighlon.'"

McLachlin J., on behaif of a slim majority, confirmed the

histoncal common law test for determinhg the requisite mens rea of unlawful act

Branch) v. Southum Inc.. so too should there be a general constitutional
requirement of warrant before entry into a dwelling house to arrest.
The problem with the majority judgment lies in its refusa1 to
recogaize a general exigent circumstances exception.
Stuart contends (at 178) that the Court's failure to recognhe such an exception has negative
repercussions for law enforcement:
In the absence of the recognition of a general exigent circumstances
exception, the police have been placed in an unenviable position. Even in the
presence of clear exigent circum~fancesof danger or destructionof evidence,
they might well be reluctant to move lest the case be jeopardized. The
Supreme Court has been insufncientlyattentive to the practical consequences
of their judgment.

"'~eneeM. Pomerance "Entcy And Arrest in Dwelling Houses" (Paper presented to
the National Criminal Law Program, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Juiy,
1998) at Section 5.2, p. 4. vnderlining in original] pnpublished].

'*[i993] 3 S.C.R. 3,23 C.R. (4th) 189,83 C.C.C. (3d) 346 [hereinafter Creighton
cited to C.R.]

manslaughter+bjective foreseeabilty of bodily harm.'" The Creightondecision introduces
into the fault analysis vocabulary of the law of homicide the concept of penal negligence.
It will be recded that in S a l t Ste. Mmie Dickson J . (as he then was) noted that "[wlithin
the context of a criminal prosecution a person who fails to make such inquiries as a

reasonable and prudent would make, or who fails to know facts he should have known, is
innocent in the eyes of the law.'""

Pend negligence is not tantamount to simple negligence.

It connotes a marked deparhm h m the standard of a reasonable person.'''

Lamer J., for a

substantial minority, agreed on the objective standard but would have changed it to provide
for objective foreseeability of death, not simply bodily harm. Further, he wouid have
injected the objective standard for fault-the reasonable person-with "any human hülties
which might have rendered the accused incapable of having foreseen what the reasonable
person would have foreseen."-'" Under Lamer C.J.C.'s objective test "the accused's

3aïhid.at 208. The 5:4 majority rested on LaForest J., who in separate reasons,
expressed difficulty in agreeing with either the Chief Justice or McLachlin J. He stated (at
237): "This case c a w d me difficuity because both sets of reasons take a view of the law that
1 have in the past resisted." But see Grant, supra note 238 at 2 18 where she writes:
By a narrow 5:4 split, the Court held that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, only bodily harm need be foreseeable and that this standard is
constitutionally adequate. Although McLachlin J . 3 judgment attracted a
majority, it was written largely as a response to the muiority judgment of
Lamer C.J. One can only assume that Lamer C.J. thought he was writing for
a majority of the Court and that some members defected at the last moment
..." Footnotes omitted]

3u~upra
note 1 O3 at 40.
"%ee also R v. Hu?~iùl~
[1993] 1 S.C.R.867, 19 C.R. (4th) 169,79 C.C.C. (3d)

97.
386~upra
note 382 at 229.

behaviour is still measured against the standard of the reasonable person, but the reasonable
person is constnicted to account for the accused's particular capacities and resulting inability
to perceive and address certain ~ i s k s . " ~ ~
McLachlin J. rejected the minority position outright ln so doing, she did a victim
analysis of the required symmetry between fault and consequences through the application
of the ''thia skuli" d e which 'kquires aggressors, once embarked on their dangerous course
of conduct which may foreseeability injure others, to take responsibility for all the
consequences that ensue, even to deatt~"~"
As well, she applied a victim analysis to the
ordinary person test concluding:

In summary, I c m find no support in criminal theory for the
conclusion that protection of the morally innocent requires a generai
consideration of individual excusing conditions. The principle cornes into
play only at the point where the person is s h o w to lack the capacity to
appreciate the nature and quality or the consequences of his or her acts.
Apart fiom this, we are dl, rich and poor, wise and naive, held to the
minimum standards of conduct prescribed by the criminai law.'"

'%id. at 23 1. The Chief Justice relied on the liberal writings of H.L.A. Hart and
Don Stuart (at 229) in justwing his position.
388fiid
at 204-205. Grant, supra note 238 argues at 209 that the Creighton decision
represents a movement away fiom liberaikm in substantive criminal law: "In general we are
witnessing a move away fiom a focus on individual fault towards more concem with the
hamiful consequences of crime. This may be a h c t i o n of a broader trend withui the Court
witnessed over the past decade in constitutional law and only recently in criminal law: a shift
away fiom a liberal conception of the state." See also Patrick Healy "The Creighton Quartet:
Enigma Variations In A Lower Key" (1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 265: "As for the fïrst point, these
cases mark a hi& point in the c o u . trend toward restriction of substantive review of the
criminal law."

3S9Supranote 382 at 2 11-212. This position was criticized by Don Stuart in
"Continuing Inconsistency But Also Now Insensitivity That Won't Work" (1993) 23 C.R.
(4th) 240.

Despite their ciifferences, both the majority and minority decisions agree that manslaughter

is not a crime of stigma necessitating a subjective standard of fault?
The Creighton

established that the objective standard of fault is alive and

Arguably, this represents a retreat nom the judicial activism seen in such cases as
Vadiancouri. M a e a u , and Logan where a subjective anaiysis of fault govemed the
outcorne. One author notes that this retreat is reflective of a new policy k i n g pumed by the
Court:

3g0Zbid
at 200-202(reasons of McLachlin J.); at 224-225 (reasons of Lamer C.J.C.).

However, the Chief Justice (at 227) found that the stigma attached to the offence of
manslaughter requires, at a minimum,objective foreseeability of the risk of death in order
to satisq S. 7 of the Churter.
Creighton, supra note 382 (unlawful act manslaughter); R. v. NagIik, [1993] 3
S.C.R.122(fdure to provide necessaries of life); R v. Finlay, [1993] 3 S.C.R 103 (mreless
storage of a f i r e m ) ; and R v. Gosset, [1993] 3 S.C.R.76 (unlawfùl act manslaughter). Of
significance to this thesis is the fact that the Court, applying the stigrna benchmark, held that
none of these crimes merited a subjective standard of fault.
39 I

3'?See Bruce P. Archibald "Fauit, Penalty and Proportionality:Comecting Sentencing
to Subjective and Objective Standards of Criminal Liability (with Ruminations on
Restorative Justice) (1998) 40 C.L.Q.263 at 278 where he writes:
The Supreme Court of Canada has been concemed, particularly in the light
of the concept of "principles of fundamental justice" in Charter s.7, not to
countenance the imposition of criminai liability on the "morally innocent".
However, the court no longer equates the moral imposition of criminal
sanctions with subjective fault in al1 circumstances. Those who fail to
comply with the behavioural standards of the reasonable person, at l e s t in so
far as they depart fiom such standards to the extent of a marked and
substantial degree, are now thought worthy of criminal punishment. It is now
deemed moral to punish the grossly negligent. ... Subjective fault is
constitutionally required for murder, attempt murder, theft and other
unspecified offences of high penalty and stigma But Parliament may
constitutiodly adopt mixedfault and objective fadt standardsin other areas,
within the outer limits of the prohibited combination of absolute Liability and
impnsonment.
Footnotes omitted]

In Reference re S. 94(2) ofthe Motor VehicieAct (British Colornbia) and R
v. VailZancourt, fbelled by a purposive approach to interpretation of the
Chmter, a majority held that S. 7 implied a broad jurisdiction for reform of
the criminal law. Since then the court has unanimously resiled fiom this
view. A new majority has assertetdm even narrower view of ifsjurisdiction
under S. 7, based in part on o desire to show greater deference to the
legislatwe and settZedjzuispmdence, and in part on a belief that the purposes
of the Charter have to be interpreted fiexibly by the court with regard to the
specific legal context and questions of poiicy put in issue before it. ... In
short, the path fiom VaiiZmcourtto the current position is a paîh in retreat?"
[Emphasis added] pootnotes omitted]
Whereas the Creighton majority position on the constitutionality of the mens rea for

unlawful act manslaughter appears to be based on the histoncal longevity of the offence as
definec% a similar argument was not persuasive when the Court found the constructive
murder provisions of the Criminal Code to be uncon~tihrtional.'~' The tide was tuming in

393~ealy,
supra note 388 at 266.

3%pra note 382 at 200. Justice McLachlin writes: "We are here concemed with a
common law offence Wtually as old as our system of criminal law."
"%ee VuiiZuncourt,supra note 100 at 320 where Lamer L observed: "Although the
concept of felony murder has a long history at cornmon law, a bnef review of the historical
development of S. 213 indicates that its legitimacy is questionable." The majority, led by
Lamer J., struck down that portion of the constructive murder Criminal Code provisions
which attnbuted criminal responsibility to an accused who caused the victim's death while
committing or attempting to commit one of the enumerated offences and used a weapon or
carried a weapon on his person. See also Alan Gold "Constructive Manslaughter Shodd Not
Have Survived" (1993) 23 C.R (4th) 262. The author maintained (at 262);
The judgment of McLachh J. ... is based almost entirely upon a historical
argument, revisited in various f o m but al1the same argument at bottom, that
''the offence of dawfùl act manslaughter, as d e h e d by our courts and t'ose
in other jurisdictions for many centuries, is entirely consistent with the
principles of funciamentaljustice." What is troubling about this judgment is
that almost every word of it could have been written about the felony-murder
mie and used to j u s t e the continuation of that doctrine of constructive
liability."
[Emphasis in the original]

favour of stabiiïty in the legal system and against ongoing social refom through judicial
decision-making?%

The Charter had been in effect approximately 11 years when Creighton was decided.
Over the course of those 11 years the Supreme Court of Canada initially had articulated a
burgeoning subjective approach to legd guilt reflected in its statutory and constitutional
analysis of the requisite mental element for murder and attempted murder, in it's partial
subjectifkation of the reasonable person test in the provocation defence to murder, and in
its characterization of the state as a negative entity at Ieast in the area of criminal Iaw. By
irnbuing the State with a negative persona, the Court constructed a justificatory premise for

its subjective approach to matters affecthg the determination of criminal liability in an
adversaid " State v. Individual" scenario. In so doing, the Court continued to shed its preCharter attitude of legislative deference in favour of a more activist approach to its
adjudicative bction.

The Creighton decision marked a shift in the balance with

repercussions for the subjectivistapproach to criminal liability. In Saulr Ste. Marie the Court

had rejected negligence as a basis for criminal liability; in Creighton the marked-departurefiom-the-nom standard underpinning penai negligence "partiy reconcile[d] the recently

'%Asimilar approach favouring stability in the law was aaiculated in Hibbert. supra
note 241 at 156 where Lamer C.J.C.for the majority stated:
Since the sole aspect of S. 21 left with the jury in the appeilant's triai was S.
2 1(l)(b), the analysis could strictly speaking, be restricted to that subsection.
...In my view. in order to avoid creating undue conMion and uncertointy in
the l m , it is appropriate tkzt we adress the issue on the continued validity

of Paquette 's statements on the relation between duress and mens rea under
21('2) head on. I will thus extend my analysis beyonù what is sîrictly
necessaryfor the resolution of the present appeal by, cortsidering S. 21 (2) in
addition to S. 21(1)0.
[Emphasis added]

S.

neglected dicta in Smit Ste. Mmie

...that a negiigent person is innocent in the eyes of the

criminad law ..."3"
The Creighton decision represents the other side of liberal thought-the individual,
provided he or she is not mentally incapacitated-is responsible for the harm he or she does
to another person. It is not a matter of the Court protecting one set of interests or values at
the expense of another, but of fincihg the balance between the two in the context of the

particular crime. "The criminal law must reflect not only the concems of the accused, but the
concems of the victim and, where the victim is kiiled, the concems of society for the victim's
fate. Both go into the eq~ation.'"~'

W.R v. Daviauik The Charter and the Adjudicative Function at Common Law
Reformdating comrnon law d e s in the post-Charter context underscores the impact

of Charter values upon the law's evolution. For example, in the sexual assault case of R
v. ~ m i a u l the
t ~ common
~
law principle limiting the defence of intoxication to crimes of

specific intent was re-examined under the auspices of the Charter and the Court's reasoning
in Vailhcourt.

397ChmterJustice, supra note 1O at 80.
3ggSupra
note 382 at 207-208.

'*[1994] 3 S.C.R.63, 93 C.C.C. (3d) 21,33 C.R.(4th) 165 [hereinaiter DmiauIt
cited to CR.]. Although he would have taken the majority position in Daviauit even M e r ,
Chief Justice Lamer (at 176) agreed with Cory J.'s position on the law and supported the
creation of an exception to the L e m d e that self-induced intoxication c m not be used as
a defence to a gened intent offence. He finther agreed that the accuseci's appeal fiom
conviction should be ailowed and a new trial ordered.

Cory J. for the majority adopted the approach to common iaw principles that offend
the C h e r articulated by Lamer C.J.C.in Swain:
In R v. Swain, [l W l ] 1 S.C.R.933, Lamer C.J.C. ...wrote on this issue. At
p. 978 he stated:
Before tuming to S. 1, however, I wish to point out that
because this appeal involves a Chmler challenge to a
common law, judge-made d e , the Chmter analysis involves
somewhat different considerations than would apply to a
challenge to a legislative provision. For example, having
found that the existing common law d e limits an accused's
rights under S. 7 of the Charter, it may not be strictly
necessary to go on to consider the application of S. 1. HaWig
corne to the conclusion that the common law d e enunciated
by the Ontario Court of Appeal lirnits an accused's right to
liberty in a manner which does not accord with the principles
of fundamentaljustice, it could, in my view, be appropriate to
consider at this stage whether an alternative common law ruie
could be fashioned which would not be contrary to the
principles of fundamental justice.
If a new comrnon law ruie could be enunciated which
would not interfere with an accused person's right to have
control over the conduct of his or her defence, 1 c m see no
conceptuai problem with the Court's simply enunciating such
a rule to take the place of the old d e , without considering
whether the old rule could nonetheless be upheld under S. 1 of
the Charter. Given that the common law rule was fashioned
by judges and not by Parliament or a legislahire, judicial
deference to elected bodies is not an issue. If it is possible to
reformulate a common law d e so that it will not conflict
with the principles of fiindamental justice, such a
reformdation shodd be undertaken.
This then is the approach that should be adopted when a common law
principle is found to hfkhge the Charter."

At issue was the cornmon law principle established in R v. ~eary*' that self-induced
intoxication couid not form the basis of an acquittal for a generai intent offence, even in the
case of extreme intoxication where a reasonable doubt exists as to the accused's capacity to
form the requisite intent for the crime deged. ''In such a situation, self-induced intoxication
is substituted for the mental element of the crime.'*<f- The Court had grappled with the issue
of a substituted mental element in VailZancourt and applied the same reasoning in Daviad:
m h e substituted mens rea nile has the effect of elirninating the minimal
mental element required for sexual assault. Furthermore, mens rea for a crime
is so well recognized that to eliminate that mentai element, an integrai part
of the crime, would be to deprive an accused of fiindamentaljustice. See R
v. VailZancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R.636.
h that same case it was found that S. I l(d) would be &ged
in
those situations where an accused could be convicted despite the existence
of reasonable doubt pertaining to one of the essential elements of the offence;
see VailZancourt, supra, at pp. 654-56. n u t would be the result ifthe Leary
rule wm to be strict& applieda3
[Emphasis added]

In canring out an exception to the Lemy principle, Cory J. was troubled by the d e ' s
indiscriminate application in light of other fiuidamental principles of criminal liability:
In my view, the strict application of the Leuv nile offends both ss. 7
and 1 l(d) of the Charter for a nurnber of reasons. The mental aspect of an
offence, or mens rea, has long been recognized as an integral part of crime.
The concept is fundamentai to our crllninal law. That element may be
minimal in general intent offences; nonetheless, it e ~ i s t s . ~

40'[1 9781 1 S.C.R 29'74 D.L.R. (3d) lO3,37 C.R.N.S.60 [hereinafter L e a y cited

to C.R.N.S.].
402~upra
note 399 at 187.

4031bidat 190.
404fiidat 189.

145
However, giving credenceto self-induced intoxicationasa defence to "general intent" crimes
such a s sexual assault was problematic. It appeared as if the accused was to be rewarded
both for his or her irresponsible drlliking and for any criminal acts which occurred while
under the influence of alcohol. Not a value choice widely endorsed in society.
The majonty Bench in Daviarlt was not blind to the downside of its decision
however tme to criminal principle it may have ben. Justice Cory was quick to observe that
"it is only those who can demonstrate that they were in such an extreme degree of
intoxicationthat they were in a state akin to automatism or insanity that might expect to raise
a reasonable doubt as to their ability to form the minimal elernent required for a general

intent o f f e n ~ e . 'He
~ ~added that "it will only be on rare occasions that evidence of such an
exireme state of intoxication can be advanced and perhaps only on still mer occasions is it
Iikely to succeed.'*

Almost as if in anticipation of public outrage at the decision, Cory J.

rounded out his comments by observing %at it is always open to Parliament to fashion a
remedy which wodd make it a crime to commit a prohibited act while dnink?'"

Which is

exactiy what Parliament did shortly thereafter.
Section 33.1"8 of the Code, captioned"Self-induced Intoxication", was Parliament's
response to the Daviault decision. That section States:

"'~nacted by An Act to amend the Criminal Code (self-inducedintoxication), S C .
1995, c. 32, S. 1.

(1)It is not a defence to aa offence refend to in subsection (3) that the
accused, by reason of self-induced intoxication, lacked the general intent or
the voluntariness required to commit the offence, where the accused departed
markedly
the standard of care as required in subsection (2).

(2)For the purposes of this section, a person departs markedly nom the
standard of reasonable care generally recognized in Canadian society and is
thereby criminally at fault where the person, while in a state of self-induced
intoxication that renders the person wware of, or incapable of consciously
controlling, their behaviour, voluntarily or involuntarily interferes or
threatens to interfere with the bodily integrity of another person.

(3)This section applies in respect of an offence under this Act or any other
Act of Parliament that includes as an element an assault or any other
interference or threat of interference by a person with the bodily integrïty of
another person.
Parliament exercised its criminai law power in the interest of the Canadian polity. This
legislative response sends the message that the bodily integrity of the individual t m p s even

fiindamental notions of criminal Iiability where a person, voluntarily consuming alcohol,
"departs markedly fiom the standard of reasonable care generally recognized in Canadian
society". Given the post-Creighlon timing of the Daviault decision and Parliament's
response thereto, a

"

marked departwe from the norrn" would appear to be a plausible

objective standard by which to measure the accused's level of intoxication.
Richard Wolson captures the social and legal ramifications of the pre- and postDaviault response, both judicial and legislative, to the defence of intoxication:

Ln the final analysis, it appears that the law of plea of intoxication has corne
full circle: the common law developed, over the course of 70years, ajudicial
response to a perceived social problem, namely, punishing those who
voluntarily become impaired and commit acts of violence against fellow
citizens. To maintain the common law, Courts needed to create the legal
fiction of the specific/general intent dichotomy. Intellechial honesty, in the
end, prevaiis, largely due to the expanding role of the Charter analysis. The
logic of the common law is then reconciled. However, the reconciliation is

done at the expense ofthe perceiveci social policy. One of the underpinnings
of the change in judicial opinion was the social science evidence that there
is no correlation between alcohol and violence. The public hue and cry,
informed, no doubt, by particular lobby groups, compelled Parliament to
enact legislation to take us back, more or less, to the siutus quo mte. Quaere
whether anythùig has changed?
A constitutional challenge has been launched against S. 33.1 in R. v. V i ~ k b e r gIt~ 'will
~ be

interesthg to see the Supreme Court of Canada's response to this challenge given its
invitation to Parliament in Daviaulr to develop a legislative response to its judgment.
Like Feeney, the Duviauftdecision is illustrative of the interplay between Parliament
and the Supreme Court of Canada in fashioning our criminal justice system by detennining
the underlying principles or values goveming the criminal process. Similarly, in

R v.

Seaboyer,"" the Supreme Court of Canada m c k down the then existing ccrape-shield"

provisions of the Criminal Code because of over breadth. Acknowledging that the Code
provisions aimed to balance the interests of complainants, McLachlin I., on behalf of the
majority which included Chief Justice Lamer, maintained that "the Courts must seek a

middle way that offers the maximum protection to the cornplainant compatible with the
maintenance of the accused's iündamental right to a fair triai.'"12 The blanket application

"(%ichard J. Wolson "Quelling The Spirits: The Evolution Of The Plea of
Intoxication" (Paperpresented to the National Criminal Law Program, University of Victoria,
Victona, British Columbia, July 1998) at Section 2.3, p. 8. pnpublished].
4'0[1 9981 B.C.J.1034.

"'

[1991] 2 S.C.R. 577,66 C.C.C. (3d) 321,7 C.R.(4th) 1 17 [hereinafler Seaboyer
cited to C.R.].

of the provisions in question served to exclude both irrelevant and relevant evidence thereby

increasing the possibility of a conviction of an innocent accused.
To summarize, S. 276 has the potential to exclude otherwise
admissible evidence which rnay in certain cases be relevant to the defence.
Such evidence is excluded absolutely, without any means of evaiuating
whether in the circumstances of the case the integrity of the trial process
would be better served by receiving it than by exclucihg it. Accepting that
the rejection of relevant evidence may sometimes be justified for policy
reasons, the fact mains that S. 276 may operate to exclude evidence where
the very policy which imbues the section-finding the tnah and arriving at the
correct verdict-suggests the evidence shouid be received. GNen the primacy
in our system of justice of the principle that the innocent should not be
convicted the right tu present one's case should not be curtailed in the
absence of an arsurunce ïhat the artailment is ciemly justifed by men
stTonger contrmy conriderations. What is required is a law which protects
thefindamental right to afuir trial while avoiding the illegitimute infrences
P o m other sexud conducl that the cornplainunt is more likei'y to have
consented to the act or less likely to be telling the truth4"
[Emphasis added]
Even though the majority in Seaboyer struck down then

S.

276 of the Code, it was not

oblivious to the legitimate goal of Parliament in enacting the legislation in the first place.

Nor were the old common law d e s goveming the admissibility of evidence of the
complainant's sexual conduct revived to fil1 the gap created by the unconstitutionality of the
impugned provision. "Like other common law d e s of evidence, they must be adapted to
conform to curent reality.... m h e reality in 1991 is that evidence of semai conduct and
reptation in itself cannot be regarded as logically probative of either the complainant's
credibility or con~ent.'"'~ Justice McLachlin held "that the old niles wbich permitted
evidence of sexual conduct and condoned invalid inférences fiom it solely for these purposes
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have no place in our law.'""

Although guidelines were proposed for the introduction and

use of sexual conduct evidence in the absence of both statutory and applicable common law
principles, the Court noted that "[sluch guidelines should be seen for what they arean
attempt to describe the consequences of the application of the generai d e s of evidence
governing relevance and the reception of e v i d e n c ~ n not
d asjudicial legislation cast in
stone."16 Parliament responded to Seaboyer by reenacting S. ~ 7 6 of
~ "the Criminal Code.
The constitutionality of the new provisions recently has been chalienged, unsuccessfully, in

R. v. ~ a r r a c h . ~ ' ~

This brief tour of the law of homicide, exclusive of the idanticide offence:Ig

is

meant to highlight the tensions that operate on the justices at the Supreme Court of Canada
in the exercise of their adjudicative fiuiction. Specifically considered was the approach

pursued by the Court in deciding issues of criminal liability in the law of homicide.
Questions arising during constitutional adjudication do not always involve judicial review
of impugned legislation. Statutory provisions otherwise within Parliament's legislative

4'8(1998),38 0.R (3d) 1, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 225, 13 C.R. (5th) 283 (0nt.C.A.)leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada grantecl June 4,1998 at [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 184.
"gThis offence is defined under S. 233 of the Criminal Code. For a detailed
of
review the offence see Grant, Chunn & Boyle, supra note 204 at 4-8 1 to 4-1 03.

cornpetence ofien are subjected to interpretivetechniqueswhich effectthe operational impact
of the provision. Such was the case in the Hill and Hibbert decisions. As well, common law
des-judicial creationsaiay be reformulated subject oniy to the discretion of the Court and
such doctrines as stare de~isis.4~~

""The Court's adherence to its previous decisions-stare decisis-was addressed in R
v. C h e [1990] 3 S.C.R. l303,62 C.C.C. (3d) 193,2 C.R. (4th) 1 bereinafter Chalk cited
to C.R.].There the Court considered, inter aliu, the meaning of the word 'kong" in then
S. 16(2) of the Criminal Code. The Court already had detennined the meaning of that word
in the 1977case of R. v. Schwurtz, [1977l 1 S.C.R.673. In Schwartz, a majority of the Court
held that the word ''wrong" meant contrary to law. Dickson J.'s dissenting opinion in
Schwartz-Laskin C.J.C.concinring-was revisited in Chaulk Lamer C.J-C., in ovemuning
the Schwartz niling to find that the word wrong meant morally wrong, stated (at 41-42):
With respect for contrary views, it is my opinion that Schwartz was wrongly
decided by this Court and that the dissenting opinion of Dickson I.
(concurred in by Laskin C.J.C.,Spence and Beetz, JJ.) is to be preferred. The
majority judgrnent fails, in my respecthl view, to appreciate the manner in
which insanity renders our nomal principles of criminal responsibility
inapplicable to an individuai as well as the particular objectivesof S. 16of the
Code.
I do noi dispute the principle that this Court should not e d y
overrule ifs prior judgments. In this regard I refr to the worh of Dichon
C.J.C., in which I conmred, in R. v. Bernard ...:
"Let me say immediately that, even if a case were wrongly
decided, certainty in the law remains an important
consideration. There must be compelling circumstances to
justify departure fiom a prior decision. On the other han& it
is clear that this Court may o v e d e its own decisions and
indeed, it has exercised that discretion on a number of
occasions."
In rny opinion, it is appropriate in this case to overtuie the majority
decision in Schwartz with respect to the meaning of the word "wrong" in S.
16(2). ... In my view, Schwartz had the effect of exponding the scope of
criminal responsibility unucceptably to include persons who, by reason of
disease of the mi& were incapable of knowing thot an act was wrong
according to the normal and reasonable standards of society even though
they were m a r e that the act wasformailj a crime. It is now necessaryfor
this Court to reconsider ifs decision in Schwurtz in order to redepne the
scope of criminal liability in a mmner thut will bring it into accordance with
the basic principles of our criminal l m .
pmphasis added]
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The case law analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 iliiuninates the subtleties of both
statutory interpretation and of reformulating the common law. More importantly, the case
law review reveais that the Supreme Court of Canada is more than a final arbiter of legal
disputes; it is also an arbiter of values, particularly when not in a confrontational position visa-vis Parliament through its criminal legislation.
DaviauIt, Seaboyer and Feeney are just three examples of the reciprocal impact of

developments in the common law and in statutory law. The Supreme Court of Canada has
been stnving to synchronize these developments through the articulation and application of

Charter values. The extent to which this is accomplished will determine not only the type
of criminal process in Canada, but also the stability of that process and the certainty of the
law therein. Values change; it is the fluidity of values in our heterogenous society which
may present the greatest challenge to the Supreme Court of Canada in facilitahg coherency

in both the written and the common law governing the criminal law process.

Coordination of the scope of criminal liability with basic principles of criminal law was used
non-adherence to a pervious decision.
to ju-

Chapter 4

Conciusion:
Makhg Sense of the Changing Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Post-Charter Criminal Law
In Chapter One the following question was posed: What are the operational limits
of the judicial fûnction in post-Chmter criminal law as revealed through an analysis o f case
law emanating fiom the Supreme Court of Canada, particuiarly, but not exclusively, in the
law o f homicide? Chief Justice Dickson posed a similar question in Hmison v. Carswell,

"' a pre-Charter case in which the Supreme Coint of Canada had to decide whether the
respondent picketer committed a trespass on the appellant's shopping centre property:
The submission that this Court shouid weigh and determine the
respective values to society of the right to property and the nght to picket
raises important and difficuit political and socio-economic issues, the
resolution o f which must, by their very nature, be arbitrary and embody
personal economic beliefs. It raises also@nàùmenral questionsas to the role
of this Court under the Canadian constitution. The duty of this Court, ar I
envisage it, is to proceed in the discharge of ifs a@udicativefunction in a
reusoned wayfiomprincipleddecision undestablished concepts. I do notfor
a moment doubt the power of the Court to act creatively-it has done so on
countless occasions; but manfestly one mtlrr mk-whut are the limits of the
judicial function
pmphasis added]
Speakhg for a majority o f the Court, Dickson C.LC. adopted a deferential position to the
impugned legislation creating the picketing offence. "If there is to be any change in this
statute law, if A is to be given the nght to enter and remain on the land of B against the will
of B, it would seem to me that such a change must be made by the enacting institution, the
"'[1976] 2 S.C.R 200,62D.L.R. (3d) 68,25 C.C.C. (2d) 186 [hereinafter cited to

S.C.R.].

Legislature, which is representative of the people and designed to manifest the political will,

~is deferential attîtude to legislative bodies was typical of preand not by the ~ o u r t . 'Th
Charter law in Canada More specifically, in the criminal con-

Dickson J. adopted the

same reasoning in the 1983 Fumant decision, a pre-Churter constructive murder case:
Section 2 13 embodies the concept that when a weapon is used in the course
of certain specified criminal acts and de& results, the accused is treated as
if the mens rea for murder existed and the homicide is murder. ...
It might be observed that the constructive murder d e has been the
subject of protracted criticism ... A kilhg in the course of the specified
offences may be murder even though the offender never intended that remit.
Ml that is required is the mens rea for the lesser offence ... In England the
Homicide Act, 1957 .. did away with the d e . The d e may seem horsh but
iî is noî thefunction of this court to consider the policy of legisation validly
enacted So long as the section continues in our Criminal Code if musi be
@en effect in accordonce with its t e r m ~ . ' * ~ ~
[Emphasis added]
The review of post-Chter developments in the law of homicide explored in Chapter 3
underscores the extent to which such an approach to the judicial function no longer is
sufficient. Again, the question must be asked: What are the operational limits of the judicial
function in Canadian criminal law in the latter 20th century? An important question, for the

criminal law reflects, in large m e m e , prevailhg community values. The extent of the
congruity says something about the confidence of society in both the criminaljustice system
and the judiciary who stand as guardians thereto.
Consistent with interpretive or middle-level theory, the actual practice of criminai law

has been the starting point of adysis. The adversarial nature of the Canadian legal system

4Ulbidat 219.
424S~pra
note 102 at 290-29 1.
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has been acknowledged a s have the challenges to the bipartite nature of the criminal triai.
However, whatever the criticisms about the b'underinclusiveness"of the adversarial system,
the fact is that a trial proceeds as an adversarial contest between the accused and the State.
This is the practical reality. Legal practitioners and acadernics ought not to loose sight of the

trial as a forum in which the State tests the accused's innocence. At common law, under the
Bill of Rights, and under the Charter, the presumption of innocence is paramount. A trial,
therefore, is not about the accwd proving his innocence-it is about the Crown proving the
allegation of wrongdoing according to law?

The law of homicide has been the primary,

albeit not the sole, focus of my anaiysis because death is the ultimate consequence of crime.
How the Supreme Court of Canada decides criminal liability in the hardest of cases, is

largely determinative of its overall approach to liability in the criminai justice system.
Given the influence of the Supreme Court of Canada, through its decision-making,

upon the criniinal law, an attempt has been made herein to highiight what may be considered
the major forces impacting upon the judicial h c t i o n at the Supreme Court of Canada level.

The wedth of criticism directed against our highest court, the apparent fluidity of the law,

and my concem as a criminal practitioner for the apparent instability in the legal system
prompted this modest investigation of thejudicial bction. Yet, the Court is an integral part

of Canadian political, social and legal life. The inevitability of social change in a multi-

"~everseonus provisions under the Code are an instance where the accused is called
upon to prove his innocence. However, as in Laba, these provisions in the post-Charter ent
are subject to strictjudicial scmtiny to ensure that they impair minimaily the presumption of
innocence.

cultural, stratified Canada, and the legal response thereto is not, as Gunter Teubner points

out, of the "stimulus-response" variety:

For the neo-evolutionists, legal autonomy means that law
changes in reaction only to its own impulses, for the legal
order-norms,
doctrines, institutions,
organhtiom-reproduces itself. But in so doing, the legal
system is not insulated fiom its environment. The key idea,
central to the neo-evolutionary theories, is the ''~e~reference
of legal structures." Legai structuresso conceivedreinterpret
themselves. but in the Zighl of extemal needs and demondr.
This means that extemal changes me neither ignored nor
directly refected according to a "stimulus-respomescheme. "
Rather, they are selectiveZyfiltered into legal structures and
adapted Ni accordance with a logic of normative
development. Even the strongest social pressures influence
legd development only insofar as they first shape "legal
constructions of social reality ." Thus, broader social
developments serve to "modulate" legal change as it obeys its
own developmental l o g i ~ ? ~ ~
Pmphasis added] [Footnotes omitted]
Coordinathg the mutual readjustment between society and the criminal law has been the task
for the Supreme Court of Canada in this unprecedented era of legal rights litigation. The

Lavallee case, for example, reveais the Court's attempt to anchor social reality in basic
criminal law principles. The question of criminal liability in the circumstances of that case
was tempered by social justice concems.

Liberal theory has played a dominant role in the adversarial legal tradition, but a
constrained role in pre-Chmter Canadian criminallaw where democratic values iaforming
the concept of parliamentary suprernacy were ascendant. However, in the post-Charter era,
the emphasis on individual rights often has been at the expense of State initiatives. The

426~upra
note 17 at 248-249.
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Supreme Court of Canada's portrayal of the State as a negative entity is a theme running
throughout the Chmrer case law on homicide. The Stillmm and Feeney decisions are
illutrative of this fact. As a adt,there is a fluctuatirtg reliance on either crime control or
due process values. In the case law analysed in this thesis, due process values appear to have
the upper hand.
Liberalism's championship of individualrights as againstthe Statealso has generated
a redefjinition of basic principles of criminal liability in constitutional adjudication. Most

sigiuficantly, the constructive murder provisions of the Code fell under the Charter's
hammer as a subjective analysis of the fault requirement for murder trumped legislative
prescriptions to the contrary. The unparalleled activism of the Supreme Court of Canada in
this area of homicide law occurred in the nrst decade following the Chmter's entrenchment.

The Court's record in civil liberties under the Bill of Rights had been unimpressive. The
same would not be said of the Court under the Charter where the advent of constitutional
supremacy liberated the Supreme Court of Canada fiom its histoncal obscurity.
Section 52 of the CorntifutionAct, 1982 has had a profound impact upon the judicial
h c t i o n . Before 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada operated in a political and legal regirne
where Parliamentary supremacy set the tone for judicial decision-making. Deference to
legislative bodies was the nom; flashes of judicial activism, as in the Drybones case, few.
Writing in the 1982Special Edition of the Supreme Court Law Review, Alan Gold explored

the potential impact of the Court's conservaiive past on the Charter's fuhue:
Unfominately, the judicial utilization of the Charter's provisions, so
optimistically contemplated by the Attorney General, has littk historicai
support. It is fair to Say that "[h]istoncally in Canada, to the extent that we

have relied on the judiciary as the instrument of definition and protection of
our civiI liberties we have not ... been well serveci," and this is true both
before and after the statutory enactment of the Conadicm Bill of Rights. ...
Even the famous decision in R v. Drybones. whose initial Iight dimmed so
swiftly, c m stiii evoke some pride in the decision itself, and regret and
disappointment only as to its judicial aftermath.

..-The importance of the fact of entrenchment for dtimate judicial
utilization cannot be overstated. The lack of entrenched character to the
Cunadian Bill of Rights has had a pervading innuence on judicial
hterprebtion throughout the Bill's case law. There was some slight
movement, at least in the eyes of Chief Justice Laskin, whose description of
the Cmadim Bill of Rights evolved fiom one of a mere "statutory
jurisdiction" to that of cbquasi-constitutionai"instrument. But essentidy, the
cases under the Canadan Bill of Righfs reflect an incessant gendection to
parliamentary supremacy, producing what has been called a "widespread
sense of illegitimacy" and an "explkit unwillingness" towards applying the
Cunadian Bill of Righl~.'~'
Expectations for the Supreme Court's performance were guarded. The Court's past
deference to Parliament had to be shed in the aew dawn of the Charter where the Court's
review fünction took on constitutional proportions.

The juxtaposed principles of constitutional and parliamentary supremacy have
provided the focal point for the restructunng of the judicial role. The CO-existenceof these
principles also has compelled the Court to grapple with its relationship with society at large.
Previously, the Court's impact on the Canadian polity was latent: for the most part, divisionof-powers cases did not have the immediate impact typical of Charter litigation. This
coupled with the Supreme Court of Canada's restrained application of the Bill of Rights
meant that its consciousness of social phenornenon was undeveloped. This would not do
today.

427~lan
D. Gold "Legal Rights" (1982) 4 S.C.L.R.107 at 107-108.
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In Chapter One 1 suggested that Guather Teubner's idea of reflexive law might
suggest a possible approach to the question of how the judiciary codd perceive itself in
reference to social phenornenon. Seen as a seKadjustiag institution, whose decisions reflect
a consciousness of the prevailing social values, the Court maintains its independence fkom
extra-legal influences. The question of the requisite mens rea for murder, for instance, saw
the triumph of a subjective approach to the question of crllninal Iiability. A person should

not be comrnitted of an offence he did not intend to commit. Moral blameworthiness
demanded subjective culpability. Yet,the apparent retreat in Creighton nom the subjective
approach shodd be seen not as a retreat, but as a Court re-baiancing the cornpethg interests
of complainants and accused persons against the background of prevailing societal n o m .
Chief Justice Dickson's endorsement in H ' of the objective standard in applying the
reasonable person test to the defence of provocation underscored the need for judicial
sensitivity to prevaiiing social attitudes: "It is society's concern that reasonable and nonviolent behaviour be encouraged that prompts the law to endone the objective standard. The
criminal law is concemed, among other things, with fixing standardsof human behavi~ur.'*~'

McLachlin I. in Creighton used the same reasoning, citing Dickson C.J.C. in Hill, to justify
the historieai objective test for determinhg the requisite mens rea for unlawful act
manslaughter-objective foreseeability of non-trivial bodily ha.r~n>*~
Chief Justice Lamer,

speaking in dissent in Creighton, conceded the objective standard although he would have
modified the common law test to objective foreseeability of death. In the final analysis,
428S~pra
note 330 at 108-109.

429Supranote 382 at 212-213.
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Lamer C.J.C.'s tenacious advocacy for the subjective standard of faut, had to concede to the
broader social and legal context.
Like any undertaking, time wili perfect the judicial process inaugurated by Charter
litigation. The Court is not immune fiom criticisrn. However, crïticism can be either
instructive or destructive. Much of what 1 have read in preparing this thesis has been of the
latter variety. Why is this so? During the Court's fïrst 100 years, legal literature attacking

its essence was sparse.

Today, the principles of judicial impartiality and judicial

independence are subjected to much scmthy, particularly in academic circles. Yet, these are
constitutional principles; they are part of the common core of values that inform both the
expectations of society and the judicial function. As such, they should be respected. Any
readjustment in their content will, as Gunther Teubner says of reflexive law, corne about

through an evolutionary, not a revolutionary, process.

This thesis attempts to meld the academic and the practicai by examining the impact
of legal theory and principle upon the judiciai function as revealed in the achial practice and
development of the criminal law. To do otherwise would yield an incomplete pichire of the

dynamics of the adjudicatory function. The Supreme Court of Canada is not only
expounding law, it is expounding values. Through its decision-making process, the Court

shapes the criminal process with repercussions for al1 involved. A rudimentary appreciation

of the Supreme Court of Canada's role in pre- and post-Charter Canada hopefully wil1
enlighten critique of the Court's role in the criminal justice system.
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